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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the strategic media practices of the ‘new nationalist’ 
political parties and social movements in contemporary Western Europe. It 
refers to an extensive literature, interviews and a review of media artefacts 
related to these political parties and social movements, to establish how they 
achieved substantial public support in the present era. It uses four case 
studies, being three political parties and one activist social movement: the 
French Front National (FN), the Flemish Vlaams Belang (VB), Danish Dansk 
Folkeparti (DF) and the Europeanist-regionalist social movement, Bloc 
Identitaire (BI).  
The thesis draws on the work of Cas Mudde, who defines the parties as 
authoritarian, nativist and populist – referred to as ANPs in this research.  It 
describes the central concern of the case study subjects with Islam in Europe, 
and their developing of the issue to gain support. In this monograph the broad 
issue, ‘Islam’, takes in mass immigration into Europe, integration or otherwise 
of Muslim populations, and the associated tensions. 
 
The research comes at a point when the party family is at a ‘tipping point’, with 
the growth of a political zeitgeist that is supportive of their broad thrust by an 
increasing number of voters in most of Europe, and this research considers the 
ANPs’ own efforts in the media field to be a contributing factor to the 
development of that zeitgeist.  
 
The research concludes that the ANPs have been successful in campaigning 
to substantially improve their political position, such that they may claim a 
legitimate place at the centre of political debate and decision making. They 
have jettisoned associations with fascism of the past, firstly as a necessary 
step to gain legitimacy, but also because they are within themselves amply 
attuned to the mores of contemporary democracy. The ANPs have generally 
adopted a degree of social liberalism, and put it forward as a counter to ‘Islam’. 
Yet, they can be seen as invoking a nostalgic interpretation of Europe from 
before the ‘post war’ era, with their rejection of mass immigration and 
‘Islamisation’ as the most demonstrative and intense expression of their vision.  
 
The core of the thesis is divided into these parts: a substantial literature review, 
a discussion section which includes a treatment of the case study subjects and 
a review of media artefacts, and a conclusion. The literature review is divided 
into two sections: the first deals with the ANPs and the themes they use in their 
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representation of Islam; the second deals with media theory relevant to the 
ANPs’ communication practices. The principal data collection took place during 
fieldwork in Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France over a period of one month 
in 2013. This data collection included the recording of 17 interviews. The 
interviewees were party and social movement spokespeople, specialist 
academics in the field, and European journalists with knowledge of the ANPs. 
The media review surveys 28 items of media ranging through feature articles 
and commentary, posters, tweets, news articles from the tabloid press, 
sympathetic online content and self-penned polemical blog posts by movement 
figures. These reviews are used to demonstrate the way the ANPs work media 
and enable the researcher to make inferences as to the character of political 
communication taking place. This analysis is integrated with the themes 
extracted in the literature review and the data collected on the field trip. The 
concluding section of the dissertation assesses the possibilities of furthering 
and consolidating the ANPs’ drive for greater legitimacy, integration into 
mainstream political life, and ultimately participation in the wielding of decision-
making political power.   
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Preface 
In 2011 the founder of the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party-DF), Pia 
Kjaersgaard, responded to Swedish criticism of Denmark’s restrictive new 
immigration laws with, "if they want to turn Stockholm, Gothenburg or Malmo 
into a Scandinavian Beirut, with clan wars, honour killings and gang rapes, let 
them do it. We can always put a barrier on the Oeresund Bridge [the bridge 
that links Denmark to Sweden]" (Elmas 2011). The utterance manages to 
criticise Muslim immigrants and relatively liberal Swedish immigration laws 
simultaneously. With conflict being a primary news value and the DF being a 
partner in the governing coalition it makes headlines. 
In the wake of the ‘Mohammed cartoons’ controversy (fierce and sometimes 
violent reactions by some Muslims to the satirical cartoons by the Danish 
newspaper, Jyllands Posten), the DF created an advertisement featuring a 
cartoon of Mohammed. It’s emblazoned with the text, “Free Speech is Danish, 
Censorship is not” (Rose 2007). 
In 2007 Filip Dewinter and Frank Van Hecke of Vlaams Belang (Flemish 
Interest – VB) are arrested at an anti-mosque demonstration. Images of their 
forceful arrest, and the female VB members in full face veils and t-shirts with a 
picture of a red slash through a cartoon mosque garner the media’s attention 
(Dirks 2007).  
Ann Sofie Dewinter, Filip Dewinter’s daughter, posed in a niqab whilst 
revealing a bikini laden body underneath the conservative Islamic garment. On 
the bikini tops “Freedom or Islam?” is boldly written. On her bikini bottoms, 
“You Choose?” (Whiteman 2012). This created the controversy it was meant 
to.  
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Fig 1. Jean Marie Le Pen - 'Non a L’Islamism' 
(http://www.france24.com/en/20110301-far-right-le-pen-back-court-inciting-
racial-hatred. First published 01.03.11 First accessed 10.10.12) 
In 2010 the daughter and successor of Jean Marie Le Pen (JMLP), Marine Le 
Pen (MLP), claims Muslims praying in Parisian streets are analogous to the 3rd 
Reich’s occupation of Paris. She subsequently loses her immunity from 
prosecution as a Member of European Parliament (MEP) (AP 2013). Her 
provocative claim makes headlines around the World.  
In 2004, Bloc Identitaire (BI), an ethno-regionalist (identifying regions as 
foundations for cultural and political community), activist organisation based in 
France, drawing heavily on the ideas of the French Nouvelle Droite (New 
Right), distributes soupes identitaires (identity soups). These are traditional 
French pork soups. BI’s expressed aim is to help the homeless ethnic French. 
Of course these soups break Muslim dietary codes. This leads to charges of 
racism and legal challenges. They argue there are Muslim specific welfare 
groups, so why not one for the ethnic French (BBC 2006a)? The issue is 
covered globally. 
In 2012 activists of the BI’s youth movement, Generation Identitaire (GI) 
illegally enter the mosque building site at Poitiers and unfurl a banner reading 
‘Generation 732 Referendum’. The location and date are significant as 732 is 
the year the Frankish King, Charles ‘The Hammer’ Martel, defeated a Moorish 
army; which some historians view as halting the spread of Islam further into 
France specifically and Europe generally. The referendum they called for was 
to halt mass immigration (France24 2012a). Their protest reaches a worldwide 
audience via web browsers, smart phones, radio, television stations and 
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newspapers.  
As solitary public utterances, provocations and acts of civil disobedience the 
aforementioned events are newsworthy enough, as conflict is a primary news 
value.  Conflict is highly attractive to news media content producers, as it has 
customarily been considered of importance to viewers. In the Western tradition 
of news journalism, the currently dominant strand of journalistic practice in the 
countries under examination, coverage of conflict is considered useful and 
socially responsible, and in demand by audiences (Alysen 2011, 37; Duffield 
and Cokley 2006, 7; Harris, Spark and Hodgson 1997, 5).   
The rise, acceptance and power of the ANP political parties and social 
movements (e.g. Bloc Identitaire, the English Defence League, Pegida) in 
much of Western Europe is important and worthy of media attention, as they 
are ‘mediated’ expressions of a highly significant development in contemporary 
Western European politics.  
In the last decade of the Second Millennium, and the earliest years of the 3rd, 
political parties that have raised concerns about non-European immigration, 
specifically Islamic immigration and extant Muslim populations in Europe, have 
made considerable gains (Mudde 2014a), and social movements focusing on 
the same issue have emerged. Though the popularity of the party family has 
fluctuated over time, dependent on national and international factors as well as 
the function or dysfunction of the party or social movement in question (Mudde 
2013a), they have become increasingly significant to the point of winning the 
most seats in European Parliament elections in the case of the DF and FN. 
Though their growth should not be considered universal. ANPs have not arisen 
to any great extent in Spain and Portugal. These countries have experienced a 
parlous economic situation. In this sense a dire economic circumstance will not 
inevitably lead to rise of politically significant. An understanding that relates 
purely to economic circumstances is not viable. The ANPs agency as political 
actors is significant. 
From being nationalist political outsiders in the 1980s that generally might win 
a few per cent of the vote in national or European elections, the ANPs now 
often join in government with centre-right parties, receive enough votes to be 
the third party or, at least form a very significant portion of the opposition. Most 
recently they have led public opinion polls for the preferred party in the case of 
the DF and the FN (Nardelli 2014; The_Local_Denmark 2014). 
The ANPs’ pressure has impacted on the platforms of the centre parties. 
Recent public utterances by centrist politicians, most notably German 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel’s comment that ‘multikulti’ in Germany had “utterly 
failed” (Siebold 2010), and the subsequent public concurrence of British and 
16 
 
French leaders at the time, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy,  would have 
been thought unconscionable a decade ago. In recent times criticism of 
immigration and Islamism have become key issues in Western European 
politics.  
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SECTION 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The Digital Crusades: The Media and Western European Nationalists is a 
qualitative study of the media strategies of Western European authoritarian 
nativist populist parties (ANPs) and related social movements, with a specific 
focus on four case study subjects and their media campaigns on the position of 
Islam in their respective nations and Europe: the French Front National (FN), 
the Flemish Vlaams Belang (VB), the Danish Dansk Folkeparti (DF) and the 
ethno-regionalist civilisationist social movement, the Bloc Identitaire (BI). 
The research is divided into seven sections.  The Introduction is followed by a 
statement of the research question. Next, the methods and methodology are 
discussed in advance of an extensive literature review. This review is divided 
into two parts. The first relies heavily on the work of Cas Mudde in defining the 
ANPs, whilst extracting key themes the ANPs utilise in their representation of 
Islam. The second part relates to the media aspects of the research, including 
Daniel Hallin’s 1986 theory on consensus, legitimate contest and deviance; 
Robert M. Entman’s work on framing; and selective consideration of official 
dominance and the different media types (e.g. ‘tabloid’ - popular, ‘broadsheet’ - 
quality). The discussion section analyzes select media content and examines it 
in accord with the research question while integrating pertinent data from the 
literature review, and the fieldwork (that is, observation and interviews). The 
final section of the thesis is the conclusion where the findings of the research 
are elucidated and topics worthy of further research are discussed. The 
conclusion outlines the development of a potentially successful media strategy 
in the contemporary political environment.  
There has been a great interest in the ANPs’ rise by political scientists due to 
the significance of the rise of the party family, and to a lesser extent the 
associated social movements. According to Mudde (2007) the research has 
heavily favoured demand side factors, that is the socio-political environment in 
which they operate, rather than supply side factors, that is those factors over 
which the case study subjects have agency, including their media strategy as it 
relates to their broader platform.  
This research assists in contributing to the body of knowledge on political 
communication in contemporary Western Europe, specifically on the and their 
strategic use of media. There is research into the media aspects of the ANPs’ 
such as the work of Mazzoleni (2003, 2008), and Ellinas (2008, 2009, 2010), 
though to the researcher’s knowledge there has been no book length 
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examination of the ANPs’ mediatisation of the issue of Islam in Europe as a 
key aspect of their strategy. The thesis also develops Hallin’s theory work 
specifically as it relates to the ANPs and Islam. 
Although the ANPs’ focus on mass immigration generally, their most intense, 
and apparently most contentious campaign relates to immigration by Muslims 
and extant Muslim populations that are perceived to be hostile, or at least tardy 
in their efforts to integrate, or assimilate into national, and broader European 
civilisation (Bosman and d'Haenens 2008; DerSpiegel 2010; Eric and Kees 
2006; Landman 2007) 
This research contends, that along with the interrelated issues of Eurosceptism 
and mass immigration into Western Europe, concerns over extant and Muslim 
immigrant populations have been pivotal for the party family and social 
movements in their media efforts, due to the salience of the issue and its ability 
to attract attention from the mainstream media, in conjunction with its ubiquity 
in the nativists’ own traditional and social media products. 
 
This research examines the case study subjects and the broader party family, 
and nativist populist Islamist-critical social movements, in what can be seen to 
be a ‘tipping point’ in their evolution (particularly the FN). At this point the ANPs 
are in a process of moving from generally being outsider parties and social 
movements to being in tune with the contemporary political zeitgeist, and 
through arousing consciousness in tensions over immigration, national state 
sovereignty and Islam in Europe, being partly responsible for creating that 
zeitgeist.  
Though the three parties and the social movement examined do have 
significant differences among their platforms, concern over Islamism amongst 
extant Muslim populations and Muslim immigrants draws their issues into a 
sharp, shared focus. For ANPs this threat to the ‘demographically challenged’ 
nations (Commission 2012) of Europe (those facing declining birth-rates and 
population), is a most visible and apparent concern; though according to them 
this has been enabled by political, academic, cultural and media elites, with 
perceived culturally hostile Muslim immigrants and extant Muslim populations 
simply taking advantage of a consensus developed among elites. 
For the ANPs Islam is viewed principally in a politico-legal sense rather than as 
a religious issue, though there is an understanding of the different strains of 
Islam by some of the ANPs – most basically at the level of moderate versus 
radical. The Western European ANPs tend not to be overtly religious (Mudde 
2007, 85), though there may be references to the Greco-Roman and Christian 
heritage of European civilisation.  As this thesis will discuss in certain instances 
19 
 
Muslims are considered and portrayed as victims of Islamism themselves. The 
ANPs describe the political expressions of Islam (defined as Islamism in this 
thesis), as mutually exclusive to secular post-Christian European, and 
specifically Western European norms. This difference is commonly defined by 
them as the separation of religion from the state, legal inequality of the status 
of women, mistreatment of homosexuals in some instances and the Second 
class (or worse) treatment of non-Muslims; and a perceived violence, 
criminality and rigidity intrinsic to Islamism and those Muslims who support 
Islamism (Fennema and Meindert 2003a; Landman 2007; Liang 2007; Malik 
2009; Mudde 2007). 
The ANPs tend to consider historical animosity between Europe and Islamic 
populations as enduring (Mudde 2007, 84). In line with Samuel Huntington’s 
Clash of Civilisations (Huntington 1996; Huntington 2007) thesis, and in the 
work of Aymeric Chauprade, the FN’s own principal authority on geopolitics 
(2014) the ANPs take a long view of history and tend to support the argument 
that the conflict between European and Islamic norms is an ongoing 
civilisational struggle, with the earlier Cold War with the Soviet Union and its 
proxies a relatively brief interlude. For the contemporary ANPs this largely 
supported ‘clash of civilisations’ is represented as religio-political, cultural and 
ethnic, rather than racial. 
 
Understanding there is an opportunity to gain votes (or influence in the case of 
the Bloc Identitaire – BI, and other social movements) from the public disquiet 
regarding the place of Islam in Western Europe, and the interrelated issues of 
mass immigration and multiculturalism, entrepreneurial politicians and party 
apparatuses have used the mass media, and their own media products (Ellinas 
2009, 2010; Mazzoleni 2003; Mudde 2007), to represent themselves as 
defenders of historical European populations (and sometimes assimilated 
settled immigrants) against a perceived and represented demographic, criminal 
and legal Jihad aimed at the heart of Western Civilisation. 
They frequently bind their criticism of Islamism with a strong affirmation that 
European nations are unwilling victims of multiculturalism, and the leftist, 
centrist and neoliberal proponents of the ideology. The idea that native 
Europeans are already, or soon will be ‘strangers in their own land’, due to 
their betrayal by ‘politically correct elites’ is a core message (Zaslove 2004); a 
position definitionally populist and nativist. 
Making the ANPs more palatable to publics via a process of modernisation and 
moderation has been crucial in establishing the parties as a viable alternative 
to the oscillating centre-right and centre left governments since World War II 
that have supported mass immigration and multiculturalism (explicit as in the 
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UK or implicit as in rigorously secular France) to varying degrees (Judt 2005). 
This modernisation and moderation has been perhaps the most significant 
‘supply side’ development in European post WWII nationalist politics. Unlike 
the Greek Chrysí Avgí (Golden Dawn), or the Hungarian Jobbik (The 
Movement for a Better Hungary), which stand apart from the broad 
contemporary Western European Islamist-critical ANPs that have distanced 
themselves from fascism.  
In utterances, aesthetics and platform this has been the core aspect of the 
process of modernisation and moderation, ‘dediabolisation’ in the FN’s 
parlance. However, there are associations between some of the ANPs and 
extremists in a historical sense. An essential part of the modernisation process 
has been the expulsion of fascist relics and a generalised rapprochement with 
the Jewish community and in some cases overt philo-Semiticism and philo-
Zionism, an assertion of democratic credentials in a populist vein, and an 
aversion to intervention in foreign wars. The ANPs also have moved to adopt 
and ‘nationalise’ liberal European norms (if in a somewhat muted way), for 
example the Danish People’s Party will claim that gay rights are an intrinsically 
Western phenomenon and acceptable in Danish culture (Edel 2010). 
As with all political actors there is both a ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ aspect to their 
level of support (Mudde 2007, 168). For the demand side there are concerns 
about Islamism, gender relations, demography, social fragmentation, loss of 
ethnic primacy, unemployment, workforce casualisation, export of jobs to 
countries with low conditions, sovereignty ceded to the European Union (EU) 
and concerns about globalising international institutions. For the supply side 
there is the moderation and modernisation of ANPs, with new media strategies 
critical in representing a form of nationalism palatable to a voting public deeply 
at odds with historical fascism. This coincides with the development of 
platforms designed to explicitly attract demographics that may feel alienated 
from the ‘New Left’ sociocultural politics expressed by the previously natural 
choice for native European working class voters, the social democrats (Abts 
2013; Espersen 2013a; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Camus 2013; Claeys 
2013; de Danne 2013; Goodliffe 2012; Vistisen 2013; Meret 2013). That the 
party family performs well with ex social democrat and communist voters is 
expressed in their platforms and media efforts, socio culturally nationalistic, 
and economically social democratic, with an emphasis on the welfare state (for 
natives and accepted immigrant groups) and economic intervention by the 
state. The ANPs are eager to present a non-racial approach to their nativism 
so as to deny attempts by political opponents and critics to associate them with 
Nazism. 
The mediatised aspects of the strategic, evolutionary moderation and 
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modernisation, and the emphasis on mass immigration and Islamism, along 
with their expression through traditional and social media are the focus of the 
research. This thesis is principally an investigation and analysis of the strategic 
media practices of the ANPs in general, and the case studies in particular. 
Though the elements are interdependent, the media strategy will be examined 
from four approaches: (i) a broad discussion of the relationship between the 
media and the ANPs, (ii) the ANPs’ engagement with the mainstream media, 
(iii) the ANPs’ media product including (iv) social media. 
ANP political parties and social movements are outsiders (or have been till 
very recently) for the most part (Mudde 2007; Mudde 2010; Pauwels 
2011a; Rydgren 2005). This notion of being distinct and separate from a 
‘remote elite’ is a definitional aspect of the populist ideology of which other 
components may be attached (e.g. socialism, nationalism, religious 
orientations). Their approach, should they reach a position of power will require 
a self-redefinition, as the party family cannot rail against itself if, and when, it 
becomes the political elite.  
Although certain broadsheet (quality) newspapers cover issues pertinent to the 
ANPs (Jyllands Posten’s Mohammed cartoons most famously), ANPs tend to 
be supported by native males from relatively challenged socio-economic 
groups (Meret 2013). Thus, tabloid media is more likely to reflect their platform 
(Ellinas 2008, 2009, 2010, 64; Mudde 2007, 249). Though not the only 
demographic that votes for them, the native working class and small business 
people are the most likely to support the party family (Abts 2013; de Danne 
2013; Meret 2013; Vistisen 2013). This serves the ANPs as the populist style 
lends itself well to tabloid news coverage. 
Gaining attention has been key to the ANPs’ quest for power, particularly 
during the ‘insurgent’ phase (Mazzoleni 2003, 10). This insurgent phase is the 
early period when they distinguish and define themselves so as to draw 
attention to themselves through bombast and provocation. As entrepreneurial 
political actors they’ve located a vacant political space (Ellinas 2010). This 
space has essentially been a qualified populist nativism designed to appeal to 
those who feel alienated from mainstream politics.  
The growth of the parties did not start to rise to a level generally threatening 
the ‘elite’ consensus till the 1990s when a convergence of issues arose, 
evolved and became increasingly salient: Islamism, mass immigration, 
sovereignty, economic decline, security, and welfare. The centrist parties at the 
time had broad agreement on key policies, multiculturalism, anti-racism, the 
benefits of immigration, the EU, a moderate approach to issues of crime and 
punishment and the process of globalisation. Though not directly related to the 
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research question, it is noteworthy the parties of the centre have tended to 
move towards positions of the ANPs in the hope of regaining lost ground 
(Ellinas 2010, 202). 
As these issues grew in electoral significance the centrist parties tended not to 
discuss them, or opposed those who were critical in a robust manner. This left 
a political space for the ANPs to occupy, and then with the mainstream moving 
towards them, they would validate their own positions, once taboo, or at least 
not discussed publicly (Ellinas 2010, 21).  It meant there was a convergence of 
alienated voters and a mainstream media eager to look for a party or 
movement to own the increasingly salient issues in a political scene becoming 
more thoroughly mediatised (Akkerman 2011; Ellinas 2010; Mudde 2007, 30). 
Capable, vocal leaders who engage in transgressive language and evocative 
deeds that are newsworthy, such as Pim Fortuyn (though an Islam-critical 
liberal/tarian populist, not an ANP party family member) and Marine Le Pen, 
proved ideal candidates to emerge into the apparent political space. To 
increase their influence they would need to adopt strategies to negotiate what 
was often perceived as a hostile media, most pointedly in the initial stages of 
their rise (2003, 10). 
Ellinas (2010) argues there are core factors essential to the growth of the party 
family. The first is salient un-‘owned’ issues (e.g. immigration, national identity, 
Islam, sovereignty, asylum, globalisation, law and order), and closeness 
between the platforms of the major parties. This opportunity structure became 
increasingly reductive as political cleavages altered: the right became 
increasingly concerned with neoliberal and globalist agendas as opposed to 
traditionalist conservatism, whilst the left increasingly focused on ‘New Left’ 
identity politics in lieu of class related issues. It produced a sense of 
abandonment principally amongst a segment of the native small business 
community and working class; the second factor was the relationship between 
the ANPs and the media.  
The mainstream media’s role as gatekeepers is essential to the ANPs as they 
can provide smaller parties the opportunity to communicate their platform to 
the wider publics when lacking in resources. Attracting attention while avoiding 
associations to historical fascisms, an anathema to the general voting public, 
was, and is, the ANPs’ crucial balancing act; a differentiation from the political 
mainstream without being perceived as extreme. 
To attract media attention the populist style of transgressive public utterances 
and an often emotive and combative leadership style is newsworthy as it 
principally relates to the news values of conflict, celebrity and novelty (Duffield 
2007a, 2007b; Duffield and Cokley 2006), in the insurgent phase of media 
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relations (Mazzoleni 2003, 10). This being the case the relationship between 
the mainstream press and the ANPs should be understood as reciprocal. The 
ANPs’ leadership style and transgressive platform attracts audiences, while the 
ANPs’ coverage gives them the opportunity to communicate with publics. In the 
insurgent phase nearly any publicity is good publicity (Camus 2013; Ellinas 
2010, 206; Mazzoleni 2003, 10).  
The capacity of the ANP leaders and spokespeople to negotiate the media is 
crucial. The rise of the FN is linked to JMLP’s appearance on French television 
at the behest of his political opponents, in order to divide conservative French 
politics. His performance was well received (Ellinas 2010, 177; Declair 1999, 
76). His daughter, articulate, highly intelligent and smoother in style, though 
capable of generating provocative headlines, has also proved a consummate 
performer and is a regular feature in the French media. MLP’s media 
performances and their capacity to provoke, interest, or appeal, but not to 
alienate or frighten strategic publics, is evidence that supply side elements are 
crucial in a party’s success, as opposed to purely sociologically structural 
factors. The appearance of the British National Party’s leader, Nick Griffin 
MEP, on the BBC’s question time, was a massive failure, and the party was 
soon replaced by the relatively palatable libertarian populist orientated United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). It was led by Nigel Farage, a skilled 
interviewee in the leadership role, adept at presenting himself as an 
‘everyman’. 
Strong feeling continues to exist within the ANPs that mainstream media 
interests are, or have been, hostile to them (Claeys 2013; Consoli 2013; de 
Danne 2013; Ellinas 2008; Espersen 2013a; Espersen 2013b; Meade 
2013; Mudde 2014b; Rydgren 2005; Vistisen 2013; van Walsum 2013). The 
accuracy of that perception is a question beyond the scope of this research, 
though the perception, if not the reality, ensured ANPs were ardent producers 
of their own media product and early adopters of social media. As political 
outsiders without established media that supported their positions (though 
tabloid style outlets have brought related issues into the public domain, e.g. 
Islamist terrorism, welfare fraud by non-natives, rates of crime, immigrant 
crime, ‘honour’ killings), ANPs have attempted to utilise their own media 
content as part of their outreach. They have sought to consolidate extant 
support by evolving communities of ideas that lead to members, votes and 
activists. The level of emphasis on self-publication may be dependent on the 
level of media isolation experienced by the party in earlier times. For example, 
the VB has been the most effectively isolated among the case studies, trapped 
within an organised Cordon Sanitaire against the nativist-secessionist party. 
This led them to be the party that invested most heavily in their own media 
production among all Flemish/Belgian parties expending some 80% of their 
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budget on media outreach, while the Belgian party average was 20% (Abts 
2013; Claeys 2013).  
The work of Hallin (1986, 116) as it relates to the treatment of controversial 
political topics by the news media provides a theoretical foundation to the 
thesis. His principal notion is that there are three incremental spaces 
(represented by concentric spheres) through which the media consider political 
issues: the spheres of consensus, legitimate controversy and deviancy. The 
interplay between the media and the ANPs as they frame and counter frame 
their positions provides a pertinent theoretical foundation for understanding the 
ANPs’ attempts to enter the sphere of legitimate controversy and ultimately 
position themselves and their platforms as consensus - the new norm. It’s 
conducive to understanding the importance of modernisation and moderation 
in their efforts to be treated as ‘normal’ by media professionals, and as such 
covered with the professional approach including balance and fairness, which 
Hallin argues is not the case for journalistic subjects considered deviant. 
The consideration of the framing, particularly in accordance with Hallin’s 
spheres, as it relates to journalistic issues and the ANPs themselves, will draw 
on the work of Entman (1993, 2007) and Rydgren (2005). Framing, and 
specifically, master frames, are a useful theoretical tool for understanding the 
contest between the ANPs, their opponents and the journalists they tend to 
consider hostile. Key issues are framed in competing terms such as ‘fascism v. 
patriotism’; ‘national community vs. vibrant diversity’, ‘racism vs. native culture’, 
‘Western secularism vs. multiculturalism and its acceptance of Islamism’. The 
key issue for the ANPs is that they frame their issues so as to avoid being 
considered deviant, extremist and anti-democratic; but rather authentic, 
representatives of the silent majority, and democratic political actors 
representing ‘the people’ against remote elites.  
In the insurgent phase the ANPs may be even more removed from mainstream 
sympathies than the parties and movements of the relatively activist left 
(Occupy for example) as there are few news vectors equivalent to The 
Guardian, Liberation, Politiken or the Huffington Post  (helpful to liberal groups) 
that are editorially congruent with the ANPs’ platforms; with the rare exception 
of a commentator like Peter Hitchens of the Mail on Sunday, Ed West formerly 
of The Telegraph, or the French journalist, Eric Zemmour who is a 
Bonapartiste conservative. This is where the use of social media, Twitter, 
Facebook and websites such as the popular fdsouche.com serve the function 
of creating communities of ideas, offering nativist frames in their news, and 
reporting news specifically of interest to strategic populations critical of 
Islamism and mass immigration (e.g. news around immigrant crime, Islamism 
in prisons, terrorism). Alexa ranked fdsouche.com the 561st most popular site 
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in France with the Communist orientated L’Humanite coming in at 1509th, the 
centre left liberation.fr at 97th, with Le Monde’s site at 18th and La Figaro’s at 
19th as of 11.11.14). 
The thesis will involve a considered, in depth literature review, which defines 
the ANPs in general and the case study subjects (which may be referred to as 
the ‘case studies’) in particular so as to understand their evolution, platform 
and tone and how this relates to their media approach from a strategic 
perspective. This will focus on their breakthrough issues as means to transition 
into the mainstream media: mass immigration and Islamism in Europe, and the 
interrelated issues of national sovereignty, security, demography and the 
coverage of conflicts between strains of Islam that are divergent, and 
sometimes in conflict with contemporary Western European norms. 
The essential topic underlying this investigation is about how the ANPs have 
utilised a media strategy to assist in their political (and meta political) goals. 
This requires an array of approaches, including a review of the media artefacts, 
to provide insight into the broader considerations of the ANPs’ strategy. 
 
1.2 Contribution to Scholarship 
There has been a plethora of academic work on the growth of nativist populist 
groupings in Western Europe that this thesis refers to as the ANPs, and that 
others have described as the far right, nationalists, national conservatives, 
radical right populists and post-fascists. Such research has largely focused on 
domestic politics, macro-level demand side issues, electoral and voter 
characteristics, with an overrepresentation of the work focused on Germany 
and France (Mudde 2010). This work specifically focuses on internal supply 
side factors that interact with external supply side, and demand side factors as 
defined by Mudde (2007, 297), with internal supply side factors being ideology, 
leadership and organisation. Essentially it concerns those areas the party has 
direct agency over. 
There is a substantial gap in the research on the internal supply side factors, 
as if the ANPs’ rise was solely the product of socio-economic factors making 
their growth inevitable, having little to do with their own efforts, and the efforts 
of media gatekeepers who interact with them as a key element in the mix. This 
research aims to fill in a specific gap in the internal supply side issues, seen as 
determining the ANPs’ strategic communications as they relate to Islamism. It 
sets out to do this by studying the initiatives of the party family itself. This will 
be a way to understand the ANPs’ efforts in the media field, with their utilisation 
of the issue of Islam in Europe, and the related topics. These will be seen, in 
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turn, as a means of breaking into mainstream politics, and achieving electoral 
success in due course, or consciousness raising as in the case with the activist 
social movement, Bloc Identitaire (BI). There is a dearth of English language 
research that focuses specifically on the relationship between the ANPs and 
established media, and their own efforts at production and dissemination via 
traditional and new media. This absence is even more pronounced when 
looking at research that utilises interviews and observation with the ANPs, 
journalists, and relevant scholars in the field. 
There is some consideration of the relationship between the media and the 
ANPs by Mudde (2007) when discussing the broader relevance of party media 
activity and its impact on the ANPs’ electoral success. Norris (Norris 
2005; Norris and Lovenduski 2004), has discussed the impact of the media in 
relation to contemporary nationalist parties’ political communications at a 
macro-level, whilst Mazzoleni (2003, 2008) has written on the relationship 
between the media and neopopulism, arguing the leadership style of the 
populists is well suited to attracting media attention, and serves as “free 
advertising” (Mazzoleni 2003, 15), whilst the response from the mainstream 
media is dependent on the orientation of the news organisation and how 
deeply they are engaged in supporting or expressing hostility towards the 
parties currently in power.  
Ellinas’s The Media and the Far Right in Western Europe: Playing the 
Nationalist Card (2010) is perhaps closest to the subject researched in The 
Digital Crusades. Ellinas argues the initial stage of the ANPs’ growth is 
dependent on two factors. The first one is the political opportunity structure, 
particularly the closeness between the established centre conservative and 
social democrat parties, in accord with the work of Kitschelt and McGann 
(1997), and the second is media coverage. Entrepreneurial ANPs need to take 
advantage of both in the breakthrough or insurgent phase. His focus is on 
national identity issues, and has no specific interest in the issue of Islam (a 
civilisational and national concern for the ANPs) or mass immigration as such, 
nor the way the ANPs specifically relate to the mainstream media, or create 
their own in order to improve their prospects. His case studies are substantially 
different from The Digital Crusades, as they do not specifically relate to the 
perceived conflict between Islam and the West either in national terms or as a 
broader civilisational struggle played out within the boundaries of states. Those 
case studies investigate and analyse the controversy over Slavic Macedonia’s 
use of the flag of Hellenic Macedonia (Alexander of Macedon’s flag), and 
Austria’s and Germany’s Word War II (WWII) legacy. 
This research will consider the strategic media approach of the ANPs as a 
group, and as parties and a social movement, all broadly in agreement that 
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Islamism presents a real and enduring threat. They offer themselves as the 
most capable political actors against any threat of Islamism to Europe and its 
constituent nations. It is a threat the ANPs see as being actualised by non-
assimilating Muslims in Europe and would-be Islamist immigrants, represented 
as eager to enjoy the wealth, and welfare, of Europe, but intrinsically hostile to 
its historical peoples and civilisation. This being the case, the research 
question needed to be formed so as to be flexible enough to include the ANPs’ 
expansive broad thrust on the issue of Islam in Europe, while directing the 
research into areas of pertinent and exemplary media content. 
 
SECTION 2: Research Question 
 
The research question identifies the ANPs considering their main demographic 
and ideological supports, antecedents, adaptation to contemporary norms, and 
their place in current politics. This work is interested in the role of media in this 
situation, because the option of media use is very commonly employed as a 
tool in all branches of political activity, including movement politics. The ANPs’ 
efforts in their media strategy are the core, as represented in the formulation of 
the research question:   
How have the ANPs generally, and the case study subjects specifically, 
developed their media strategy so as to most likely achieve significant 
levels of electoral success for the party family and support for 
associated social movements? 
The focus of this thesis is the development of the issue of Islam in Europe as 
the ANPs’ major focus, in conjunction with a conscious disassociation from 
extreme nationalism, the ANPs’ greatest liability. One they are eager to lose 
and their political opponents are eager to magnify.  
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SECTION 3: Methodology 
The research question is framed by qualitative and interpretive research, with 
the dissertation a study in the field of political communication with an emphasis 
on the media strategy of the ANPs generally and the case study subjects 
specifically.  
The subject of the research, the ANPs’ media strategy with a specific reference 
to their creation of campaigns around Islam in Western Europe, is complex and 
dynamic. The project has undergone significant shifts in the approximately six 
years the researcher has been rigorously following its evolution. The 
complexity of the issue demands the adoption of interdisciplinary methods to 
develop a full thesis with theoretical foundations of appropriate applicability and 
depth. 
Qualitative research has been described as a specific approach enabling the 
exploration or understanding of the meanings that individuals or groups ascribe 
to social or human problems. That being the case the research requires 
interpretation by the researcher. This style of research favours the ability to 
draw out and elucidate the complexity of a situation (Stake 1994). According to 
Crotty (1998) interpretive research can be criticised on the grounds of the 
unreliability of the data, the inability to reproduce research and the heavy 
reliance that the research has on interpretation. This is counterbalanced by the 
limits to depth, detail and interrelatedness that can be achieved when 
researching an issue as dynamic and complex as the one at hand, when using 
a quantitative approach (Crotty 1998). This is not to suggest that quantitative 
data cannot be used to supplement such research, as is the case in this thesis 
with electoral results, number of views and similar metrics. 
Qualitative research does not aim for the contested objectivity of the scientific 
method; rather it looks for a degree of flexibility, depth and tailoring of methods 
in order to best answer the research question. The inherent subjectivity in 
qualitative interpretive research is not seen as a fatal flaw, instead it is 
understood that the researcher must understand their position in relation to the 
subject matter and be self-aware, and cognisant of their inevitable impact on 
the research.  
The researcher considered his personal impact during both data collection and 
interpretation standards and practices that are in accord with conventions of 
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scholarship, e.g. objectivity or a thorough-going transparency, consistent 
reasoning, a consciously ethical approach toward establishing facts. The 
research will be viewed and developed through Mudde’s 
(2004; 2007; 2009, 2010; 2014b; 2013b) work on authoritarian nativist 
populism, Hallin’s (1986) work on spheres of deviance, legitimate debate and 
consensus where pertinent, Entman’s (D'Angelo 2002; Entman 1993, 2007) 
theories of framing,  Mazzoleni’s (Mazzoleni 2003, 2008) and Ellinas’s (2010) 
work on the media-assisted rise of populists, and scholarly work on journalism.  
 
3.2 Methods 
The research is not an empirical study of the agenda setting power of the 
media, it is assumed the nativist populists generally, and the case studies 
themselves in particular consider that media exposure, and production in the 
traditional and specifically web enabled media fields, are essential to their 
growth and maintenance (Ellinas 2008; Mazzoleni 2003, 2008; Mudde 2007).  
 
3.2.1 Case Studies 
Within the field of interpretive research the work will primarily take a case study 
approach. According to Stake (2006) case studies are a strategy of inquiry in 
which the researcher explores in depth a process or event. Case studies are 
limited by time and researchers collect detailed information on the subject of 
research using varied data collection procedures. Case studies have been 
chosen in this instance as they serve as ideal research strategies in 
comparative studies, and allow the themes extracted during the initial 
document review (which have been considered fully in the literature section of 
this document). 
Case studies have been used in a variety of disciplines, and are recognised as 
an "intensive and detailed study of one individual or group as an entity, through 
observation, self-reports, and other means" (Stake 1994).  The advantages of 
case studies are their flexibility, and potential for depth – which proves ideal for 
a multi-faceted, dynamic subject such as the research undertaken. They prove 
appropriate when integrating a number of qualitative research methods.  
Case studies are of three different, overlapping types (Stake 1994). The first is 
the intrinsic case, which the researcher undertakes to get a better 
understanding of a particular case, and does not necessarily involve theory 
building. The second type of case study is the instrumental case study, which 
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is designed to provide insight into an issue or redraw a generalisation. The 
third type of case study is the ‘multiple case study’. These are conducted in 
order to gain a better understanding of the research subject due to 
comparability and generalisation. It is evident that the research undertaken is a 
combination of all three of these as it contains elements of exploration, 
bounded and founded in developed theory, whilst using a comparative 
approach in order to make generalisations about the subject. 
According to Stake there are no rigid distinctions between aforementioned 
case study types which may fit into a multi-purpose zone, whereby there is a 
process of detailed investigation that might include an examination of 
applicability of a said theory in that particular instance (e.g. Mudde’s definition 
of the ANPs, Hallin’s spheres). Seawright and Gerring (2008) discuss choosing 
the appropriate case study with particular reference to political research. They 
describe both the pragmatic and theoretical aspects pertinent to case study 
selection. 
From a pragmatic perspective the four case study subjects were amongst the 
most forthcoming to be interviewed and discuss their approaches to media and 
related issues. The subjects of the four case studies had all developed 
considerable media presences, were engaged in public utterances and had 
numerous media engagements, had their own traditional media (e.g. 
newsletters) and had invested heavily in Web 2.0 methods of communication.  
The most readily apparent problem was language. This was managed by 
interviewee selection, not an issue in Denmark due to the ubiquity of English of 
high standard, but more so in Flanders and France. The interviewees with the 
exception of Fabrice Robert and Georges Gourdin of the BI had an excellent 
grasp of English. The BI was able to provide me with an interpreter for the 
interview with Robert and Gourdin. The researcher has a rudimentary 
understanding of French and the principal supervisor, Dr. Duffield, is a 
Francophone and was able to assist in translation. Language issues related to 
the review of documents and media review will be discussed imminently. For 
the analysis the four case study subjects selected were appropriate to the 
goals of the research as they were publicly critical of Islamism in a pronounced 
and consistent manner.  
The English language option was the British National Party (BNP). The BNP 
was an unlikely possibility for the research as the most ideologically extreme 
case study, with a history imbued in neo-fascism; though the party leader, Nick 
Griffin, was engaged in promoting a process of modernisation.  The party was 
too internally chaotic and extreme in approach, and evidently in a period of 
terminal decline and fragmentation, so as to make research into it implausible. 
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The four subjects were chosen due to availability of access, and the criteria 
they filled, are detailed briefly here, and elucidated fully in the sections specific 
to them.  
The FN is the model ANP party and has moderated and reoriented significantly 
under the leadership of MLP. She has taken the party to be the most 
successful in terms of French seats in the 2014 European Parliament elections 
(Lichfield 2014). The FN has been in existence since 1972, and was founded 
by the leader’s father, JMLP. The party was host to an array of factions that 
included traditionalist Catholics, Europeanist new right intellectuals, and empire 
loyalists amongst an array of dissident nationalist groupings. Under the 
leadership of MLP the party has attempted to modernise, moderate and 
professionalise with the aim of becoming an increasingly mainstream and 
respectable patriotic, populist party that could form a government. 
The DF had direct impact on the relatively strict immigration policy of a 
coalition agreement it entered into with the liberal Venstre party and the centre 
right Det Konservative Folkeparti (Conservative People’s Party) under Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen. Of the case study subjects the DF is the most integrated 
into the mainstream on a national level.  
The VB is an enduring nativist-secessionist party (most similar to the northern 
Italian/Padanian Lega Nord) that has enjoyed strong support within Flanders 
itself, though it’s coming under pressure from the conservative-liberal 
nationalist party, the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New Flemish Alliance N-VA) 
(Fontanella-Khan 2012), led by the media capable Bart De Weever. The VB is 
perhaps the most isolated of the parties considered the application of a cordon 
sanitaire – a boycott on contact with the party by all those who would want it 
ostracised, including a boycott imposed by mainstream journalists. The VB is 
consciously provocative in their media strategy as outlined in the introduction. 
Along with the BI they are more prone to create street spectacles. 
The BI proved an interesting comparison, as they were once a minor political 
party who have since refrained from electoral politics to become an activist 
organisation with a strong emphasis on social media: a ‘nationalist 
Greenpeace’ in the words of president Fabrice Robert (2013). They are 
strategic provocateurs who concentrate on Web 2.0 campaigning and have 
been active in developing a number of interrelated themes focused on 
European, French and regional identities: the ‘grand replacement’ of native 
Europeans with immigrants, the rise of Islamism in Europe, and the loss of 
native ethnic primacies.  
The selection of the case study subjects provides the minimal shared criteria: 
they must be among the ANPs most publicly critical of Islam whilst adhering to 
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Mudde’s definition of nativist, populist and authoritarian (2007). The BI is a 
borderline case and it will be examined further in the discussion and review 
section. Within the case studies’ selection there are instances of enduring 
parties, the FN, VB, who’ve demonstrated moderation over time in their 
platform and media efforts. The DF has no historical association with fascism, 
and it has been rather constant in media tone, with most recently two leading 
party members and interviewees affirming a stronger line than the other two 
parties, suggesting there should be no further immigration into Denmark by 
Muslims (Reimann 2011).   
 
Figure 2 Integration of Case Study Methods 
 
The case studies consist of three interrelated areas of research: a broad 
consideration of the subjects’ media strategy including document review, semi-
structured interviews and journalistic observation, and a review of media with 
an examination of the approaches of the subjects, founded on understandings 
obtained from the literature review. These case studies focus on key aspects in 
the media strategy of the case study subjects as they relate to Islamism. The 
issues are drawn together in the discussion and review section, where media 
examples are quoted and described, and function as a starting point for 
examination in a media and document review. 
  
3.2.2 Media and Document Review 
A starting point for consideration of traditional and social media is an 
understanding of the four case study subjects’ own media products and 
outcomes of their communications to the public through the general media. 
Understanding of this is used by this research, as a way of comprehending the 
parties themselves. The media record, its products read at face value, as a 
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repository of clippings and other artefacts, is a fairly comprehensive, ongoing, 
publicly available documentation (Duffield 2009) of the ANP’s activities.  
In this thesis, the backbone of the work on discovery of the nature of media 
activity, and its importance to the ANP’s goals and viability is contained in 
Section 6 (Discussion). The preceding Section 5 (Literature Review: Media) 
introduces the ANP’s media operations and journalistic norms applied to 
evaluating the work of news media. Section 6 then consists of an examination 
of salient media examples; whether that be, for example, a website posting on 
a controversial street event, transcript of a published interview with a party 
leader, a leaflet that has publicised main grievances and brought on a 
prosecution, or a news feature on main developments in the ANP campaign by 
a professional writer in a ‘non-committal’ or mainstream newspaper.  
This examination of media by the researcher is interpretative. It is both a 
review of media, and discussion of the essential data and themes contained 
therein that will emerge from this research project overall – hence it is headed 
‘Media Review and Discussion’. It refers to the information and themes 
obtained from the literature review and the supporting interviews recorded in 
the field. As said, it makes reference to general mass media, and the ANP’s 
own media products, as publishers. In such a way, this interpretative work, in 
the process of reviewing individual media products, becomes the main artery of 
the research project, because in bringing together elements from these three 
areas, it distills them into a statement of the thesis, which follow, in the general 
Discussion, in Section 6, followed by the Conclusion in Section 7.    
Themes in the debate generated by and around the ANPs’ approach to the 
related issues of Islamism, and mass immigration have been drawn out by a 
review of media. To preempt the literature review and discussion and review 
section the themes are: a general criticism of Islamism as being foreign and 
mutually exclusive to European norms, concerns around full face covering by 
some Muslim women - the burqa and niqab, concerns over demographics and 
welfare, security, the formation of parallel Islamist communities, mosque 
construction, and concern over the halal rules governing food. These issues 
are broadly campaigned on as visible and commonplace expressions of Islam 
within the experience of prospective supporters. 
In accord with the work of Mazzoleni (2003, 2008) and Ellinas (2010) with 
specific reference to the growth of the nativist-populists and more generally 
with the work on initially marginal political parties and social movements; an 
initial insurgent phase can be identified in which they try to attract attention by 
developing an interdependent relationship with the media. In this, the 
provocative public utterances and spectacular acts related to salient issues, 
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which ANP groups commit while they have only a marginal political status, will 
get them attention, and so recognition in news media, for good or ill. The idea 
is that, with recognition, and especially with some electoral successes, a 
process of mainstreaming that will confer more credibility on their views will 
succeed such media exercises. It should be noted this does not have to follow 
a strictly linear pattern but may oscillate between insurgency and 
mainstreaming dependent on the context. For example media initiatives may 
be exaggerated in a period of decline for the party, or media work may become 
more muted once the party has moved into a place of legitimate controversy. 
The research utilises a cross section of media material for review that covers a 
wide range of political positions, in English language, or in translation from 
other languages, either translated via computer or by persons competent in the 
language concerned. This is not a conventional contents review but rather the 
consideration of media product as a ‘segue’ into the ANPs’ broader strategies. 
The particular method was devised after the preliminary review of media 
indicated there were ample, and diverse sources appropriate for the research 
purpose: to review and discuss issues that are exemplary of the interplay 
between the ANPs and the establishment media, and their self produced 
media content, and through that to see the development and prioritisation of 
issues to be forced into public debate, wherever possible, legitimised, and 
used to garner public acknowledgment, support and political power. The media 
articles chosen for review were primarily selected to effectively develop those 
issues raised in the literature review whilst being exemplary of different types 
of media content. This meant they needed to reflect the issues selected, be 
representative of the subject and of the media being discussed. That being the 
case, it was essential the media reviewed includes broadsheet (quality), tabloid 
(popular) and self produced media, pertinent to the particular issues under 
discussion. 
The content reviewed was selected from the following sources: 
 
i. High quality (based on establishment of facts, interpretative, widely 
esteemed publications) English language media published in the United 
Kingdom, including both daily news and magazine reviews. Titles for 
review include The Economist, The Guardian, and The Independent. 
The tabloid press is less consistent over time. They do, however, cover 
stories that may be particularly pertinent to an examination of the ANPs’ 
media campaigns, as their audiences tend to approximate the target 
audience of the ANPs, whilst covering issues that may cross over with 
the concerns of the ANPs.  
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ii. Within the countries under review, local English language publications 
are available, which largely serve the expatriate and business 
communities, whilst major outlets provide English language editions, 
which are archived and available (e.g. France24, The Local Denmark). 
iii. The translations of national content via Google Translate. This is not 
such a rigorous content review that it dwells on specific points of 
meaning in translation, but rather an examination of themes, which can 
be obtained reliably enough from an automated translation of this kind.  
iv. Lastly, an important source is the publications put out by the ANP 
organisations themselves. These are often designed to make points to a 
foreign audience and are frequently produced in English (e.g. VB’s The 
Flemish Republic). They can also be reviewed in person by the 
researcher in conversation with members of the organisations 
concerned, to obtain clarification on essential points they wanted made 
public. The self-produced media of the ANPs is essential to a complete 
understanding of their media campaigns, considering the parties are 
peripheral to the mainstream to varying degrees. It shows their view of 
their own mission and agenda, and provides a crucial window on their 
own approach, while demonstrating their strategic communications at 
work, at a level of detail. They provide information about the ANPs’ 
social/new media products as an aspect of their overall campaign – and 
how significant it is for their development in terms of effective political 
communication. 
 
3.2.3 Observation and Semi-structured Interviews 
A fieldwork component of data gathering was included in mid-2013. This was 
to reinforce the work on literature and the collection of material for analysis of 
media operations of the ANPs. It provided the possibility of checking and 
confirming information, to fill gaps in the narrative of developments and gain 
essential impressionistic inputs, and back grounding on the nature of the 
organisations and their participants. In the course of visits to four countries – 
Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium and France – to meet representatives of 
the case study organisations, two modes of operation were adopted: 
observation of the activities and conduct of the party members, and semi-
structured interviews to obtain informed opinion at first hand on main issues.  
 
The researcher in this case, carried out observations and wrote notes on 
actions encountered and comments made, relevant to the object of the inquiry. 
For example the DF conference offered the opportunity to meet party 
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participants and learn at first hand the views and attitudes informing their 
political actions, including their pronouncements through mass media.  
Several interviews were conducted, as detailed elsewhere in this work. The 
exercise drew on the observation that interviews are a highly economical and 
direct way of obtaining information, but a versatile form that includes the option 
of checking immediately on the meaning of statements, and pieces of 
information from outside the interview encounter, with the respondent. The 
interviews were semi-structured in the sense that a set of core questions was 
included in each one, to maximise the yield of information on points relevant to 
the research questions.   
While the case studies were found in Denmark, Belgium and France, the 
itinerary also included The Netherlands, as there the researcher had the 
opportunity to interview the editor of Volksrant (roughly equivalent to The Age, 
or Sydney Morning Herald, in public standing and editorial disposition), about 
the ANPs through a Dutch perspective, e.g. discussion about Pim Fortuyn, 
Geert Wilders, Islamism, immigration and the Dutch media response to the 
issues. Assoc. Prof. Jan Erk, a political sociologist and expert on the ANPs 
was also interviewed in The Netherlands. The fieldwork was principally timed 
to coincide with the annual conference of the Danish People’s Party in the 
regional town of Herning, on the island of Jutland, as the party extended an 
invitation to attend, offering observer status. The DF provided a seat at all 
sessions, two interviews with party identities and the opportunity, realised, of 
interviews with journalists as informants with specialist knowledge of the 
situation of ANPs, especially in Denmark.   
Obtaining access in this way provided a practical commencement date for a 
field trip. The rest of the itinerary would be constructed to follow. Prospective 
interviewees were approached directly by email, post or telephone, and given a 
time frame in which the researcher would be able to visit. This needed to be 
flexible to meet the availability of interlocutors, for example to meet a Member 
of the European Parliament when in Brussels, not at Strasbourg or in his 
constituency area. There were delays, some precautionary interrogations of 
the researcher, refusals and communication failures, none of which prevented 
the assembly of a full, sufficient and satisfactory schedule, especially for the 
limited time available, just under four weeks in Europe. One interview was 
conducted later on line.  
The brief details for the interviews are as follows: 
14.09.13 – Mr. Anders Vistisen, youth leader of the DF. Elected as an MEP in 
2014 
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15.09.13 - Mrs. Yvette Espersen, an English born marketing expert with a 
Jewish heritage and long time media advisor to the DF. Married to Mr. Soren 
Espersen. 
15.09.13 – Mr. Soren Espersen, former journalist, media advisor and deputy 
party leader and spokesperson for the DF. 
15.09.13 – Mr. Alexi Sokoler, journalist for the Jyllands Posten (the paper that 
published the Mohammed cartoons) 
15.09.13 – Ms. Tenna Petersen, journalist with the Jutland News Service 
 
In the Netherlands interviews consisted of: 
18.09.13 - Mr. Sander van Walsum, opinion editor of leading daily, De 
Volksrant 
19.09.13 - Ass. Prof Jan Erk of Leiden University 
 
In Belgium: 
21.9.13 – Mr. Geoff Meade, journalist for the Press Association covering EU 
affairs since 1979 
23.09.13 – Ass. Prof. Koenraad Abts of Leuven University 
24.09.13 - Mr. Philip Claeys MEP for Vlaams Belang 
25.09.13 - Mr. Ludovic de Danne, counsel to Marine Le Pen on International 
affairs 
26.09.13 – Mr. Lorenzo Consoli, former President of the International Press 
Association, EU/Brussels correspondent for TMNEWS 
 
In Paris, France: 
03.10.13 - Mr. Yves Le Jeune, media advisor for Bloc Identitaire and the editor 
of the website Novopress 
03.10.13 - Mr. Simon Charles, spokesperson for Bloc Identitaire, Ile de France 
(Paris region) 
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04.10.13 - Mr. Yves Camus, leading scholar on French nationalism with the 
Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques 
 
 In Nice, France: 
06.10.13 - Mr. Fabrice Robert, founder and president of Bloc Identitaire, Ms. 
Stephanie Vitalie and Mr. Georges Gourdin, representatives of Bloc Identitaire 
Online: 
 
05.04.14 - Ass. Pro. Cas Mudde  
The interview questions principally focused on the how the interviewees 
perceived the media treatment of the case study subjects (e.g. levels of 
support/hostility, if tabloids were more or less useful to the party family due to 
the issues covered), then a discussion of the efforts of the case study subjects 
themselves, then branching out into broader topics such as ideology, program, 
supporter base, levels of support, alliances and future directions and hopes.   
Using a scholarly imperative of being as functionally balanced as possible, the 
intention was to get a balanced cohort of interviewees from party 
spokespeople, academics and journalists so as to cover the principal aspects 
of the case study parties’ approach to media strategy. The intention was to 
provide a diverse array of topics. At the same time, the fact of the inquiry being 
on this specialised topic, not a broader treatment of the ANP movement and its 
impacts, removed any pressure to seek out direct representation of some kind, 
of its many critics and opponents; a task that would skew the research project 
towards another topic and double its scale. The perspective of non-participants 
in the movement is clear and is taken into account in the course of the thesis.         
Though the interviews and observation focus on the themes related to Islam in 
Europe, secondary themes were considered, as in many instances they are 
interrelated and may be drawn into the interviews as appropriate. These 
matters include the ANPs’ preferred constructs on major issues: ‘reform 
fatigue’, globalisation, the relative decline of native Europe demographically, 
politically and economically, alienation and disenchantment with elite opinion 
including ‘establishment’ support for economic liberalisation, multiculturalism, 
mass immigration and expansion of the EU at the expense of national 
sovereignty. 
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3.2.4 Structure of The Digital Crusades 
The Digital Crusades is structured in three substantive and mutually supporting 
parts, which is proposed as a systematic and thorough way to answer the 
research question. The first part is the literature review. Aside from the 
traditional function of a literature review, of addressing overall the pertinent 
research and theory relevant to the dissertation, it brings out themes for 
examination in the Discussion and Review section (6) and Conclusion (7) that 
follow. Following the literature review there is a discussion including a synopsis 
of the fieldwork and the four case study subjects, consisting mainly of the 
review of media artefacts that represent the ANPs’ communication strategy 
under review. That discussion refers to, and builds on concepts and 
information in the literature review, and it can be elicited an understanding of 
the themes and issues in the ANPs’ development as a European political force. 
The final section draws on the foregoing discussion to provide conclusions and 
consider directions for further study.   
The literature review to follow is considerable in that it draws out themes that 
are examined in the discussion section, held ‘at the front of mind’ during the 
fieldwork observation and interviews, and the selection of media content. The 
review considers the party family themselves and issues relevant to associated 
social movements, the themes that feature in their campaigns, and a 
discussion of Hallin’s theory on journalistic bias as it relates to political and 
social actors, Entman’s understanding of media frames, and consideration of 
the different types of media as they relate to the ANPs.  
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SECTION 4: Literature Review 
4.1 Defining the Authoritarian Nativist Populists 
The ideology, leadership, organisation, target demographics and the media 
environment of a party or social movement will inevitably impact on all aspects 
of their performance, including the way they are represented by the 
mainstream media, and the way they seek to represent themselves via their 
own media efforts. In this literature review these factors are elucidated and 
developed so as to provide a comprehension of the ANPs generally and the 
case study subjects specifically leading into the discussion. 
The growth of the ANPs is one of the most widely researched areas of politics 
with an array of academics, particularly from political science, analysing and 
theorising their growth since the mid 1980s, and particularly since the mid 
1990s. The definitional aspects in this thesis are principally in accord with the 
work of the Dutch political scholar, Cas Mudde.  
Though the ANPs generally existed as a relatively marginal force prior to the 
1990s, this changed as they became diametrically opposed to the Greens in 
the age of post-materialist politics, as the cleavage between the socio-culturally 
conservative and liberal became increasingly significant (Bos and van der Brug 
2010).  The rise of the ANPs was considered a reaction to the growth of left 
liberal parties (Ignazi 1992), with different strands of liberalism becoming 
victors in the new economy and society, while the ANPs represented those 
who had not fared so well, as globalisation saw manufacturing jobs outsourced 
to where labour was cheaper, with competing in an already stressed labour 
market with immigrants.  
Both the Greens and the ANPs have successfully established themselves 
around issues that have traction with voting publics: initially the environment for 
the Greens, and mass non-European immigration for ANPs. These were the 
core issues, though as they have become established they have developed 
broader policy bases.  
The review will consider the relevant scholarship thematically. Understanding 
the key elements of the ANPs’ platforms, their ideological underpinnings, and 
the demographics are essential to researching the media strategy and their 
target audiences.  
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4.1.1 Authoritarian Nativist Populism 
According to Eatwell (1989) these parties have been described as ‘far right’, 
‘extreme right’ or ‘radical right’ to best separate them from the mainstream right 
who have traditionally been represented by Christian Democrats or their 
equivalents in Western Europe (e.g. the Tories in the UK). 
To allay confusion, as ‘right’ in the political sense, has a number of meanings 
from libertarian capitalists through to fascists, the research will use the term 
authoritarian nativist populist (ANP) in accord with Mudde’s essential 
characterisation (2007). In the values sphere the cases under study are what is 
traditionally considered conservative (though this conservatism now may 
include the acceptance of gays, freedom of speech and other liberal positions 
that are norms in contemporary Europe – if only embraced as a foil to 
Islamism). On economic issues this is not necessarily the case. In particular 
the Dansk Folkeparti and the Front National (under MLP) have offered a 
political program of anti-globalist policies and a defence of the welfare state, 
which might traditionally be considered left in the Anglosphere. In the United 
States the economics of the right tends to refer to a laissez-faire approach, not 
the case with the ANPs who generally support mixed economies, the welfare 
state and elements of protectionism to bolster national economies (Espersen 
2013a; Espersen 2013b; Mudde 2007; Mudde 2014b).  
For the purposes of the research the case study subjects must have a 
particular focus on Islamism in Europe. All parties of this type in Western 
Europe do effectively have a negative or at least ambivalent position on the 
issue of Islam, as it is seen as a challenge to the ethnic and civic aspects of 
their respective nations, and European civilisation generally. It is a defining 
feature of the party family, the reason UKIP in England is not adopted as a 
viable case study subject. 
There is diversity in the ideology, style and historical trajectory of the ANPs 
researched. The issue that unites them is a concern for the survival and 
maintenance, as they see it, of their specific nations, and European civilisation 
generally, in light of perceived threats, of which Islamic communities in Europe 
and Islamic immigration into Europe are highly significant (Liang 2008; Meret 
and Betz 2009; Mudde 2007; Mudde 2009). 
 
4.1.1.1 Cleavage 
Though not exclusively the case, the ANPs tend to receive most of their 
support from humbler citizens: the unemployed, working class and small 
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business people (Claeys 2013; Abts 2013; Meret 2013; Mudde 2014b). Thus a 
centrist or left wing position on issues like welfare (for those who’ve paid into 
the system) is popular, as is the anti-globalisation position developed by MLP. 
Her public utterances are reminiscent of the radical left. “We need to resist the 
free market policies that threaten our economy, and yes, even our identity,” Le 
Pen told cheering supporters, criticizing also, “those princes of the finance and 
banking world who are nothing more than a global mafia and exploit man with 
no-one controlling them,” (Bamat 2012). The populists present a reality where 
the ‘degraded, venal, corrupt elite’ feed off the honest ‘people’. When 
considering the research question and subsequent discussion this directs 
media content selection to consider examples from ‘tabloid’ producers as these 
are the most likely news choice for the ANPs’ supporter base. 
On the values axis the ANPs tend towards the authoritarian conservative 
position that supports the traditional family, the historical national community 
and severe punishment regimes (Mudde 2007). For the ANPs the struggling, 
hardworking citizen has many contemporary enemies; from thieving, remote 
multinationals eager to drive down wages or export work to companies with 
scandalous conditions, through to refugees they perceive as spurious, 
demanding welfare when they have not paid into the system themselves. On 
the values front they face a highly organised and well-funded immigration lobby 
where, as they see it, ‘business elites’ and ‘liberal left elites’ (disparagingly 
referred to as ‘bobos’ - bourgeois bohemians in French) are eager to displace 
their ethnic primacy in both cultural and economic terms. In this sense there is 
the notion of a convergence of the interests of the neoliberal right and the 
socially liberal left on the issue of mass immigration and multiculturalism. 
 
4.1.1.2 ANP Agency: Supply and Demand 
This research considers the performance of the parties under study, and 
related social movements, in terms of a convergence of issues including ones 
once deemed marginal, to be defined here as ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ issues. 
The purely deterministic sociological approach supporting the notion that crisis 
will inevitably support the rise of ANPs has proved inaccurate in countries 
suffering the worst of the economic circumstances. Ireland, Spain and Portugal 
have negligible ANP activity, and the Greek Golden Dawn party, essentially a 
neo fascist party, goes well beyond the parameters of the ANPs due to their 
extra democratic aesthetic and program. The historical memory of the horrors 
of fascism in some countries may well have exacerbated the taboos around 
nationalism taboo-laden (e.g. Spain, Germany and Italy).  
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However research (Mudde 2007) is available to show that the activities of the 
parties themselves and the quality of their leaders make a significant difference 
to their success as parties and social movements. These are the ‘supply side’ 
issues. Indeed, the lack of a viable political party to represent the issues 
favoured by the ANPs may lead to social movements taking to the streets, as it 
can be argued was the case with the English Defence League (EDL) and the 
German PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Opposed to the Islamisation of 
Germany). It may make the rise of a social movement like the EDL an 
appealing option as the British National Party is generally viewed as deviant, 
and UKIP has not offered any serious discussion of the place of Islam in Britain 
(although wanting a radical reduction in the number of immigrants overall). 
The issue of demand and supply factors is pertinent to this monograph as the 
research is principally about those factors which the case study subjects have 
an apparent degree of agency over, and about their efforts at media strategy in 
an environment often perceived as hostile. In this sense it focuses on the 
internal supply side factors as they relate to external demand side factors in 
the media environment and more broadly. 
One of the leading scholars of nationalism in post war Europe, Hans-Georg 
Betz (1994, 2008) was principally concerned with demand side factors, and 
argued radical national politics was due to globalization and post-industrialism 
(i.e. decline in stable manufacturing jobs) in Europe, with the losers in the 
process being most inclined to support parties of this type. The traditional 
social democrat supporter was not ideally placed to contend with the demands 
of the new economy. That is, demand side factors were of overwhelming 
importance, and supply side factors (including ANP media strategy, 
performance and production) were not considered to be of great significance. 
Other scholars diverged with this opinion and considered supply side factors as 
part of the totality of ANP success or failure. Pippa Norris considers party 
organisation in her work, Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral 
Market (2005). Of particular note is Jens Rydgren 
(2004, 2005, 2006, 2008b, 2008a), who considered supply and demand factors 
and their interplay, and whose work will be discussed further in the literature 
review section specifically related to media and framing (5.1.4). 
For the purposes of this work supply and demand factors are in accord with 
Mudde (2007, 202) who defines macro level demand factors (the socio-
economic impacts of post-industrialisaton in Europe, crisis, ethnic tension, 
attitudes towards authoritarianism), meso level demand factors (family and 
education), and micro level (attitudes and insecurity). The work of Mudde is 
important to this thesis, due to broad scholarly support for his analyses. In 
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conjunction with the pertinence for this research they are proposed as being 
profound, pointed, balanced and functionally objective. 
He divides supply factors into external (political system/s, politico-cultural 
environment, media), and the internal factors (ideology, leadership and 
organisation). Mudde goes on to argue that party success and failure is part of 
a totality that includes both supply and demand factors. This is important for 
this research in that it focuses on the internal supply factors, how they relate to 
the external supply factor of established media, and how they develop salient 
issues in a manner attractive to prospective supporters. 
As discussed by Mudde (2007) and van Der Brug (2005), there has been a 
tendency towards the use of a sociological model, which implies a deterministic 
response to the related demand side factors such as concern over symptoms 
of post-industrialisation and globalisation, in conjunction with rates of 
immigration, Islam and hostility towards the EU (providing political opportunity 
structures). Within Western Europe the key issue for the ANPs, mass 
immigration, has been a universal phenomenon, though it has its peculiarities 
in each state. There are considerable differences in the popularity of the 
various national parties and social movements, which must operate within their 
specific regional and national environments while taking advantage of Western 
European wide issues.  
As noted, this research supports a multi-causal approach to the relative 
success or failure of ANP political parties and social movements, which 
includes their unique historic trajectory, specifically their relationship with 
historical fascisms, demand side issues, the political opportunity structure, and 
the supply side issues, most notably the strategic approach of the ANPs to the 
mainstream media and their own media product. In the words of Mudde (2007, 
293):  
“Populist radical right parties must be put at the center of research 
on the phenomenon. Populist radical right parties are not just 
dependent variables, passively molded by structural factors, but 
they are also independent variables, actively shaping part of their 
own destiny”.  
The principle of a convergence between supply and demand issues will define 
the relative success or failure of ANPs. In this research voters are considered 
to be agents (as are the ANPs) who vote for parties on the basis of supporting 
the ANPs’ policies as much as the members of any other party family 
(Fennema and Meindert 2003b).  
Zaslove (2012, 443) supports Mudde’s notion that the relative success or 
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failure of the ANPs is both related to structure and party agency. In particular 
parties must walk the populist tightrope and be seen as capable of being viable 
and responsible enough to govern (or become part of a governing coalition), 
while maintaining their integrity as an outsider party railing against ‘corrupt, 
venal elites’ and their special interest allies. It is not an easy mission, and may 
be why party leaders who are strong, nuanced communicators (e.g. Marine Le 
Pen, Heinz Christian Strache) can develop salient concerns untouched by 
other parties, due to a form of taboo imposed by the post WWII parties of 
relative consensus, while not straying into deviance and an inevitable political 
deterioration (as happened to the British National Party). Of course the 
structural issues are dependent on party convergence where the two or more 
central parties are seen as colluding on policy in opposition to a significant 
portion of the population, in a scenario situation where salient issues aren’t 
given a voice. 
That votes for ANPs might be considered essentially a protest vote is not 
substantiative, as there are other protest vote options including communist and 
other far left parties. As populism itself is viewed as a thin ideology (Mudde 
2007), such perceived anti-system votes can be considered as representing a 
valid decision (Van Der Brug, Fennema and Tillie 2005) much the same as any 
other vote against an incumbent party.  
 
4.1.2 The Post World War II Evolution to Nativist Populism 
A key theme running through this research is communicating the process of 
normalisation via modernisation and moderation. This process is expressed in 
the ANPs’ public utterances, aesthetics, and media campaigns in an explicit 
and implicit sense (discussed in detail in Section 5). By focusing on aspects of 
severity and extremism evident amongst some Islamists the ANPs can develop 
an image that they are reasonable, but assertive in their defence of their vision 
of contemporary Western norms. 
Though the ANPs are not in the same party family as historical fascists, there 
has been some historical continuity in certain instances, and it serves the 
purposes of their opposition to highlight this continuity, just as it serves their 
purposes to modernise, moderate and distance themselves. The ANPs are not 
aggressive imperialists like fascists. As nativists their tone is defensive, not 
expansive. They are not overtly militaristic and do not organise vigilante groups 
to engage in violence against their political opponents (unlike the recently 
banned French Jeunesses Nationalistes Révolutionnaires, Young Nationalist 
Revolutionaries, who were a neo-fascist movement, or the Greek Golden 
Dawn).  
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Much of the legacy that the ANPs are attempting to overcome extends back to 
the discrediting of the extremists and the creation of a liberal consensus in 
Western Europe (Judt 2005). Militant, imperialistic nationalism of the kind 
manifest in fascism, Nazism and its variants was marginalised after World War 
II, and in fact became illegal in many Western European states (e.g. Germany 
and Italy). Extreme nationalist ‘groupuscules’ operating in Western Europe 
were at times incorporated into anti-Communist activities like Operation Gladio, 
in which they were trained to act as guerrilla leaders should Soviet forces 
invade from behind the ‘Iron Curtain’ (Ganser 2006). 
The nationalists were peripheral to mainstream politics, though their successful 
use of concerns about immigration was believed to have pushed mainstream 
conservative parties, approximately from the 1960s to the 1980s, into 
mimicking their position in a subdued manner, due to the arousal of a strong 
sentiment against non-European immigration.  British Prime Minister (1979-
1990) Margaret Thatcher’s decision to limit immigration was partially viewed as 
a response to the rise of the National Front (Taylor 1982).  
To achieve serious electoral success parties needed to move from a position 
commonly perceived as deviant towards the mainstream by pursuing issues, 
and develop those issues as a vehicle to enter into the mainstream political 
space. The most pressing of these salient issues, which could be developed by 
ANPs, was concern over mass immigration and Islam, along with 
Euroscepticism. The importance of the public perception of the ANPs being 
mainstream as opposed to deviant will be discussed in the section on media 
and the ANPs (Section 5) considering the findings of Van der Brug, Fennema 
and Tillie (2005). They examined the results of 25 ANP parties and found there 
were three essential aspects to ANP party success, which accounted for 83% 
of a party’s performance: The party must be considered normal and 
democratic, with any parties considered fascist performing poorly; the political 
opportunity structure must be present, and the ANP must not be crowded out 
by the parties of the mainstream right (or an insurgent party like the New 
Flemish Alliance), (Van Der Brug 2007). 
The ANPs are fully engaged with the democratic process and have an 
ideological adherence to electoral based democracy (the VB and FN have 
been active parties for more than three decades), though there is a distinct 
difference between liberal democracy and the popular democracy purported by 
the ANPs (discussed in section 4.2.1). This is important as it relates to contest 
between the general will of ‘the people’ versus the importance of the 
individual’s (or minority’s) rights (e.g. to cover the face fully, to resolve civil 
disputes in sharia courts) crucial in liberal democracy. 
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Rydgren argues (2005, 433) the old master frame of the extreme right 
(historical fascisms) was not viable in any sense due to the outcome of World 
War II. He goes on to state the new parties with a nationalist master frame 
moved on to an ‘ethno nationalist xenophobia based on the doctrine of ethno 
pluralism’ (Rydgren 2005) attached to an anti-political establishment populism 
developed in the 1970s by the FN. According to Rydgren (2005) this new 
frame ‘allowed’ the new parties (he defines as extreme right wing parties) ‘to 
mobilise on surprise xenophobic and anti-immigration attitudes without being 
stigmatized as anti-democrats’. This populist ethno pluralism spread from the 
FN to other evolving members of the party family from 1984 onwards. 
Rydgren’s work is of great merit in discerning the new master frame, though 
his description of the parties as extreme right is inappropriate for the ANPs, 
while Mudde’s 2007 description is more accurate and nuanced. 
Pauwels (2011a, 99) is in agreement with Rydgren (2005, 2006) when he 
argues there are key characteristics a radical right populist party (ANP) must 
have in order for some degree of success. These supply side characteristics: 
i. Sufficient initial resources, party organisation and discipline 
ii. Strategic skill 
iii. Free from ideological baggage at odds with party growth (e.g. WWII 
Revisionism, Holocaust denial, sympathy for totalitarianism) 
iv. And most importantly it needs to be sufficiently detached from anti-
democratic political currents (in the eyes of voters) 
Populists argue they are the real democrats, and express the volonté générale 
(general will), often supporting electoral reforms perceived as deeply 
democratic, such as proportional representation and Swiss style citizen 
initiated referenda, or a greater degree of proportional representation.  It is put 
forward so as to allow them more access to parliamentary seats, and can 
achieve concrete gains, like the successful ban on minarets and the reduction 
of immigration by the Swiss People’s Party in 2009. In accord with most 
published opinion polls, issues such as the reduction or termination of 
immigration, and concern over Islamism in Europe, are seen to be conducive 
to positive electoral outcomes for ANPs due to public support for such policies 
(IPSOS 2011). It is key for the ANPs to be considered democratic, the more so 
the better. 
 
4.1.2.1 Eastern Europe 
Due to the relative dearth of non-European immigration into Eastern Europe, 
most specifically, Muslim immigrants, the political expression of nativism is 
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substantially different. Though many Eastern Europeans experienced the 
tyranny of Nazism and its vassal states, oppression by the Soviet Union 
endured for over 40 years (Judt 2005), an influential experience in the 
formation of political opinion. There are historical memories of the Muslim 
Ottoman invasion of South-Eastern Europe and its style of subjugation, which 
also may precipitate a historical resentment. Intellectual currents that infused 
the ANPs, such as ethnopluralism, specifically among their leadership cadres, 
are absent from the parties, which are fascistic (e.g. Jobbik, Golden Dawn) in 
policy, style and activity, and do not fit in with the ANPs (Camus 2013; Mudde 
2014b).  
 
4.1.2.2 Ethnopluralism 
At the outset it is important to distinguish between the ‘New Right’, as it is 
understood in the English speaking world, and its meaning in continental 
Western Europe. In English speaking countries New Right refers to the neo-
liberal politics of British Prime Minister (1979-1990), Margaret Thatcher and US 
President (1981–1989), Ronald Reagan: free trade, privatisation and a rolling 
back of the government, essentially a combination of social conservatism and 
economic liberalism with a strong emphasis on economics (Judt 2005). The 
focus of the French centred continental Nouvelle Droite (New Right – ND) was 
not economics, but rather, European civilisation, ethnopluralism, the legacy of 
Indo-European polytheism, and ‘the right to difference’. Its focus was cultural 
rather than economic (Zaslove 2008a; Bar-On 2013). 
The significance of the ND is due to its influence on some of the ANPs’ 
ideology, particularly the FN the BI, and the leadership cadre of the VB. The 
ND, headed by philosopher and academic, Alain de Benoist, developed 
themes that were, in some ways, sympathetic to nativist views, and provided a 
new intellectual depth to those who perceived threats from non-European 
mass immigration, Islamism, communism and US orientated neo-liberal 
capitalism, to European culture (Zaslove 2008a, 2008b; Bar-On 2013).  
The ND’s argument was that all universalist ideologies (including Christianity 
and Islam) were imperialistic, and were an anathema to authentic freedom and 
profound community life (Bar-On 2013; Faye 2010, 2011, 2014; Faye and 
Kopff 2012). The ND argued that any and every ethno-nation had a right to 
autonomy, free from such imperialisms, and refuted such ideological systems 
that they believed were essentially homogenising. The ND were anti-
communist, anti-global free market, anti-Nazi, anti-imperialist, and against 
mass immigration. Instead, they argued for particularism, rootedness, direct 
democracy, and a pagan renaissance based on Indo-European Polytheism, 
49 
 
and Classical Greek and Roman philosophy, against the prevalent 
universalising tendencies of globalising ideologies, whether principally 
religious, economic or political (Bar-On 2013; Faye 2010, 2011, 2014; Faye 
and Kopff 2012). 
Though some of the arguments put forward by the ND may have been 
appealing to the broad left, such as the attacks on US cultural imperialism, and 
the perils of global capitalism, most of their output gave theoretical foundation 
to nativists. The prevailing theme amongst the ND was a deep concern about 
homogenising “mondialism” (one worldism), and a demand for an ethno 
national “droite au difference” (right to difference), a view common amongst the 
ANPs. De Benoist and some of his colleagues in the ND were significant 
contributors to the second largest of French newspapers, Le Figaro, in the late 
1970s. 
The ND was inspired by the work of Italian communist intellectual, Antonio 
Gramsci, who elucidated his notion of cultural hegemony while imprisoned by 
the Fascist regime. Gramsci argued firstly a cultural war must be won before 
radical changes in social structures can succeed (Rydgren 2005, 427). This 
differentialist cultural nativism adopted by the ANPs has direct roots in the work 
of the ND. Mudde (2014b) states that ANPs are radically different parties now 
and only the leadership cadre (and even then not all of them) would’ve been 
influenced by the work of the ND. As opposed to the racial or ethnic hierarchy 
(or both) evident in Nazism, ethnopluralism supports the notion of relatively 
homogenous national groups in rooted geographic locations that are of equal 
value. The French are not superior to the Algerians; rather they are equal but 
different, and undue interference by mass immigration (by the Algerians into 
France or the French into Algeria as was the case in the colonial period), and 
colonisation, is viewed as being damaging to either autochthonous community. 
In this sense they are opposed to both colonialism and mass immigration (Bar-
On 2013).  
Rydgren (2005) argues the party family has two defining characteristics: 
ethnopluralism and populism. It could be argued that ethnopluralism is nativism 
with a global perspective, in the sense that all nations are worthy of 
sovereignty, relative homogeneity and their right to difference whether Karens 
in Burma, Tibetans in the People’s Republic of China, or the Flemish in 
Belgium. This representation of ethnopluralism separates it from the colonial 
and Nazi approaches to racial or ethnic hierarchies. According to Bornischer 
(2010) the most important of the populist’s new issues has been the 
development of new master frames. Thus, the ND’s enduring contribution is 
ethnopluralism.  
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Although an intellectual movement there was an overlap in membership of the 
FN and the ND (Bar-On 2013; Rydgren 2005), and as the FN was the model 
party, notions of ethnopluralism spread from France to analogous parties and 
social movements in Western Europe, specifically amongst the leadership 
cadre. In terms of the media strategy of the parties and ex party, now social 
movement (in particular) this understanding of Gramscian hegemony may be 
considered relevant to the construction of media strategies and the position of 
the leadership cadre. It should be noted that ND ideologue, Guillame Faye, 
more radical than de Benoist, does discuss biological race in his work (Faye 
2010, 2011; Faye and Kopff 2012). 
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4.2 Defining Characteristics: Authoritarianism, Nativism and Populism 
Mudde (2007) defines the party family as having three definitional traits, which 
apply to the three political party case studies and arguably to the social 
movement under study (discussed in the Bloc Identitaire, section 6.2.4). These 
are populism, authoritarianism and nativism. The three are understood to be 
interrelated, but will be dealt with separately in this section so as to focus on 
the salient aspects relating to the case study subjects’ media strategy. They 
are relevant to research as they mutually support each other and set up the 
prime argument and tone of the self-produced media, and dictate public 
utterances in established media. 
 
4.2.1 Populism: The State Against the Nation 
The ANPs’ capacity to criticise the centrist parties is accentuated by the fact 
that they do not run national government (though support from the DF made 
possible the formation of the Rasmussen government of Denmark), and avoid 
the realities of compromise politics in this regard. The ability of the ANPs to 
castigate, criticise and transgress polite norms adds immensely to their 
newsworthiness, as does the often flamboyant, contentious and charismatic 
nature of the leaders. There is a particular emphasis on the capacity of a 
charismatic leader (Mudde 2007; Pauwels 2011a; Rydgren 2006) within the 
party family (discussed fully in section 4.2.3.1).  
Mudde describes populism as a “thin-centred ideology” (2007, 23), which can 
attach itself to other ideologies (e.g. socialism, nationalism, Islamism), in which 
case it can be ideologically complete, and in this sense there is nothing 
incongruous with parties of the left which exhibit populist approaches. For 
example the French politician Melenchon’s Gauche de Front rails against 
elites. The foundational idea of populism is that society can be ultimately 
separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” 
versus “the corrupt elite,” and that politics should be an expression of the 
general will (Mudde 2004, 543) which supersedes all constraints: 
constitutional, structural and otherwise.  Mudde’s (2007) definition has proven 
to be the most favoured in the contemporary debate over populism (Pauwels 
2010, 100). 
 
Pauwels (2010, 99) discerns four key elements in Mudde’s minimal definition of 
populism. Populists:  
i. consider the people as a homogeneous and pure entity 
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ii. consider the elite as a homogeneous and corrupt entity 
iii. consider the people and the elite as two antagonistic groups, and 
iv. favour measures to give power back to the people (e.g. direct 
democracy) 
The interests of ‘the elite’ are portrayed as mutually exclusive to those of ‘the 
nation’, constituted by the ‘authentic people’. ‘The elite’ are globalists, they are 
economically and socially liberal, they have outgrown the nation and become 
citizens of the world (or at least Europe) and have a disdainful attitude towards 
the idea of an organic, rooted nation (Mudde 2007; 2004).  
Pauwels’ fourth point, favouring measures to give power back to the people 
can be viewed as radically democratic. Kaltwasser (2011) describes this as a 
‘democratic extremism’. Hence, for the ANPs to be considered as democratic 
extremists goes some way in countering opposition claims they are the heirs to 
fascism – rather they are of ‘the people’ and for ‘the people’ (their people). The 
role of the media in exposing the many foibles and outright criminality of the 
political class and associated elites is crucial in this process and will be 
examined in the section on media and the ANPs.  
 
Rydgren (2005, 427) describes a scenario where the behaviours of centre right 
and centre left are represented by the ANPs as a matter of conspiratorial, 
centrist collusion (this narrow political front provides the political ANPs 
opportunity structure as described by (Ellinas 2010)). Kaltwasser (2011, 194) 
suggests this representation of the centre by the ANPs may be founded in 
reality, serving not as an antidemocratic tendency, but as the inevitable 
expression of a political opportunity structure made apparent by the increasing 
remoteness of ‘elites’ from ‘the people’. Depending on the party in question, 
the definition of the people tends to be discussed in both ethnic and civil terms, 
but never in purely racial terms: for example the greatest opponent of Flemish 
nationalism is the French speaking Walloons, who are not visibly different from 
the Flemish; there are Danes of Turkish background who are members of the 
DF, while the FN spokesperson reports it has always been avid in its support of 
Harkis, Algerians who fought for the French during the Algerian War, 1954-62 
(de Danne 2013). 
 
Kaltwasser (2011, 199) suggests the ANPs provide a “voice for the groups that 
do not feel represented by the establishment, particularly by putting forward the 
topic of immigration.” The further the policies of elites are from the demands of 
the voting publics the greater the opportunity to present themselves as the 
authentic vox populi in their media campaigns, particularly if the press are 
perceived as colluding with the political class. The ANPs’ representation of 
themselves as popular democrats, rather than being constrained by the liberal 
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system, is designed to define themselves as ‘authentic’, against the façade put 
forth by the mainstream parties. 
Mudde (2007, 150) contrasts populist democracy and liberal democracy. The 
most apparent difference is a notion of constraint on the general will. Mudde 
describes populist notions of democracy as plebiscitary democracy. This being 
the case it holds the ‘general will’ as absolute and looks to directly engage 
citizens in the process. This relatively radical democracy serves a number of 
functions for the ANPs. At the level of public perception it can assuage 
criticisms, which suggest the party family is totalitarian – the heirs to fascism.  
The ANPs are anti-systemic (Ignazi 1992) but they are committed to the 
democratic process, and have been for decades in the three case study 
subjects that are political parties. Instead of preferring the overthrow of the 
system in line with revolutionary ideologies, the incrementalism, and claims 
that the political system as it stands is not democratic, provide them with a 
foundation for their ‘dediablolisation’.  
On the policy level plebiscites have proven useful for securing policies that the 
ANPs perceive as being blocked by the constraints of elites and in some cases 
activist judges (Mudde 2007). The power of referenda is particularly appealing 
to the ANPs as an expression of the general will, and the opportunity to have 
the key platforms around mass immigration, as well as crime and punishment 
and the European Union put to the test, when they are aware polls suggest the 
policies developed by centrist parties are unpopular. Most famously tantilising 
to Islamist-critical ANPs is the success of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 
referendum banning the construction of minarets (2009), the expulsion of 
criminal foreigners (2010) and curtailing of mass immigration from the EU 
(2014).  
Populists can argue they are being radically democratic in acting against a 
remote elite. There is also an emphasis on the class origins of the centrist 
parties; pointing to the largely ‘Oxbridge’ makeup of the Tories, Liberal 
Democrats and to some extent Labour, or the number of French leaders who 
attended elite schools and universities, to make a case about 
unrepresentativeness of the body of politicians in power (Camus 2013). The 
ANPs seek to define the ‘nation’ as a homogenous grouping, and to keep it 
that way, as against any radical diversification (Mudde 2007, 157).  
There is nothing intrinsically violent in populism. However, its anti-elite 
foundation can, and frequently does lend itself to vitriolic attacks directed at 
elites, but these do not advocate for violence as the ANPs are intent on 
defining themselves as a mainstream force and appropriate for the formation 
of government.  
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Mudde (2007, 49): 
“There are some parties that are radical right but not populist. 
While this combination used to be quite common, the experience 
of semi-permanent opposition and the current populist zeitgeist 
(Mudde 2004) have brought most radical right parties to adopt 
populism. Good examples of such transformations are the Belgian 
VB and the French FN.” 
Their media product and platform is targeted at a voting public that they 
perceive is against mass immigration, patriotic, concerned about perceived EU 
overreach, and assumes native values and behaviours must have precedence 
over immigrant values if there is any perceived conflict. On the issue of mass 
immigration the populists take the position that it has been forced on nations by 
a coalition of ‘elite’ groups: the political class, intellectuals, cultural and media 
leaders, and big business (who are represented as eager to import cheap 
labour and drive down the wages of natives) (Mazzoleni 2008; Mudde 2007). 
As the mainstream right has to give due consideration to its natural 
constituents, who tend to support neoliberal approaches to immigration, (or 
other ideological positions, such as Christian rejection of ethnic or sectarian 
considerations), the ANPs can broadly appeal to extant nativist sentiment as a 
point of differentiation. It is this essential ability to express the criticisms of the 
alienated ‘people’; against the ‘elite’ that allows the ANPs to function effectively 
as parties that define themselves as political outsiders. The attraction of the 
ANPs is their outsider identity, as transgressive actors who are willing to break 
taboos and cause controversy, though they must also evolve so as to be 
considered mature and reasonable enough to capably contend with the 
responsibilities of government. 
 
4.2.2 Nativism: Our Own People First 
Of the three essential elements to the party family as defined by Mudde (2007), 
nativism is central to the ANPs and the media activities related to their 
concerns and platforms about Islamism in Europe. ANPs are adverse to elites, 
and (like all functioning party families) they are willing to use authoritarian 
means to obtain their ends, in this case to confound elite interests, sentiments 
and power. However, their particular vision is an expressly and strongly nativist 
one. Nativism is part of the ideological core of the case study subjects being 
researched, and the foundation for the media strategies relating to mass 
immigration, Muslims, Islam and Islamism.  
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In quoting Higham (1955, 4), Mudde (2007, 18) provides a pertinent definition 
for the nativist approach to nationalism in an American context, transferable to 
contemporary Western Europe: 
“Nativism, therefore, should be defined as intense opposition to an 
internal minority on the ground of its foreign (i.e. un-American) 
connections. Specific nativistic antagonisms may, and do, vary 
widely in response to the changing character of minority irritants 
and the shifting conditions of the day; but through each hostility 
runs the connecting, energising force of modern nationalism. While 
drawing on much broader cultural antipathies and ethnocentric 
judgments nativism translates into a zeal to destroy the enemies of 
a distinctively American way of life.” 
From Higham’s description it is apparent nativism displayed by the ANPs is not 
the Nordicist, supremacist, imperialism of Nazism; rather it’s the protection of 
what is perceived as the indigenous extant culture from internal and external 
threats. In this sense it serves a similar function in public utterances on 
economic protectionism, “we look after our own first” (Claeys 2013). To remove 
any taints of the historical fascisms is amongst the core business of the ANPs 
for reasons of accuracy, and for reasons of public acceptance. This national 
collective overlaps with populism’s notion of the ‘pure people’; they are in fact 
one and the same, threatened by enemies above (‘elites’) and inside (non-
assimilating immigrants, criminals, unassimilable deviants), and outside, 
globalists, Islamists and other anti-national forces. The ANPs declare 
themselves wanting to overcome two perceived and ‘mediated’ burdens on the 
congruent ‘nation’ and ‘people’:  on one hand corrupt parasites in positions of 
power; on the other hand: outsiders hostile to national culture allowed into the 
body politic by the ‘corrupt elites’, on the pretext of improving the economy (the 
ANPs see this as capital lowering wages by increasing labour), or by a ‘liberal 
left’ who support multiculturalism (the ANPs see this as a method for 
destroying the sense of national community of the autochthonous population). 
Nativists are not necessarily racists; rather they are exclusivists eager to 
preserve the relative homogeneity of their national group as they define it. For 
example protestant groups who argued against Irish Catholic immigration into 
America, did not do so on the grounds of racial animosity as such, as the 
biological differences between Irish and English were hardly discernable to the 
eye. Rather, they were concerned that the Irish immigrants were culturally alien 
to Protestant society and were the agents of a hostile religion. Secular and 
Christian nativists are inclined to view the Muslims in Europe in this way (Betz 
2008; Betz and Meret 2009). The ANPs perceive themselves as defenders of 
national traditions, and European civilisation, as opposed to offering the voting 
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public a radical new vision of the future (such as the extreme nationalists did in 
the lead-up to World War II) (Payne 1995). In this sense their project is 
essentially about the conservation of extant nations, and European civilisation, 
as they perceive a process of decline, and under demographic and cultural 
threat from internal and external Islamists and the elites that facilitate them. In 
this sense they may be considered traditionalists, with a view to stablilise the 
ethnic mix of their nation in favour of the autochthonous citizens and those 
immigrants the ANPs consider well integrated and part of the nation. 
For the nativist the accepted member of the nation is privileged within the 
national boundaries. Calls for ‘Austria First’ or ‘France for the French’ and 
demands for the expulsion of illegal immigrants is at the heart of the 
ethnocratic view of politics (Ellinas 2010, 11). This exclusivist nationalism 
demands that natives (and settled, accepted immigrant populations) receive a 
pre-eminent position within their respective nation-states - a situation defined 
as ethnic primacy in this thesis. 
 
Mudde (2007, 19) defines nativism as:  
 
“…an ideology, which holds that states should be exclusively 
inhabited by members of the native group (the “nation”) and that 
non-normative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally 
threatening to the homogenous nation-state.”  
The ANPs promote nativist protectionism in cultural and economic terms, in 
contrast to neoconservatives who tend to be interested in free markets, 
interventionism and open borders. The use of the term racism in this sense is 
problematic, for reasons indicated above. A more accurate, or marketable 
descriptor would be ‘culturalist’ if anything, and the term ‘nativism’ ideal. For 
example, Basques can have nativist feelings towards Spaniards, the Tibetans 
towards the Chinese and the Balinese towards the Javanese.  
The ANPs tend to be against overseas wars that are viewed as imperialist 
meddling in the affairs of sovereign states, unless perhaps they can be strictly 
defined, in individual instances as being in the national interest (Kaltwasser 
2011, 194). The neoconservatives differ in this; hence the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
by the United States and a coalition of allies. The ANPs (e.g. FN, VB) were 
against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as they were viewed as interventions 
in non-hostile sovereign nations. The outcomes seem to have been a 
resounding victory for Jihadists, and ultimately a defeat for the Allies despite 
valiant and well-considered efforts in Afghanistan. The nativists generally see 
warfare as protective and defensive in accord with their economic policies and 
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have not been supportive of US led interventions generally. For the ANPs 
these anti-war public utterances may have held them in good stead as Western 
intervention in foreign wars particularly in Iraq, and the consequent refugee 
crisis is unpopular within Europe. 
European ANPs that are orientated towards ethno-nationalism inevitably have 
civic nationalist aspects to their program, which include: the secular state, or 
the mutual exclusivity of some aspects of the law as it relates to sex equality or 
legal provisions for or against gays. Nationality is not seen exclusively as a 
matter of blood ties, but of those willing to adhere to the cultural formations of a 
host people, becoming accepted if they assimilate. Nativism can be referred to 
as a particular expression of nationalism, which has both civic and ethnic 
elements, both diametrically opposed to policies of multiculturalism, (though 
not necessarily opposed to some degree of multiracialism as a condition of 
society, as nativism is defensive and not definitively racist), where there will 
inevitably be ‘out groups’ perceived as a threat to the body politic. 
 
4.2.3 Authoritarianism  
Of the three of Mudde’s features that define the ANPs, authoritarianism is 
perhaps the most broad, as there is a degree of authoritarianism in most 
political parties and social movements (with the possible exception of radically 
decentralised, regionalist anarchist or libertarian movements), with strong 
approaches to punishment not being exclusive to the ANPs (e.g. ‘Three Strikes 
You’re Out’ policies in the United States; rates of execution in PRC, 
criminalising discriminatory speech by mainstream European parties, 
blasphemy laws prominent in some Muslim countries); nor do they have a 
monopoly on charismatic leaders who have considerable power. Mazzoleni 
(2008, 206) states there are two aspects crucial to authoritarianism: The first is 
a focus on the leader, seemingly to the exclusion of other officers and principal 
members of social movements and parties. The second is the ANPs’ tendency 
to be severe in issues relating to crime and punishment, as they tend to be 
strong supporters of ‘law and order’, while not adhering to established views on 
human rights, such as MLP’s desire to hold a referendum on the reinstatement 
of the death penalty (Connexionfrance 2011).  
 
4.2.3.1 Charismatic Leader 
The question is principally one of how exaggerated the ANPs’ central figures 
are in comparison to the leaders of other social movements and political parties. 
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As previously noted there is a perception that the ANPs are more likely to have 
charismatic leaders than members of other party families, though it is a 
questionable premise (Mudde 2007). This tendency does occur in the ANPs, 
whereby the party leader is a central feature of the campaign itself, and 
encapsulates the party message and ‘spirit’. It could be argued however that 
this is ubiquitous among many of Western Europe’s contemporary leaders.  
Leaders like Jacques Chirac (French President 1996-2007), Tony Blair (British 
Prime Minister 1997-2007) and Angela Merkel (German Chancellor 2005-) have 
had strong personal presences and have taken their parties on new courses at 
least partially under their own force of personality. 
Mazzoleni (2003) suggests the reliance on the media profile of a charismatic 
leader is strongest in the insurgent phase, and as the party becomes 
established other spokespeople will take an increasing role. According to 
Mazzoleni (2003, 4): 
“Neopopulist movements characteristically organise themselves 
around charismatic and strongly personalized leaderships and are 
immediately and exclusively identified with highly visible and 
controversial leaders: Le Pen [Jean Marie], Haider, Bossi, Perot, 
Manning or Hanson. These leaders are endowed with distinctive 
public speaking skills and in some cases with ‘media-genic’ 
personal qualities, which they shrewdly exploit to gain popularity 
and media attention. They typically also employ highly emotional, 
slogan-based, tabloid style language…”.  
The DF, VB and FN can be classed as well-established political parties, even 
though, as will be discussed in the sections on the parties in the case studies, it 
could be argued both the VB and the FN are still reliant on their leaders as the 
principal vector from which their public profile is formed. With the FN in 
particular, its development may have been held up by its difficulties with the 
electoral system; in spite of polling in the range of 10-20% it has had minimal 
electoral representation over the decades. In terms of development, and moving 
away from a prime reliance on the leader-figure; in France, as MLP develops 
the party as an organisation and fixture in the array of political forces, other 
party functionaries have moved into positions of prominence: Steve Briois, 
Louis Aloit and Ludovic de Danne amongst them.  
The VB has not been so much hampered by the electoral system, but affected 
more by the cordon sanitaire erected by hostile interests, which has seen the 
party treated as an anathema. It is not unreasonable to consider the VB is still 
participating in an enduring insurgent phase. That may even be moving it in the 
direction of defeat, considering the rise of the relatively moderate Flemish 
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nationalist formation, the N-VA, whose leader, Bart De Weaver does engage in 
a media populism including appearing on game shows (Abts 2013; Claeys 
2013). 
 
With the DF, Pia Kjaersgaard was crucial in the establishment of the party in 
the first instance, and the new party leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, is central 
to the party’s representation of itself. However, from an informal examination of 
media product and direct observations made at the 2013 DF party conference, 
there does not seem to be a great deal of emphasis on him in comparison to 
the leaders of other parties.  
As a social movement as opposed to a political party the Bloc Identitaire 
President, Fabrice Robert, does organise events and give speeches at 
demonstrations. However the BI is a consciously decentralised movement, and 
being of lesser significance in terms of political power the BI inevitably attracts 
less media attention than significant electoral parties. This being the case the 
spectacles designed to attract media attention must be more significant, as for 
the BI and the media that cover them action speaks louder than words. As a 
decentralised movement, it is more a matter of leaders than a single leader. 
Leadership qualities and public utterances serve as focal points for media. 
However the central authority of a charismatic leader is not central to the ANPs 
in a definitional sense. It can be plausibly argued that they are not that greatly 
different from centralist opponents. Where using an authoritarian style, by 
asserting a commanding role, the leaders must skilfully balance their anti-elite 
line with sufficient nuance and moderation, to limit associations with anti-
democratic and extreme parties. While they may depend on a strong and 
heavily publicised leader to make their mark, this phenomenon is their ‘Achilles 
Heel’ and must be performed in order to avoid negative historical associations. 
The issue related to law and order will be discussed in the key issue section - 
‘Security: Criminality and Terrorism’ (4.4.7). 
The ANPs’ definitive characteristics as they relate to their media product, 
specifically their representations of Islam, impact heavily on their output. Their 
focus on an ‘internal minority’ perceived as threatening provides them the 
opportunity to extract and develop themes in their media output which only 
they have the resolution to confront. Those aspects of Islam they perceive as 
dangerous to the nations and European civilisation are examined in the 
following section on key issues.  
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4.3 Key Issues  
In this section the key issues represented by the party family will be discussed 
in relation to their expression in the media campaigns of the ANPs generally 
and the four case study subjects specifically, so as to engage fully with the 
research question, and provide signposts for the discussion section. The issue 
selection that features in the party and social movement platforms of the ANPs 
is indicative of issues they perceive are salient with targeted audiences. It is 
addressed to those who feel partially or fully unrepresented by the main 
parties, and policies they think have been avoided by the establishment parties 
due to the adherence of’ ‘elites’ to ‘political correctness’.  In their view such 
trends have stifled legitimate debate around their key issue of mass 
immigration, and the problems they describe to publics as emanating from it: 
crime, parallel societies, Islamism, a loss of identity and opportunistic demands 
on welfare.  
 
Having defined the key characteristics of the ANPs, principally using the work 
of Mudde, the thesis will examine issues critical to the ongoing ANP media 
campaign. These are the principal campaign issues of the ANPs generally and 
the case study subjects in particular. They are considered in accord with the 
characteristics of authoritarianism, nativism and populism. 
 
4.3.1 Parties and Social Movements of the ‘Betrayed’ 
The tabloids (popular) and broadsheet (quality) media often enough are replete 
with articles on corruption within the political class and amongst elites; the 
‘enemy above’ is represented, as is the ‘enemy within’: those groups who are 
criminals and hostile immigrants adverse to cultural norms, or engaging in 
welfare fraud and similar crimes, that provoke outrage in a readership perhaps 
already primed for such a response. In an interview with the researcher, Cas 
Mudde (2014b) stated the ANPs were expanding their voting bases. However 
the original surge of support had come from alienated working class and lower 
middle class voters, who previously supported the social democratic parties. 
The voters were principally male and often with less formal education (Meret 
2013).  
A common idea that parties of this type are purely protest parties, not viewed 
by their voters as able to support their long-term interests, is contested. Bos 
argues (Bos and van der Brug 2010, 793): 
“If citizens see an anti-immigration party as legitimate, they will 
evaluate it by the same standards they use to judge other parties. 
Whether that will make the party successful in elections will depend 
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on the distribution of voters and the competition from other parties. 
However, our analyses strongly suggest that being seen as 
legitimate and effective are necessary, but not sufficient, 
preconditions for being successful.” 
Therefore, if voters are to take the parties ‘seriously’, the drive towards 
legitimacy via a policy of moderation and modernisation is critical for enduring 
success. On the other hand any notion of being deviant and non-democratic 
will damage any expansion in the available political space. Though they may 
be protest parties for some, as the Greens or other parties beyond the bi-polar 
split also may be, they are parties that have endured for decades and have a 
developed set of policy issues, in many cases becoming increasingly salient.  
As previously discussed these ideas are framed in terms of the characteristics 
of authoritarianism, nativism and populism, and with an emphasis on populist 
democracy in opposition to the ‘corrupt, global rule’ of elites. These are not 
revolutionary parties that look to overthrow the system, and are generally 
increasingly successful in democratic contests. Bos and van der Brug’s (2010, 
780) research demonstrates parties will be aware they have inverse chances 
of political success when they can be represented as heirs to historical fascism 
and extreme nationalism. They argue:  
“Because of their (fascist) anti-democratic and anti-constitutional 
legacy (Carter, 2005) many people think that some of these anti-
immigration parties pose a threat to the democratic system. Many of 
the activities of anti-fascist and anti-racist organizations are directed 
against these anti-immigration parties. Even though potential voters 
for these parties may be critical of the political establishment, most 
of them will not want to endanger the democratic system. So, even 
if a group of citizens agrees with the parties’ platforms on issues 
such as migration, many of them will not support the party if they 
feel it poses a threat to democracy.” 
In the sections to follow, it will be shown how the issues are framed, more often 
than not, in terms meant to be persuasive – as part of a democratic contest of 
ideas. Public utterances, the content of self-made media, and messages they 
try to convey via mainstream media or their own efforts, are managed, whether 
through reasoned argument, strategic provocation, or a combination of both. In 
places, much of this will be complemented and offset by contentious public 
gestures by party adherents, including senior figures - all ‘grist for the mill’ in 
generating public attention to the parties and to their issues.   
It is the primary thesis of this research that the issue of Islam in Europe is a 
‘breakthrough’ issue for the ANPs, and that it has become central to their 
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platforms and media campaigns. Accordingly, the following section of the 
literature review will specifically delve into the issue of Islam in Europe in 
relation to the ANPs, to extract certain themes relating to the research 
question, in order to later examine and review them fully with examples of 
media content in the discussion and conclusion sections. 
 
4.3.2 Islamism: Issues and the ANPs 
The focus of this research is on the ANPs’ strategic utilisation of the issues 
surrounding Islam in Europe in order to gain votes and ultimately power for the 
political parties, and as a focal point for protests, and influence gained by 
social movements like the BI and EDL. The ANPs represent Islam to be the 
most apparent, enduring and visible threat to European civilisation (Betz 
2008; Betz and Meret 2009; Mudde 2007). The ANPs often portray the 
presence of Islamism in Europe as an inevitable symptom of the policy of mass 
immigration developed by establishment interests against the ‘general will’ of 
‘the people’, in populist terms.  
Islam is visible in Europe due to religio-cultural customs, which are different, 
and in some instances oppositional to contemporary European norms (and are 
contested within Muslim communities themselves). The relative degrees of 
female head and body coverings (from the liberal who may wear none at all, to 
the radical who must even wear gloves while in public to cover hands from 
view), and mosque/minaret construction as a highly visible sign of Islam in 
Europe, have been contested by the ANPs to varying degrees (Bourmand 
2010; Brix 2010; Ferrari and Pastorelli 2013; France24 2012b; Hunter-Henin 
2012; Joyner 2012; Politiken 2009). 
Less visible, or indeed, invisible expressions of Islam have been developed as 
issues and utilised by the ANPs as well: most notably, required provision of 
Halal food in public institutions such as schools and hospitals, and the 
reference to sharia law in civil law matters (AFP 
2012; Cities_Against_Islamisation 2013; Danielsen 2014; Rippon 2012 ). 
These expressions of Islam in Western Europe are broadly defined as Islamist 
‘parallel societies’ that are represented as operating separately and in 
opposition to the native European political and cultural norms: a ‘fifth column’ 
of Europe’s enduring civilisational enemy. In conjunction with the security 
threat related to jihadist political violence, sometimes intermingled and 
conflated with the rates of crime emanating from Muslim immigrant 
communities these issues are developed by the ANPs in their media output 
and public utterances, and will be used as examples and considered fully in the 
discussion section. 
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4.3.3 Islamism, Islam and Muslims 
A detailed consideration of the relationship between Islamism and Islam is not 
appropriate unless it specifically relates to the research. This research does 
take into account that there is a deal of conflation of Islamism, Islam and 
Muslims. The research will not provide arguments condemning the ANPs for 
their perception and representation of Islamism, Islam and Muslims in Europe, 
nor a supporting argument for their position on the issue, or their 
representation of it to strategic publics. Rather it is viewed as a highly 
contentious issue attractive to the media, specifically after the terrorist acts in 
the US and Europe, and which is represented by the ANPs (amongst others) 
as being a grave, continuing mortal threat to European civilisation generally, 
and their respective nations specifically – with considerable media efforts being 
devoted to the issue. In this sense the research will avoid value judgments 
related to those issues represented by the ANPs as it is beyond the remit of 
the thesis. 
The research considers Islamism, Islam and Muslims as inevitably interrelated 
concepts in the polemics of the day, and difficult, if not impossible to clearly 
discern from one another.  Some of this is due to the diversity apparent in 
Islam, and the inter-religious and intra-religious conflicts about what Islam is, 
and what that means in the public and private realm for Muslims and non-
Muslims in Europe. To maintain focus on the research the definitions will 
remain relatively simplistic, though it is understood to be a profoundly complex 
issue (Betz and Meret 2009; Bleich 2009; Ferrari and Pastorelli 2013; Göle 
2014; Landman 2007; Vidino 2009).  
 
For the purposes of the research Islamism will be defined as the political 
expression of Islam. Islam is defined as a monotheistic, faith based religion 
that has political and legal aspects in its orthodox expressions. Muslims are 
those who adhere to the religion in a diverse fashion while maintaining an 
established and near universally accepted set of core beliefs (i.e. unity of god, 
angels, prophets, Abrahamic scriptures, predestination and afterlife). Of the 
two main traditions Sunni Muslims are by far the most numerous in Western 
Europe; which can be further divided into Madhabs (legal schools), and 
numerous movements (e.g. Deobandis, Sufis, Salafis, liberals), and the 
religious understanding of the individual Muslim. 
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4.3.4 Islam In Europe 
With the exception of Muslim populations in Albania and Bosnia Herzegovina 
European Muslim populations in the pre-World War II (WWII) period were small 
in number, with both the Muslim Albanians, Macedonians and Bulgarians (both 
ethnically Turkish) and the Bosniak Muslims being associated with the 
Ottoman invasion of South-Eastern Europe; historically relatively heterodox 
and relaxed in their Islam in comparison to more conservative, literalist strains 
in the Arab World and Asia (Göle 2014; Pauly 2004; Tibi 2007; Vidino 2009). 
The arrival of significant numbers of Muslims in Western Europe was due to 
the convergence of two factors: the dearth of labour after the horrific number of 
casualties wrought in WWII and the dissolution of European empires that had 
significant Muslim populations, or where historical alliances had been formed. 
In the case of Britain it was principally Muslims from South Asia, in France from 
the Maghreb, in Flanders, Holland and Germany it was initially Turks and later 
Moroccans. There have been successive waves of Muslim immigrants into 
Western Europe from most parts of the Islamic World often relating to crisis; 
such as the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and most recently Syria, or the sectarian 
conflicts between Rohingyas (Burmese Muslims) and Burmese Buddhists. The 
Pew Forum estimates there were about 19 000 000 Muslims in EU countries in 
2010 (Kia 2008). 
There have been two notable invasions by Muslim armies into Europe relevant 
to this thesis. The first was the Moorish invasion of Spain, with sorties reaching 
into southern France, notable as an event as it features heavily in the media 
campaigns of the Bloc Identitaire  (Rippon 2012). The second invasion was by 
the Muslim Ottoman Turks into Greece and the Balkans reaching as far west 
as Vienna. The Turkish invasion is significant in that it is a point of reference 
for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), one of the strongest ANPs in Europe, 
capturing 25% of the vote in polling early in 2014 (PewResearchCentre 2011). 
The FPO has referred to the Muslim immigration into Austria as the 3rd Turkish 
siege, the others being events from the Ottoman invasions (Hooper 2014). 
Though occurring centuries ago these invasions by Muslim powers of the time 
are represented as part of an ongoing historical conflict between the Muslim 
World and Christian, or post-Christian Europe (Betz and Meret 2009) which 
aligns with Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations thesis (Liang 2008). 
 
4.3.5 Media View of the Conflict Beyond Europe: Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations 
The centrality of concerns about Muslims in Europe brings the focus onto a 
number of issues that are foundational to the ANPs’ media campaigns. It is 
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seen in their representations of Islam, both in commenting on its visible public 
displays (e.g. demands for modesty in clothing in comparison to Western 
European norms adopted by some Muslims, opening of mosques, building of 
minarets), and in their participation in media debate about Muslims in Europe, 
particularly trading in the well recognised news value of conflict (e.g. terrorism, 
criminality amongst Muslim immigrants and their descendants, ‘honour killings’, 
hostile approaches to gays).  Converging with the rise of the ANPs was a 
reassertion of an expressly political Islam by some Western European 
Muslims; exacerbated in some cases by the conscious promotion of a strict 
Arab interpretation of Islam with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states acting as 
both economic and memetic vectors. This type of Salafism has not traditionally 
been found amongst Turks or Moroccans in their ethnic homelands. 
As noted the ANPs’ concern over Islam has been represented as an external 
threat in agreement with Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis, which is 
accorded wide support amongst the ANPs (Betz and Meret 2009; Mudde 
2009). There are several external events in which the conflict between Muslims 
and others, most particularly Christians has been extensively covered by news 
media: the Balkans War in the 1990s, the conflict between Orthodox Christian 
Serbs and Albanian Muslims in Kosovo; the war between French-allied 
authoritarian secularists and Islamists in Algeria; the Russian wars against 
Chechen secessionists which became suffused with Jihadi elements amongst 
some of the initially nationalist combatants (Flood et al. 2012); the Wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan; the mistreatment of Christians in the Middle East; conflicts 
between Muslims and Christians in Central and North Africa (e.g. Nigeria, 
Sudan); the influence of Islamists in previously ‘Western-friendly’ Muslim 
authoritarian countries after the revolutions in Egypt and the Maghreb, and 
finally acts of terrorism and religio-political assertion within the West itself. 
 
In this sense a series of conflicts, some of them related to the flawed ‘War on 
Terror’, and all of them involving Islamists were heavily covered by foreign 
correspondents responding to the primacy of conflict as a news value. Some of 
these cases have presented conflict between Western Europeans (though 
often led by the US, and often with Muslim allies), and Islamists (or at least 
Muslims) as the primary enemy; the key exception being the intra-European 
War in Kosovo, where NATO supported the largely Muslim Albanians against 
Serbia, a mostly Orthodox Christian population historically allied to Russia.  
External conflict that can be seen as an external struggle against Islamists may 
contribute to the rejection of immigrant Muslim populations.  Conflict with 
Islamists outside of Western Europe has been heavily covered by the media, 
which may be expected to have its impacts on public consciousness regarding 
Islam within European borders.  Development of this, into a perception of 
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generalised conflict, by Huntington (1996) has most famously been expressed 
as an on-going civilisational conflict between the West and Islam in a 
geopolitical setting. This conception of a broad historical and contemporary 
antagonism is integral in the nativist understanding of the apparent, and 
heavily covered intra-European issues relating to Islamism in Europe. 
 
4.3.6 The ANPs and Islamism Within Europe 
The concern about the place of Islam in Europe has evolved about the path 
Islam has been taking within historically Christian or post-Christian Western 
European nations. That would include concern about Muslim immigrants who 
have already, or may radicalise, (as it might also be a great concern for other 
Muslim immigrants wanting to integrate well with European society at large). 
The focus on the particular group became much more pronounced after the 
attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, and the subsequent acts 
of terrorism in Europe and beyond (Betz 2008).  
The ANPs, as nativist parties, are ideologically opposed to the presence of 
non-assimilating immigrants, or public positions taken by such groups, 
particularly when there is an established historical animosity and religio-cultural 
assertiveness on the part of some Muslim immigrants, their descendants, and 
native converts (Andersen 2007; Betz 2008; Cutts, Ford and Goodwin 
2010; Göle 2014; Liang 2007; Vidino 2009). Immigration, and specifically the 
place of Muslim immigrants in Western Europe are issues that have become 
central to the mainstream political discussion, particularly as they relate to 
identity and security.  
In Europe, emphasis on immigration issues was for most of the post-war era 
largely limited to nationalist movements and parties. The ANPs were the party 
family that originally stressed the perceived “incompatibility of Islam with the 
basic tenets of the European or native culture” (Mudde 2007, 85). By the 
second decade of the new century, however, with the pressure of conflicts 
abroad, economic stress, and cumulative immigration, this position is being 
increasingly adopted by centrist conservative parties (e.g. German Christian 
Democrats, the Sarkozy-led UMP, the British Conservative Party). Opinion 
polls (On_Islam 2014; Ramdani 06.01.2011; YouGov 2013; Fregosi 
1998; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Landman 2007) have confirmed 
considerable concern about Islamism in Europe, the polls almost always 
finding a large section of the survey population admitting some degree of 
anxiety or hostility.  
The ANPs define the West as standing for a depth of enduring civilisation, 
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which manifested itself in Europe and spread to areas colonised by Europeans. 
As stated by the Dutch politician Geert Wilders, the West was founded on the 
ideas of ‘Rome, Athens and Jerusalem’ those defined as being concepts in 
opposition to Islamism. In that thesis, the West is the more civilised entity, the 
home of freedom and prosperity, basing itself on the mode of rational thought 
of the Classical Greeks and Romans, tempered by Christianity. Some including 
Wilders put an emphasis on the Jewish contribution to European civilization, 
adopting a philo-Semitic and pro-Israeli stance which though earnest, also can 
be used to render accusations of Nazism void.  The following sub-sections 
focus on issues specific to the ANPs’ utilisation of their notions of Islamism, 
Islam and Muslims in their media strategy. 
 
4.3.7 Immigration and the Enemy Within 
Due to cultural taboos, which the ANPs would define as ‘political correctness’, 
the topic of mass immigration has been frequently excluded from European 
politics by political elites, the mainstream political parties, and the main social 
or religious organisations (Sibley 2011, 12). The fact that the matter was rarely 
discussed in overt fashion, lest charges of racism might arise, ensured the 
ANPs had ownership of an increasingly salient issue, specifically as regards to 
the fact of large-scale immigration of Muslim populations into Western Europe.  
Mudde (2013b, 248):  
 
“In some cases the changes in salience of the immigration issue 
seem to follow Christopher Wlezien’s (1995) famous 
‘thermostatic model’ – that is, growing public salience about 
immigration leads to electoral success, and to an increase in 
policy activity on immigration. This could be seen in Denmark, for 
example, where the salience of immigration rose sharply 
between 1990 and 2001 when the DF achieved its electoral 
break - through, yet fell again in 2005 after the first period of DFP 
support for the minority government and a tightening of 
immigration laws.”  
Opposition to mass immigration, specifically non-European immigration is the 
core of the ANPs’ platform, and along with Euroscepticism their strongest 
issue, as no other party, party families or social movements have been willing 
to outflank the ANPs in regards to owning the issue for fear of losing their 
supporter base. However some on the centre right have begun to tackle the 
issues as a foil to the ANPs, while some on the left have raised anxieties about 
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the effect off immigration in lowering wages. Immigration was generally 
supported by the established parties operating under a neoliberal frame of free 
trade and free movement in the labour market. The ANPs would rail against 
the ‘establishment left’ as having sold out the native working class in order to 
engage with new-Left concepts of multiculturalism and anti-racism. Groshek 
and Englebert (2013, 189). 
“Similarly, in dissenting from and then leaving the Dutch Liberal Party, 
Wilders has accused what he terms the elitist political left of favouring 
Muslim immigrants over working-class Dutch citizens. Wilders has thus 
built on the legacy of Fortuyn’s double differentiation from the political left 
in accusing them of privileging a foreign minority while simultaneously 
positioning himself as needing to act − as an outsider able to exert 
influence − within the political establishment on behalf of a marginalised 
majority.”  
 
Rather than moving away from the issue the party grouping has moved beyond 
it (Mudde 2013b), into some of the additional areas that are covered in this 
section of the thesis – all interrelated and branches that spring from the trunk 
of mass immigration.  This focus blames the represented adverse effects of 
mass immigration on the policies of political, business, academic and media 
elites far removed from the travails of ‘the people’s’ day to day lives. The ANPs 
describe a situation in which the interests of business elites who aim to access 
cheaper or more qualified labour in lieu of training or employing unemployed or 
under employed citizens, converge with social liberals who ideologically 
support multiculturalism, in contrast with the ANPs’ intention of maintaining the 
ethnic primacy of the historical population, and a coherence between the 
notion of the nation and the state. 
Nativism is the core ideological foundation of the ANPs’ opposition to 
immigration, specifically Muslim immigration and Islamic settlement in Western 
Europe. There may be animosity also towards other non-native European 
immigrant groups, such as Roma, Chinese, and Christian or animist sub-
Saharan Africans, amongst (Mudde 2007) the parties. To counter being 
defined as broadly racist and inflexibly anti-immigrant, ANPs like the FN will 
laud the success of previous waves of immigrants from Spain, Italy or Poland 
(Betz and Meret 2009, 314). By supporting the notion that other native 
European nationals can integrate well into a new country somewhat 
seamlessly, they can suggest there is an ease among European nations, which 
they will publicly frame as anything but the case with large portions of the 
Muslim population; particularly as some in the later generations are more 
assertive in their religio-cultural practices than their grandparents. 
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As an immigrant group perceived as not simply alien (like the Vietnamese 
French or British Hindus for example), strict followers of Islam (Islamists) are 
represented as hostile to European norms, due to the history of conflict and 
divergence of behaviours already discussed. Mass immigration and the 
resultant Islamic communities have been presented in negative terms on 
several points by the ANPs: mutual exclusivity of religio-cultural norms, 
economic costs of asylum, welfare and government services required by 
immigrants and their children, the breakup of native communities, particularly 
in poorer areas, criminality and terrorism. In locations such as Belgian 
Flanders, France and Denmark the issue, in conjunction with the ANPs’ 
growth, has contributed to a destabilisation of the established right – left 
dichotomy, and offered a third position, or a fourth where a Green party, or an 
ardent left-wing group also is successful.  
 
4.3.8 Parallel Societies as Islamism’s European ‘Fifth Column’  
Examples of the ‘parallel societies’ phenomenon can be found in the capital 
cities of the case study subjects, and sometimes in important regional centres: 
Copenhagen, Paris and other major French cities, and the Brussels suburb of 
Molenbeek all have areas of high concentration of Muslim migrants.  These are 
areas featured in the media output of the ANPs.  Problems that arise in these 
areas are represented by the ANPs as evidence of the mutual exclusivity and 
failure of the process of integration or multiculturalism. The most pointed 
examples are the occasional outbreaks of ethno-sectarian violence (e.g. 
Oldham – Northern England 2001; Anderlecht – Brussels 2006; the recurrent 
riots in sections of the French Banlieues which are presented as ethnic). 
Sectarian and ethnic animosity between Muslim and other populations is 
prevalent in some of these areas, and has been a featured point in the 
campaigns of the ANPs as will be considered in the discussion and review 
chapter. 
The response by the ANPs to the emergence of the ‘parallel societies’ includes 
demands for limiting the number of mosques (e.g. VB wants one central 
mosque for visitors), leaving the EU and the European human rights charter 
(thus ending the asylum process), halting all non-European asylum 
immediately, denying social services to Muslims and demanding their return to 
their point of origin, particularly any who display criminal behaviour. The Dutch 
politician, Geert Wilders suggested the number of Muslims in Europe that 
needed to return to their ancestral lands might be in the “tens of millions” 
(Danish-TV:DR2 2008).  
Mudde (2013b, 6) states that increased concern over the issue among 
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economically challenged Europeans has been more considerable due to a 
focus on cultural frames as an understanding of their declining economic 
status, instead of class frames. In accord with their nativism and populism, the 
ANPs seemingly have not concentrated on class frames of capital versus the 
working class, but rather ‘the people’ contra elites, which has class aspects. 
The ‘cultural’ aspect is then added in; concern over the historically non-
European immigrant populations, Muslims in particular, perceived as 
intrinsically in conflict with Western European norms. 
The effectiveness of the message that Islam is intrinsically hostile to European 
norms is in a large part evidenced by the pick-up of the issue by the VB and 
the LN (Jackson and Parkes 2014). The VB and the LN had already achieved 
political success as secessionist parties, respectively in Belgium and northern 
Italy (called Padania in the LN’s understanding), prior to the more recent phase 
of debate on Islam in Europe, and adopting the issue brought them increased 
support. The ANPs view the presence of Muslim immigrants as a major assault 
on their ethno-nations, and as a “fifth column of international Islam” (Mudde 
2007, 85). 
A message that influences some ANPs is that by stealth, criminality, and the 
weight of simple demographics, with the assistance of appeasing 
multiculturalists, and internationalists who have issue with the very idea of a 
nation, the continent of Europe is being transformed, slowly but with ethno-
suicidal certainty towards becoming ‘Eurabia’. The term refers to the supposed 
integration of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East and their populations 
(Carr 2006). The Jewish Egyptian historian, Bat Ye’or, developed the concept 
of Eurabia. It carries considerable weight within the self-defined ‘counter-jihad 
movement’ (CJM) (de Lange 2007). It has been developed by other leading 
CJM movement intellectuals including ‘Fjordman’ (Peder Are Nøstvold 
Jensen), a blogger of significant influence in the CJM. The separateness and 
innate hostility of Islamists towards their host nations is a theme that has been 
strongly developed by the ANPs. 
 
4.3.9 Conceptions of ‘the Muslim’ 
One of the frequent heavily represented charges of the ANPs is the huge drain 
Muslim immigrants and their descendants place on government services, in 
terms of family and unemployment benefits, hospitals, schooling, and the 
asylum, refugee and immigration system itself. This charge is said to discount 
any contribution from the Muslim community such as the importation of skills, 
increased productivity, or payment of taxes. 
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Unlike the traditional historical foe of the European pre World War II ultra 
nationalists, ‘the Jew’, Islam and Muslims are considered a threat because of 
their numbers, over and above any particular inherent characteristics that 
might give them access to controlling power. Anti-Semitic nativists have 
portrayed ‘the Jew’ as being cunning, manipulative and overrepresented in the 
fields of media, academia, politics, business and law; an enemy to the nation 
not by sheer volume of numbers, but rather by the supposed capacity to 
control the nation at a cultural, financial and political level, satisfying to the 
aims of the Jewish minority at the expense of the broad interests of the 
autochthonous populations.  
 
The Islamist immigrant on the other hand is presented as relatively 
uneducated, thuggish, violently criminal, and intellectually and spiritually 
backward. In this sense a small number of Jews might be a threat, while it 
would take many Muslims to bring down the foundations of European 
civilisation (Mudde 2007, 85). In this way ‘the Jews’ have historically been 
represented as a threat to the nation in terms of quality, while the Muslims are 
represented as a threat in terms of quantity. This perceived challenge is 
expressed through both a problem of foreignness, and of the ‘demographic 
jihad’.  
 
4.3.10 The Full Face Veil and Issues Around Gender and Sexuality 
One of the most contentious aspects of Islamism in Europe is the wearing of 
full veil (the Gulf niqab which allows a slit for eyes, or the Afghani burqa with 
mesh across the eye area). This is tied in to a broader criticism of the ANPs as 
it relates to practices considered patriarchal, and sexist when compared to 
Western European norms. This concern over the treatment of women in 
Islamist subcultures is one of the most apparent modernisations in the 
evolution of the ANPs. In the visible sense the issue relates to dress and levels 
of modesty, while it less visibly relates to the perceived lower status of women 
in sharia civil courts and the status of Muslim women generally. This thesis is 
not about the reality of the situation, but rather about its development as an 
issue by the ANPs as part of a broad media campaign focused on inherent 
tension between European norms and Islam.  
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Fig 3. Filip Dewinter and niqab clad supporters protesting against mosque 
construction (http://www.filipdewinter.be/geen-megamoskee-op-de-sint-
bernardsesteenweg. First published 2009 First accessed 10.12.13) 
The ANPs are eager to highlight the poor treatment of women amongst some 
European Islamic populations, specifically those who adhere to strains that are 
deemed as fundamentalist, and at the same time make an attack on 
supporters of multiculturalism and the left wing ‘enablers’; presenting them as 
favouring ‘cultural relativism’ and multiculturalism over their feminist concerns, 
when given a choice between the two (Andersen 2007).  Most ANPs take up 
controversies such as the wearing of niqab/burqa in public, female genital 
mutilation, honour killings, and polygamy. Yilmaz (2012, 370) describes a 
‘hegemonic shift’ amongst the ANPs, where “traditionally progressive anti-
capitalist, anti-imperialist, anti-sexist and anti-homophobic relations” have been 
taken up, defining themselves as being in opposition to an intrinsically 
oppressive Islamism. Some material evidence is provided by the fact the 
parties have active women members, including prominent leaders, such as the 
FN and DF. 
The styling of the targeting of Islamism by the ANPs therefore brings in a 
language of social liberalism. The parties can be protectors of national 
cultures, taking up gender equality, approval or tolerance of homosexuals (but 
not necessarily gay marriage), democracy and the separation of church and 
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state (Mudde 2007), all consistent with the general mores of contemporary 
society. Even if liberal orientated individuals, parties and social movements, 
more generally articulate such ideas it helps the ANPs in their denials of 
fascism, answering those charges which are the most damaging tactics in 
attempts to delegitimise them.  This infusion of social liberalism helps with the 
rhetoric against orthodox Islamic teachings opposed to homosexual 
relationships (which may be punished severely), and pursuing a patriarchal 
approach to gender relations.  
Such segmented liberalism can be evidenced by the promotion of high-visibility 
examples. The former DF politician, Louise Frevert, was once an actor in 
explicit pornography and is now in an enduring and public lesbian relationship 
(Andersen 2007). Geert Wilders has spoken about certain Moroccan Dutch 
youth threatening Amsterdam’s gay community. Openly homosexual Pim 
Fortuyn was perhaps the earliest, most articulate and charismatic of the critics. 
Some ‘traditionalists’, hostile to changing social attitudes and customs, might 
raise objections, but successful parties understand the importance of nuanced 
performance by party leaders and spokespeople who can gain supporters from 
among the political and social centre - those who can walk the tightrope 
between ‘too much’ and ‘too little’. They hope to move with the times, while 
maintaining their socially conservative voter base with the more pressing and 
visible issue of mass immigration and Islamism – a position needing to be 
expressed in the media accordingly.  
 
4.3.11 The War of the Pigs: Halal  
Halal refers to food that has been prepared in accordance with Islamic 
proscriptions. This means that pigs are haram (unclean), as is alcohol. All halal 
meat must be killed by a Muslim slaughterer who intones “Allah al Akbar” (God 
is great) during the process. The animal’s throats are cut and they are ‘bled 
out’. In some instances pre-stunning occurs, in some it does not 
(Department_of_Halal_Certification_Ireland 2014). In this it is similar to Jewish 
religious slaughter, with the exception that there is no pre-stunning for kosher 
slaughter. 
There are a number of aspects of halal which the ANPs take issue with halal 
requirements in Europe: i) that it is in profound conflict with European dietary 
traditions in which alcohol and pork products play a large part, ii) that halal 
products are ubiquitous and non-Muslims purchase them or are served them 
unknowingly, iii) that the money paid to gain certification is passed on to non-
Muslims, hence it is a religious tax paid by the non-religious, iv) that there is 
evidence from veterinary groups that it is not the most humane method of 
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killing, and it causes animals unnecessary pain for the sake of outmoded 
religious beliefs in a civilised country,  and v) possible health risks to humans 
related to the method of slaughter. 
 
The above concerns will be considered thoroughly in the discussion and review 
section specifically relating to the subject (Section 6.6). Moreover, in secular 
countries where cuisine is an important aspect of the culture, it is inevitable 
that concerns over culinary issues will be developed by the ANPs. MLP made 
the ubiquity of halal meat an issue when campaigning against President 
Sarkozy, while the new group of FN mayors are refusing to provide meals 
relating to religious requirements, though there is still a non-pork option (RFI 
2012a). 
 
4.3.12 Mosque Related Issues 
Alongside the dress of Muslim women in Europe, the construction of mosques 
has been the visually apparent issue highly campaigned on by the ANPs.  For 
the ANPs mosque construction has a number of aspects of concern to them, 
and which they utilise in their media campaigns: i) mosques as evidence of the 
‘Islamification’ of Europe due to their rise in numbers and the high levels of 
attendance in comparison with churches, ii) mosques as religio-political vectors 
for the dissemination of Islamism hostile to the native population – ‘radical 
mosques’, iii) the funding of mosques by overseas states with petro dollars, 
such as Saudi Arabia or Qatar, that operate on sharia law and are express 
strains of Islam in conflict with European secular norms, and iv) Mosques are 
presented as objects of domination, which is amplified by the call to prayer. 
The ANPs’ development of the issue of mosque construction and funding has 
been a considerable effort by the party family and social movements, 
particularly as it relates to ‘mega mosques’, and those that are apparently 
Islamist and religio-politically hostile to the host nation. 
 
4.3.13 Economics, Welfare and Demographics  
Economics, welfare and demographics are often interrelated in the media 
product of the ANPs. With the rise of the Muslim population, concerns about 
demand on the welfare state and the national economy become much 
mediatised. The ANPs argue, ‘the boat is full’ (Betz and Meret 2009) in simple 
terms of overpopulation, while playing upon negative impacts of immigration, 
especially examples of egregious crime or examples of imposing religious 
assertiveness or outright hostility by Islamists.  
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Converging with the growth of the number of Muslims in Western Europe has 
been the aging native population and falling birth rates, which will not sustain 
the autochthonous population. A third factor lends the issue more weight. The 
unstable, though some would say dynamic character of contemporary 
economics, under the impact of neoliberal thought, brings with it heightened 
anxiety about sometimes rogue economic management, financial crisis, 
recession and unemployment. Impacts of this are felt across the board, 
especially among young white, working class school-leavers, and their 
immigrant counterparts. Yet, it is an available argument to the ANPs to re-state 
themes about immigrants taking their jobs, while also representing hostility 
against economic rationalism and a borderless World order 
(The_Local_France 2014a). 
 
All the subjects scrutinised in the case studies support welfare for the native 
population, and for accepted immigrant groups, while in their media campaigns 
they express concern over increasing demands on the welfare state from 
immigrant populations, or ethnic communities descended from recent migrants.  
Arguments made in favour of immigration, such as economic benefits it will 
bring, are contested. For example, it will be argued through any available 
forum or channel that immigrant workers will not have paid into the tax system 
sufficiently, compared to native European populations (Norfolk 2011, 63); that 
schools are being overwhelmed by non-native groups; and to compound the 
anxiety, parents and organisations of some of these immigrant groups are 
perceived as wanting to indoctrinate children into Salafism. 
One of the essential differences in a party taxonomy that separates 
neoconservatives (in agreement with the ANPs on the threats posed by 
Islamism but not always the responses, nor the focuses), and neoliberal 
populists (e.g. UKIP), from the ANPs is difference over economics. This in 
particular brings in the appeal to the more economically challenged voters who 
are a key demographic of the ANPs. 
Mudde (2007) as a leading analyst moves to contradict any assumptions that 
ANP parties adhere to neoliberal economic positions. The ANPs he argues, 
view the ‘nation’ (a ‘people’ occupying their state) as paramount, and thus 
economics, business, welfare and government must serve the nation, and its 
social interest. The rhetorical alternative, is a commitment of the state to 
serving multinational businesses, or immigrant communities that form part of a 
global and fluid labour market. The concept and mechanism of the market is 
accepted, but not as a global market, rather a national market (Mudde 2007). 
The ANPs’ positions can be considered progressive in the ‘left wing’ sense of 
opposing any decline in living standards, with a particular concern with the 
autochthonous middle and working class. Economic and financial failure 
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undermining such standards will be represented as largely the fault of 
globalisation and ‘elites’ that benefit from it (Espersen 2013a). For the ANPs a 
cultural protectionism and economic protectionism of domestic industries, and 
the domestic workforce, should not be considered mutually exclusive in this 
sense. 
When developing their economic policies the ANPs generally have considered 
that working class, lower-middle and middle class native Europeans (Pauwels 
2011a) are the most likely to support them. Those who have been the ‘losers’ 
in the process of globalisation tend to be more resistant to multiculturalism, as 
they perceive themselves most directly challenged, economically and culturally 
by immigrants, specifically Muslim immigrants from developing countries 
(Andersen 2007).  
The platform designed to act in accord with the interests of the ‘native working 
class’ has developed over time, with many of the parties initially supporting 
neoliberal policies, influenced by Thatcher and Reagan. It has undergone a 
process of ‘proletarianisation’ (Rydgren 2006) which saw the parties take their 
economic position more in accord with working class interests, even becoming 
social democratic in part, and keen to support national industries against 
foreign competitors. A deepening cleavage is noted, no longer capital contra 
labour so much as the national interest against the global.  
Their economics will instrumentalise the ANPs’ core features. It is nativist in 
the sense that the economic argument is meant to protect the ‘national 
interest’, against predatory foreign capitalists in a time of globalisation, while 
simultaneously supporting intra-national homogeneity by restricting welfare. 
This anti-globalist, and ‘welfare chauvinist’ approach to economics is evident in 
the platform of the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party – DF), which has 
moved its economic policies approach from one of neoliberalism, leftwards to a 
position that could be described as social democratic (Andersen 
2007; Espersen 2013a; Espersen 2013b), in order to broaden its electoral 
appeal to working class native Danes.  
 
MLP supports a mixed economy whereby the state would provide a barrier to 
the excesses of ‘ultra-liberalism’, perceived as ruthless in its treatment of 
vulnerable individuals within an ethno-national community, and deeply 
destructive of the nation itself. For the ANPs social welfare is essential in the 
formation of the national community and is viewed as a deserving reward for 
contributing natives and accepted immigrant populations. Le Pen has 
increasingly used language usually associated with the left wing policy, and 
likewise the VB supports a mixed economy of which the welfare state forms a 
part (Abts 2013). In accord with BI’s efforts at gaining public attention they 
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have developed soup kitchens specifically designed to cater for the ethnic 
French by serving free pork soup (BBC 2006b). The soup kitchens convey a 
welfare-minded approach, while simultaneously excluding Muslims. The 
nativists’ idea is to go outside of the current right-left dichotomy of main-party 
politics by supporting the welfare state (albeit restricted to natives), and 
developing economic policies designed at protecting native business, workers 
and culture from the perceived excesses of global free trade.  
The ANPs’ populist and authoritarian aspects are evidenced in the harsh 
criticism of elites, both multinational, and state (particularly well paid EU 
bureaucrats) who are being seen as destructive of the national community via 
their support of free trade and mass immigration, or ‘handing over sovereignty’ 
to supra-national bodies like the EU, UN and NATO. Business and 
bureaucratic elites are portrayed as being totally removed from the problems 
faced by the native working class and small business class, with commonly 
unpopular practices like privatisation of public assets being the focus of 
campaigns.  
The ANPs are reticent to engage in detailed criticisms of economic policies, or 
wholly detailed exposition of their own economic programs, as this is not 
considered their area of strength or expertise (Matlack 2013); unlike 
immigration, law and order, and identity. The sort of economic concerns 
expressed by the ANPs tend to mimic the ‘outrages and injustices’ that are 
commonplace in tabloid newspapers, the Daily Mail being a prime example, in 
which there are numerous articles documenting immigrant crime and welfare 
fraud, the high cost of the ‘bogus’ asylum program, the problems sometimes 
associated with Roma, and the excesses of bankers and the financial and 
economic elite. The nativist economic populism is often backed with traditional 
authoritarian responses to criminal outrages and social injustices, with 
demands including increased sentences for such crimes and the expulsion of 
criminal immigrants. They point out the inherent unfairness to the native citizen 
taxpayer ‘rorted’ by both the immigrants and their ‘enablers’, and the 
multinational financial elite who avoid taxes, steal from the nation, do no ‘real 
work’, and can be represented as parasitic. This tabloid audience may be more 
responsive to the media tone of the ANPs as it is analogous with their historical 
media output. 
 
4.3.14 Security: Criminality and Terrorism 
Criminality and terrorism attributed to members of Western European Muslim 
populations are separate though interrelated issues as both affect real and 
perceived security, or more pointedly the sense of insecurity. They are heavily 
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mediatised issues in the tabloids in particular. Terrorism especially is designed 
to elicit a media response from the strategic perspective of the violent, 
politically motivated criminals who engage in it. The fact that conflict is a strong 
news value only makes the framing of the issue more focused, and 
encourages the hard line taken by the ANPs on issues of crime and 
punishment. A straightforward position is easily expressed in a sound bite. It 
may assist in appealing to prospective voters already concerned about crime 
associated with Muslim immigrant communities or neighborhoods.  
The issue associated with Islam that has the most immediately negative and 
sinister connotations is terrorism. The suicide bombings in London and Madrid 
were shockingly newsworthy in themselves, even while when states like Italy, 
Spain, Britain and Germany have experienced other, non-Islamist terrorist 
activity within living memory (e.g. ETA, IRA, Red Brigades, National Socialist 
Underground). The targeted acts of Islamist terrorism aimed at silencing artists, 
critics, journalists, politicians and others who have been critical of Islam in 
Europe, or are seen to have contravened sharia by ridiculing Mohammad, are 
significant to the research in that they have been presented by the ANPs as a 
challenge not just to the physical security, but to the liberal artistic, intellectual 
and media cultures of Western Europe.  
 
Acts like the assassination of the contentious Dutch commentator and film 
maker, Theo Van Gogh, who made a film about the oppression of women 
under Islamism, and the attempted assassination of Kurt Westergaard, the 
editor of Jyllands Posten the Danish newspaper which published the 
Mohammad cartoons, are prime examples of this type of targeted terrorism 
aimed at liberal Western approaches to free speech and satirisation of Islam 
(Sjolie 2010). 
Concern with Islamic terrorism overlaps with the ANPs’ focus on ‘Islamic’ 
criminality – both prominent in the ANPs’ media product. As parties operating 
on a ‘law and order’ platform the ANPs support the maintenance of a strict 
legal system, arguing for such rules that essentially mandate heavy penalties 
for crimes, which should be actively and rigorously applied. They will demand 
support for the police, rather uncritically; and in France the FN has raised the 
issue of the death penalty (Willsher 2011). The approach offered is punitive in 
the first instance extending into support of harsh prison regimens, a right for 
citizen self defence sanctioning counter-violence, and restoration of the death 
penalty with particular reference to expressly named crimes. These proposed 
solutions, or responses at least, will be presented as simple and 
straightforward ones – ideally suited for making headlines. 
When crimes are linked to non-native populations, these in turn are made 
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something of; they are associated in the ANPs narrative. Examples are Islamist 
terrorism, the activities of ethnically based street gangs, rioting by recent 
immigrant populations and their descendants, or hate crimes against native 
Europeans - an issue developed by BI (Bloc-Identitaire_Dijon 2011) and FN 
(AltertaDigital 2012) and adopted by the centre right leader, Jean-Francois 
Cope (Sage 2012). This relates to populism as the principal agency of the 
policies on mass immigration. Where crime is perplexing for citizens, any 
salience of ‘non-native’ crime is represented as the social problem related to 
mass immigration. The merging of the populist and authoritarian aspects of the 
party family and social movements can be seen in MLP’s calls for a 
referendum (exemplary of direct populist democracy) on the reintroduction of 
the death sentence, a strongly authoritarian punishment option.  
  
4.3.15 Globalisation 
Nationalist parties are averse to globalisation as they see international political 
organisations (e.g. EU, United Nations, NATO) as a direct threat to the national 
community, in terms of weakening it through gradual dissipation of national 
sovereignty by the EU, neoliberal economics and increased mass immigration, 
all associated in the one process (Mudde 2007). Globalisation is viewed by the 
ANPs as a form of economic and cultural imperialism – an imperialism 
consciously working to undermine the national culture and community, and 
homogenise the world in an effort to create atomised, traditionless consumers, 
with minimal, if any historical roots. Many of the ANPs, particularly the FN, 
relate globalisation to the “American way of life” including junk food (Mudde 
2007, 185) and anti-social, non-European music forms like hip-hop. ANPs 
argue against US cultural and economic imperialism, though the perceived 
Islamification of Europe via mass migration is a more immediate concern, and 
of a greater magnitude.  
In their media campaigns the ANPs present themselves as defenders of the 
nation against an array of universalising enemies, from US capitalism, mass 
immigration, the ‘human rights regime’ perceived as being responsible for 
giving preference to foreigners over natives. They are well aware that sub-
groups within their target demographic haven’t flourished in the globalised age 
of ‘off-shoring’, work force casualisation, competition from relatively cheap 
immigrant labour and the struggle of first world manufacturing against cheap 
tariff free imports (AltertaDigital 2012, 15). 
Zaslove (2004, 2008b, 2012) defines the ANPs as an anti-globalisation force. 
From his position it’s not hard to discern the party family may claim to be the 
most emphatic anti-globalisation movement.  Mainstream parties of the centre-
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right, are mostly aligned with neoliberalism and globalisation. Mainstream 
parties of the centre-left, labour, social democrats, are divided in approach, 
though mostly backing financial deregulation and free trade, often when in 
office privatising state assets, and wanting to regulate not depress migration. 
Movements further left and the Green parties want economic regulation and 
reduction of corporate power, along with easing of the drive for economic 
growth and exponential growth in trade movements. According to Zaslove 
(2008b, 2008a) the ideal society for the ANPs would be one in which national 
sovereignty was paramount, European civilisation would be supported by a 
confederation of independent nation states with citizens receiving national 
preference in terms of welfare and housing.  
To express these differences among parties on globalization: centre-left 
interests, or the so-called liberal left, would not be looking for an end to the 
‘world system’, but rather its replacement with an alter-globalisation. It would 
be an international order, not built on corporate late capitalism, but on ideas of 
social justice, environmentalism and fair trade; a stance in opposition to 
neoliberalism and in accord with the principles of the World Social Forum. At 
this point the ANP rejection of neo-liberal globalisation has a different 
philosophical character, seeing it as an anathema, an elite driven, corporate 
ideology to be replaced by the model of national entities (Zaslove 
2004, 2008b, 2008a, 2012).   
Zaslove (2008a) gives four principal reasons the ANPs are strong anti-globalist 
parties: 
i. Globalisation is elite driven 
ii. Globalisation limits state sovereignty 
iii. Globalisation is linked to the growing power of the European Union 
iv. Economic globalisation destroys the organic nature of civil society, 
threatening the ‘natural’ economic order and its traditional organising 
principles 
JMLP is quoted, declaring, “After having destroyed the village, the parish, rural 
society, and traditional social relations… they still want to deregulate, to uproot, 
and change the rules of how our society functions, not for the good of French 
workers, but to align it to the scandalous economies of the Third World” 
(Zaslove 2008, from Meny and Surel 2000, 146). 
Marine Le Pen has made the FN’s anti-globalisation message even more 
pronounced than her father, making persistent public statements against 
international banking and multinationals. Amongst her pronouncements she 
has stated, “we need to resist the free market policies that threaten our 
economy, and yes, even our identity; and those princes of the finance and 
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banking world who are nothing more than a global mafia and exploit man with 
no-one willing to confront them” (Zaslove 2008a). So globalisation, the 
prevailing trend of the present era, is most often being framed by the ANPs as 
a vehicle for anti-national elites who have no allegiance to national wealth, 
tradition or sovereignty, wishing merely to destroy the national community, for 
the benefit of themselves, and to suit the goals of supra national bodies. 
 
4.3.16 United Against Islamism in Europe 
The notion of a pan-national cooperation, between parties that are explicitly 
nationalist, as the ANPs are, is by its nature problematic. The parties must 
simultaneously adhere to the principal belief in the sovereignty of the nation 
state while forming alliances when dealing with Europe-wide issues: trade, 
security, and immigration for example. This being the case there has been a 
number of ANP alliances, both formal and informal that have developed in 
order to navigate such policy areas.  The issue of Islamism in Europe is both of 
national and ‘civilisational’ concern to the ANPs – thus an understanding of the 
pan-nationalist approach to relationships between party members is relevant. 
A field of opportunity, but difficult for the parties is participation in the European 
Parliament (EP). Its large multiple-member constituencies and proportional 
voting system enable small parties to get delegates elected, providing them 
with access to political resources: salaries, communications, research, and 
travel – and to publicity. As Morris (2013) reports on the basis of an extensive 
survey, members from the ANPs tend to use the business of the EP for 
publicity, using the forum and availability of a media gallery to affect the adage 
that ‘communication can be action.’ Morris (2013) describes the sometimes-
contentious relationships among the Eurosceptic nationalists in the European 
Parliament, with apparent difficulty in forming relationships and maintaining 
unity within such groupings as Europe for Freedom and Democracy.  
The ANPs under examination are nativists, but with regard to pan-European 
issues they are ‘civilisationists’ in the sense they do support the notion of a 
broader European civilisation; a civilisation that they perceive to be a 
composite of Hellenic, Roman and Christian (Liang 2007, 17). This 
‘civilisationist’ approach is manifest in the formation of pan–European ANPs 
institutions that maintain the balancing act between ensuring national 
sovereignty and dealing with European wide issues. Any relationships between 
parties are based on a confederate model, in opposition to the European 
Union, which they abhor as they perceive it to be anti-nationalist, elitist and 
undemocratic.  
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Though informal communications between party members are frequent and 
established (e.g. VB and the FN, the FPO and the LN) the Vienna declaration 
of 2005 is a significant indicator of the tone of the parties. A gathering of 
representatives of the main parties included the FPO, VB and FN, while the LN 
sent an observer, as well as Eastern European (e.g. Ataka) and smaller parties 
from Western Europe (Pleyers 2013). The ‘Contact Forum for European 
Patriotic and National Parties and Movements’ adopted a declaration that 
stated a set of objectives: 
i. The establishment of a Europe of free and independent nations 
within the framework of a confederation of nation states 
ii. The renunciation of all attempts to create a constitution for a 
centralist European superstate 
iii. The clear rejection of the boundless entanglement of European 
integration to geographical, cultural, religious, and ethnic non-
European areas of Asia and Africa 
iv. The effective protection of Europe against the dangers of terrorism, 
aggressive Islamisation, superpower imperialism, and economic 
aggression by low-wage countries 
v. An immediate immigration stop in all states of the European Union, 
also in the so-called area of family reunion 
vi. A pro-natalist family policy, which aims at the promotion of large 
numbers of children of the European ethnic communities within the 
traditional family 
vii. The solidarist struggle of European ethnic communities against the 
social and economic effects of globalisation 
viii. The restoration of social systems of the member states of the 
European Union and social justice for European ethnic communities 
This declaration is the manifesto as to what they would do in regard to 
international relations within Europe. It supports the notion that ANPs are not 
nationalist isolationists; rather they are non-interventionists in the internal 
matters of ‘friendly sovereign states’, but will align themselves in confederation 
when closing ranks against external threats to their understanding of European 
meta-culture, reminiscent of ND ideas of ethnopluralism and a European 
confederation, of which threats Islam is the most pressing that they see.  
One of the most apparent issues amongst the interviewees, contacted for the 
present study, was some concern about being seen to be in league with 
political extremists (e.g. groups prone to racial violence). The problem extends 
to relations among the larger and more cautious groups here under study. For 
example DF representatives (Vistisen 2013) were concerned about anti-
Semitism they perceived in the FN, even though it was understood MLP had 
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been moving the party in another direction, while the FN (de Danne 2013) was 
eager to distance itself from the relative extremism of Jobbik in Hungary, 
Golden Dawn in Greece and the British National Party. Thus there are three 
proximate groupings in the political parties: relatively ‘clean’ parties such as the 
DF (though no less radical in their approaches towards Islam) with no public 
association with historical fascism; successful moderating parties such as the 
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and FN, and parties perceived as crypto or 
explicitly fascist such as Jobbik, Golden Dawn and the BNP. 
Of particular interest to this research was the failed attempt at the creation of a 
formal group at European Parliament level so as to provide more resources to 
constituent members. The FN performed exceptionally well at the European 
elections, though the other allies in the patriphilic, Islam/ism-critical and 
Eurosceptic group were unable to form such an alliance. Neither UKIP, the 
Sweden Democrats nor the DF were willing to join the European Alliance for 
Freedom, and without their participation the constituent parties - the FN, Lega 
Nord, Wilders’ Party for Freedom or the Austrian Freedom Party - were unable 
to form such a group with official status in the Parliament. As the thesis is 
being written FN led negotiations between ANPs are under way to form a bloc 
of 25 members of the European Parliament from seven constituent states so 
as to benefit from added financial support and opportunities on committees. 
 
4.3.17 Foreign Affairs:  Israel and Turkey 
There are two foreign affairs issues, which are of particular importance to the 
ANPs’ media campaigns: the accession of Turkey to the EU, or rejection of it, 
and the issue of Israel-Palestine. For the ANPs, the entry of Turkey into the 
European Union is an anathema and is a proposition universally condemned 
(Liang 2007). The notion of 70 000 000 new members of the EU, from a 
country becoming more consciously Islamic in the conduct and tone of 
government, is perhaps the most significant and pressing foreign affairs issue 
for the ANPs. The Vlaams Belang demands the entire Turkish question should 
be settled by a referendum in each of the member states, whereby Europeans 
would cast their votes on the admission of Turkey, but also on the European 
Union constitution and the further enlargement of the EU (Claeys 2013).  
Support for Zionism and a general philo-Semitism serve two principal functions 
in a strategic sense. Giving support to the idea of the Jewish state and making 
concerned and protective public utterances about Jewish populations in 
Europe can counter charges of Nazism by the ANPs’ political opponents. It 
also provides the ANPs with Christian and Jewish militant Zionist allies, 
framing their relationship as a united front against radical Islam. The VB has 
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well developed relationships with Antwerp’s Orthodox Jewish community 
(Claeys 2013). The FN (de Danne 2013) supports a two state solution to the 
Israel/Palestine issue, while publicly purging anti-Semites from the party. One 
of the DF’s spokespeople and media advisors in 2013 was Jewish and the 
party is supportive of Israel, while Bloc Identitaire campaigns exclusively on 
Islamism, supporting Israel on the principle of the right to difference, and for all 
peoples to have a nation state (Robert 2013).  
Concerns over foreign affairs are principally determined by shared interests, 
which focus on a confederation of European peoples meeting challenges to 
their respective nations and European Civilization generally. The most 
apparent agents of these anti-national changes would be, once again, elites of 
the EU facilitating mass immigration into Europe, and appeasing radical 
Islamists, by acquiescing to demands for sharia law, with an acceptance that 
Islamic cultural norms should be considered on an equal footing as ‘native’ 
ones. 
It is apparent there is an array of issues related to Islam in Europe, and 
overseas, that have been focused on as points of difference between the 
ANPs’ perception of native European cultures and their representation of Islam 
in Europe. In order to answer the research question fully the second section of 
the literature review examines aspects of the media addressing theoretical 
issues and media types. 
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SECTION 5:  Literature Review - The Media and Authoritarian 
Nativist Populists 
5.1 Introduction 
This section specifically covers the relationship between the media and the 
ANPs, with a particular emphasis on the application of their media strategy, 
and will consider the work of area specialists like Mudde and Rydgren, and 
media researchers, most notably Hallin and Entman. It provides an 
understanding of the media relevant to the Discussion and Review Section (6).  
The study by Linda Bos, Walter van der Brug and Claeys de Vrees (2011) 
confirms Mudde’s (2007, 248) statement that news media are both friends and 
enemies of the ANPs. This is because there is an underlying hostility towards 
the ANPs, but the ANPs often make news due to their sometimes bombastic 
and confrontational style, acting in conjunction with leaders who often have a 
mediagenic celebrity. In this sense there is a reciprocal relationship, valuable 
for the insurgent phase, as the ANPs often have fewer financial resources than 
other party families in the early stages of their growth and are eager for 
coverage. 
Some established media, generally tabloid, can be sympathetic to the issues 
raised by the ANPs (e.g. concerns over Islamism, criminality, welfare fraud by 
immigrants, the burqa/niqab). This acts in conjunction with the tendency of the 
tabloid papers to be hostile to certain types of ‘elites’ that are in opposition to 
the ANPs platforms. It applies when attacking the political class in general, and 
urbane elites, the oft-castigated ‘bourgeois bohemians’ who would be amongst 
the most directly in opposition to the ANPs in terms of platform. 
The ANPs perceive the need for the established media (and/or their ‘own’ 
media, produced by themselves) to spread their message (Mazzoleni 
2003, 2008). As such they must finely balance their populist rhetoric so as not 
to move into a ‘deviant’ position. The movement towards a new area of 
contention must consider the salience of the issue; attack their opposition while 
attracting media interest, without being so radical and vitriolic in their content 
and tone as to be considered extremist by extant and prospective supporters. 
To define yourself and your party or social movement as standing up for ‘the 
people’ against ‘elites’ and Islamist immigrant populations, and their 
descendants, perceived as hostile, is newsworthy. In the next section the 
principal theories used in the review and discussion will be elucidated, 
specifically as they relate to the ANP media strategy of gaining legitimacy 
through developing salient issues in their characteristic style. 
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The current prevailing media ethos in the Western liberal tradition is based 
around news values as the primary motivating interest of journalists. These are 
anticipated as reflecting audience interest, which in turn will serve the purpose 
of the ANPs to be ‘interesting’. Their principal means of doing so is by being 
controversial and engaging in conflict with established political norms over their 
salient issue selection. With existing animus directed towards political ‘elites’ 
among general publics, they move to self-define as champions of the ‘people’. 
For the more capable media players like Fortuyn (though not fitting the full 
definitions of an ANP), MLP, or Oskar Freysinger of the Schweizerische 
Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party – SVP), they develop a level of celebrity on 
top of their contentious, populist message, adding the value of their personal 
lives to the broader political programme, making them relatively suitable for 
coverage in tabloids. 
Structural issues, and the orientation and influence of the media company may 
be crucial, through setting the editorial tone of the newspapers, or an owner’s 
predilection for being involved in the controversy of the day, (viz Rupert 
Murdoch as an interventionist owner at News Corporation). However media 
professionals function independently and are reliant on audience interest for 
the continuation of their livelihood and professional progression. In this sense 
news media organisations are not ordinary companies as they have a 
characteristic interest, finding and publishing news, which entails deep social 
involvement. 
 
5.2 Consensus, Controversy and Deviance: Hallin’s Three Incremental Fluid 
Hegemonic Spheres and Mainstreaming    
Though now seemingly entering the political mainstream, if polls and electoral 
results are evidence of the increasing acceptance ANPs’ platforms and 
ideology, the interviewees representing the party family and social movements 
reported a sense of isolation and a self-perception of being at odds with a 
largely hostile media (Claeys 2013; De Danne 2013; Espersen 
2013a; Espersen 2013b; Robert 2013; Vistisen 2013). This is by no means 
empirical proof of any said hostility; yet it does provide an indication that at the 
organisational level the ANPs have viewed themselves (or previously have in 
the case of the interviewees from the DF) as operating in an adverse media 
environment. (The DF may be the exception; its interviewees, if previously 
aggrieved, now report the party as being treated as any other political player 
with media coverage). Their sense of a hostile tone from the mainstream press 
is congruent with the judgment of academic researchers (Abts 2013; Mudde 
2013a).  
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Hallin’s (1986, 117) theoretical model was developed around the media 
coverage of the Vietnam War. It serves as a useful analytical tool in 
understanding the media strategies of the ANPs in light of historical burdens 
and the case study subjects’ outsider status. The theoretical model is pertinent 
when researching the salience of mass immigration and Islamism in Europe, 
and demonstrates the skill required from party and movement spokespeople 
and media producers to engage with previously (and in some cases still) taboo 
issues without being perceived as deviantly totalitarian or racist. The model 
illustrates how outsider parties and social movements must behave when they 
engage in public utterances and their production of media content; as they aim 
to move their issues from the deviant periphery, to the realm of conscious and 
acceptable debate, until their ideas might become mainstream consensus 
values held by large numbers of the citizenry. 
 
 
Fig 4. Hallin’s (1986, 117) Sphere of Fluid Hegemony  
As depicted in the accompanying diagram, Hallin’s model of concentric 
spheres indicates three areas of relationship among political actors and the 
public, with the media acting as the conduit through which the exchange is 
represented. The spheres are not hard-edged, but rather ‘fuzzy’ incremental 
graduations from a centre of deep consensus, to positions increasingly distant 
from most widely accepted norms, towards ‘deviant notions’. There is 
movement between the three spheres and the borders are permeable. The 
borders are largely of convenience and the trajectory from issues of core 
consensus to deviancy are best understood as being from most acceptable 
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through to the deeply deviant, with myriad shades of grey in the transition 
between them. 
According to Hallin (1986) the sphere of consensus is the place where 
universally accepted ideas are manifest. Those that are in opposition to the 
consensus are either worthy of legitimate debate or are considered deviant. 
For instance ‘democracy’ exists within the sphere of consensus. The 
mainstream media support this hegemonic principle of democracy as a self-
evident good that isn’t challenged, though its definition may be (i.e. popular 
democracy contra liberal democracy) (Hallin 1986). Proponents associated 
with racial supremacy or sympathy towards the Third Reich must be expelled 
from the ANPs (an example would be the expulsion of the fascist Alexandre 
Gabriac from the FN) (France_24 2013) as they imbue the ANP with deviance 
in terms of public perception.   
Following this pragmatic dictum, the ANPs’ strategic requirement (in terms of 
internal supply side factors) is to move any of their issues considered deviant, 
into the sphere of legitimate controversy, and then into consensus by framing 
their position in a manner that will move it towards mainstream acceptance. 
Such issues as concerns about Islam in Europe are ‘the spear tip’ of broader 
criticisms of multiculturalism, as there are no pervasive concerns about Hindu 
and Sikh immigrants in Britain or Vietnamese immigrant descended 
populations in France for example. In this sense Islam is a breakthrough issue 
for the ANPs.  
From the perspective of the ANPs’ media strategy it makes sense to bring the 
issue of Islam in Europe into the sphere of legitimate controversy by focusing 
on where Islam comes into conflict with the Western consensus, such as 
concerns over women’s rights, secularism, parallel societies and security. This 
assists in navigating established media hostility, as the more deviant the 
position from what is acceptable in the sphere of consensus, the more 
aggressive the journalists tend to be towards those considered deviant. Hence, 
can be seen the crucial nature of strategic framing for the ANPs, and their 
spokespeople and media producers, to navigate what will attract media 
attention but not place them in a position to be framed as deviant. 
Where coverage moves from the sphere of legitimate controversy towards 
deviancy the media reportage gets increasingly hostile (Hallin 1986). There is 
no institutional or audience expectation that those in the sphere of deviance 
are worthy of a fair and objective treatment, and the consideration of both, or 
more sides of a situation, as the professional code of journalists generally 
demands (Hallin 1986). If the code is null and void when reporting on deviants; 
it is not the same when reporting on issues of consensus or legitimate 
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controversy. Much of course depends on the editorial tone, outlook and 
principles of the media in question. Examples of deviance, which are inevitably 
reported in a hostile manner by the mainstream media, would be neo-Nazis, 
Holocaust deniers, and Islamists suggesting the implementation of strict penal 
codes such as amputation or death by stoning; all notions profoundly at odds 
with the contemporary consensus in Western Europe. 
From this model it becomes apparent the ANPs must communicate in a space 
of legitimate contestation to gain support, with the long-term agenda of 
developing hegemonic consensus in accord with their platforms – a nativist 
‘culture war’. This is complicated by the editorial stance of the different media 
producers and distributors, but it does provide a useful model to build on when 
examining the ANPs’ strategic media approaches. Thus, importance is 
attached to moderation and modernisation, so prospective voters will not take 
charges of fascism and Nazism by their opponents seriously, and so frames 
that present them in such a light may be discounted. They may be counter 
framed with positions espousing radical democracy, women’s rights, 
secularism, and defence of established European and national norms against 
agents of an often-violent religious doctrine unable to disentangle itself from 
political positions in direct conflict with the concerns of the ‘natives’ and other 
accepted immigrant populations. 
This version of the model has been created to help examine issues pertinent to 
the ANPs’ efforts at mainstreaming, and their work in areas where they can 
develop arguments and media product so as to improve their likelihood of 
gaining acceptance with prospective voters, and while intending to remove any 
negative associations with the past. In this case it suits the purposes of the 
ANPs to link consensus issues like democracy to those in the sphere of 
legitimate controversy like Islam in Europe, as a threat to it. Deviant issues are 
to be avoided, and those who espouse them are to be expelled from the 
parties and movements. 
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Fig 5. The Three Spheres as they relate to the ANPs  
Much of the agitation around these issues falling into a ‘deviant’ field has been 
so contentious that it presents in the media as negative publicity, although as 
Mudde (2007, 252) argues, even that may be of help to the cause:  
“Common political wisdom says that any publicity is good 
publicity…given that the potential voters of the populist radical right 
parties tend to be the most suspicious of elites, including the media. 
The argument that even (highly) negative coverage in the media will 
bring parties electoral success, because of the rise in their profile and 
the salience of their issues makes perfect sense.”  
That there is hostility towards the ANPs is accepted and as suggested by 
Mudde in the above quotation, is beneficial as long as it remains in the area of 
legitimate controversy. The skill of ANP spokespeople and media producers is 
essential when considering the need to attract enough media attention without 
moving into the sphere of deviance, when developing and owning salient 
issues principally related to mass immigration, sovereignty and Islamism in 
Europe. Thus in the insurgent phase a leader like JMLP, a capable, though 
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damagingly provocative orator, well versed in the intellectual traditions of 
European nationalism (Camus 2013) does attract media attention. His capacity 
to draw out salient issues into the political debate, leading to recurrent 
coverage on issues of mass immigration, Islamism and identity, launched his 
party as a political force. MLP has learnt from her father’s overly controversial 
public utterances that would move him into the sphere of deviancy with a 
damaging regularity. She maintains a course into the area of legitimate 
controversy of which discussion of Islam is an example; most certainly in the 
view of the targeted audiences she aims to reach. The art of ANP public 
utterances is to politicise salient issues via controversial media outputs 
(whether leader utterances, proclaiming of campaign issues, YouTube videos, 
televised debates and so on), but in a moderate and modern fashion that will 
ensure it will operate in the sphere of legitimate controversy. In such a case, at 
least a significant portion of the strategic public is likely to find the message 
palatable, if not appealing. This enables the ANPs to own, or stake a major and 
valid claim to issues (e.g. immigration, sovereignty, identity), with the intention 
of opening up the debate and moving it into the sphere of legitimate 
controversy in the first instance, and on to consensus in the second. 
As the party family often lends itself to a particular media style that is often 
abrasive, it remains essential that nevertheless they should avoid associations 
with anti-democratic parties and social movements perceived as being related 
to historical fascism. This being the case it’s essential for parties and social 
movements of this kind to present an image that is indeed democratic in belief 
and commitment. They do this by consciously defining themselves as being in 
contrast to the anti-democratic nature of their proclaimed opposition: Islamists, 
the EU and loosely defined media, political, economic and academic elites. 
Camus (2013) reports the FN was replete with members who had associations 
with the Vichy regime of the 1940s, who mostly have retired from the party 
over time, while a new generation with no ties to fascism, neo fascism or 
related extreme views, and only experience of democratic, nativist populism, 
will be the future of the party. The totalitarians have been ousted while the 
patriotic populists who know how and when to measure their tone are in the 
ascendency. 
 
5.2.1 Overcoming Official Dominance and Penetrating the Sphere of Legitimate 
Controversy by Developing Salient Issues and Contesting Established Frames 
Official dominance refers to the institutional tendency to treat official actors (i.e. 
established parties, politicians, academics, senior public servants – those who 
populists tend to refer to as ‘the elite’) as the preferred source of news, and 
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news verification. In such a situation news media become highly dependent on 
official sources for the collection and validation of information. In this sense 
official actors are often able to frame issues in press releases or other official 
public utterances in the first instance; giving them a primacy in news stories, 
and providing audiences with an official version, which may be mediated via 
the journalist, and subsequently the audience. ‘Officiality’ provides intrinsic 
‘weight’ to journalists. Shehata (2007, 147) argues: 
“The mechanisms behind official dominance can be understood 
through the lens of Hallin’s model of spheres (1986). According to 
Hallin, journalistic norms, such as objectivity and balance, are put 
into practice only under specific circumstances, depending on the 
level of conflict and consensus surrounding the issues at hand. He 
argues that journalists strive for objectivity only when dealing with 
topics that are within a sphere of legitimate controversy. For other 
issues—belonging to either a sphere of consensus or one of 
deviance—balanced reporting is not regarded as being necessary. 
It is quite reasonable that journalists use the indexing mechanism to 
evaluate the legitimacy of a controversy. When making decisions 
regarding how to cover a story, journalists consciously or 
unconsciously evaluate the level of conflict surrounding the issue 
within established political institutions. Legitimacy is based on the 
presence of critics within those institutions. In contrast, critical 
voices outside these institutions are not regarded as being 
legitimate when their views are not backed up from inside.” 
Thus, for the ‘official dominance’ theorists any issues that are deemed to be in 
the realm of deviance are not treated with the journalistic approaches of 
balance, functional objectivity and getting both sides of the story (or more if 
that’s appropriate). Therefore the process of developing acceptable frames for 
publics and avoiding being considered deviant is crucial for the ANPs and their 
coverage in the mainstream media. At the same time they will be seeking 
alternative routes to get potential support, for example via social media, to 
counter critique the frames of a mainstream media, and to take on where they 
can, in public confrontations and debates, social movement opposition such as 
anti-racism groups and organised supporters of multiculturalism. 
 
With particular reference to the ANPs Mazzoleni (2003, 16 ) argues: 
“Depending on the degree of integration of the media systems with the 
dominant political elites of a country, the established news media 
reflects the views of the elites to which they themselves belong. 
Accordingly these media outlets may tend to adopt a law and order 
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attitude and use their journalistic weapons for the defence of the status 
quo when it comes to attack from anti-establishment forces, such as 
protest groups and populist movements.” 
It can be understood there are relationships between journalists, and the 
established parties, which have negative aspects for the ANPs in terms of 
access and fair coverage; but this may have positive ramifications, as publics 
averse to the mainstream journalists might see them sympathetically as 
outsiders.  
 
5.2.2 Framing 
As already discussed in previous sections the essential aim for the ANPs is to 
have their platforms considered in Hallin’s sphere of legitimate controversy (if 
not in the sphere of consensus), so that their ideas can be considered viable 
and transferred into votes in the case of the parties, or support and diffusion of 
their arguments in the case of social movements. Of the four case study 
subjects, only the Dansk Folkesparti (DF) spokespeople and Danish journalists 
(Espersen 2013a; Espersen 2013b; Meret 2013; Vistisen 2013; Petersen 
2013; Sokoler 2013) considered the party to be fully integrated into the sphere 
of legitimate controversy. That is even though some of their public utterances, 
such as those by interviewee, youth spokesperson, and now MEP, Anders 
Vistisen (2013), became rather radical, with his explicit suggestions for capping 
the number of Muslim immigrants. Framing the issues in a way palatable to 
publics, and ideally the media at hand, is essential in moving towards electoral 
success and transforming issues into political power. 
Entman (2007, 164) describes framing “as the process of culling a few 
elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights 
connections among them to promote a particular definition.” He goes on to 
say that framing serves four functions: “problem definition, causal analysis, 
moral judgment, and remedy promotion.” This has the effect of ‘priming’ 
audiences in a certain way so they are likely to make certain meanings 
from news. Entman’s (1993, 55) work defines framing as: 
 
“Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is 
to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to 
promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe, a 
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point explored most thoroughly by Gamson (1992). An example 
is the ‘cold war’ frame that dominated U.S. news of foreign 
affairs until recently. The cold war frame highlighted certain 
foreign events-say, civil wars-as problems, identified their source 
(communist rebels), offered moral judgments (atheistic 
aggression), and commended particular solutions (U.S. support 
for the other side). 
“Frames, then, define problems-determine what a causal agent 
is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms 
of common cultural values; diagnose causes, identifying the 
forces creating the problem; make moral judgments-evaluate 
causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies-offer and 
justify treatments for the problems, and predict their likely 
effects. A single sentence may perform more than one of these 
four framing functions; although many sentences in a text may 
perform none of them. And a frame in any particular text may not 
necessarily include all four functions.” 
From this perspective it is apparent that the contest between competing 
frames of issues is central to the ANPs’ concerns; crucial to any political 
success, mobilised around the drive towards becoming ‘mainstream’. They 
will do it by removing embarrassing party members from their ranks, 
moderating their positions, and ensuring their provocations are in accord 
with what they perceive as popular notions - those which have not been 
addressed by other politicians due to perceived established political norms 
(critically referred to as ‘political correctness’).  
Entman (2007) sees agenda setting as equivalent to the first function of 
framing, placing the issue in a space as to where it is considered worthy of 
discussion, to use Hallin’s (1986) terminology - the sphere of legitimate 
controversy. That is, issues are offered to prospective audiences should 
they choose to think about and consider them. In this sense they are 
provided “what they should think about” (Entman 2007, 164), not 
necessarily how to think about them, though these factors are inevitably 
intermingled. The framing of issues is discussed as bias implicit in the 
reporting of issues. 
The competing frames, those presented by the ANPs, their political 
opponents and the established media following its own dictates (as an 
institutional third force in this instance) are key in attracting or repulsing 
potential support, where increasingly salient issues around immigration 
and Islam, are being communicated to the public. Rydgren (2005, 425) 
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discusses the development of a ‘master frame’ created by the previously 
discussed French Nouvelle Droite (New Right - ND), which replaced the 
‘old master frame’ of racism, conspiratorial anti-Semitism and 
totalitarianism. Rydgren describes this frame as deeply stigmatised (2005, 
414), or to use Hallin’s (1986) terminology, deviant, and in this instance 
beyond rebranding. The only relatively successful parties that might be 
reasonably described as belonging to the extreme right, currently 
represented in parliament, are Jobbik, the German NPD and Golden Dawn 
all broadly understood as being the direct heirs to historical fascism. 
It should be noted that Rydgren (2005) considers the party family and 
social movement under investigation in this thesis as extreme right, and 
that there is a clear transition from the Nazism to the contemporary form of 
ANPs. In accord with Mudde (2007) this thesis does not concur that the 
current parties (and social movements) are simply fascists gilded with 
populism and fake democracy. They are seen as rather a new family of 
parties and social movements, which may in their history, have had 
symbolic and doctrinal attachments to historical movements of racial 
imperialism, but have consciously been moved a great distance from 
relationships with fascism. Indeed, one of the key interests of this thesis is 
how the party family and social movements have strategically 
disassociated themselves from fascism, whether charges of linkage were 
justified or otherwise.  
Rydgren (2005) suggests three possible reasons for the successes of the 
party family and related social movements: i) a new master frame 
attractive to voters and not deviant ii) crisis leading to social protest iii) and 
the development of political opportunity structures. Of the three factors, 
partially analogous to Mudde’s demand and supply factors only the first of 
them, the development of a new master frame in an evolutionary sense is 
directly within the agency of the political and social actors being 
researched. 
Rydgren (2005) describes the new master frame, diffused from the FN to 
other members of the party family, as a hybrid of Nouvelle Droite (ND) 
ideology and populism. This new master frame argues mass immigration 
has destroyed distinct cultures, intrinsically no better or worse than one 
another – rather distinct peoples, ethnies, which had the ‘right to be 
different’. Unlike the struggle between the capitalists and socialists, 
ethnopluralism advocates and the ND in general will argue that distinctive 
peoples have the right to maintain their identity against suggested 
economic or socio-cultural advantages of multiculturalism. According to 
the ND, the Basques and other European peoples have the same right as 
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Japanese, Xhosa or indigenous Amazonians to relative ethnic autonomy. 
As discussed above, the key aspects of the doctrine of ethnopluralism 
have spread to certain of the Western European parties and social 
movements of a nativist orientation. In a sense of defending distinct 
ethnies, ethnopluralism essentially supports the notions behind nativism. 
It’s not an expansionist idea, but rather proposed as a defensive one that 
looks to maintain national communities as they stand against globalising 
movements of all kinds, including neoliberalism and Islamism. 
 
The notion of ethnopluralism is invoked as supportive of protectionist 
nativism. As stated by Mudde (2014b) the intellectual elite of the parties 
and social movements, particularly those of the older leadership cadres, 
would be aware of the new ‘master frame’ as defined by the ND/populism 
hybrid. The successes of the FN would have seen it pass to other 
movements as they saw its potential for success (Rydgren 2005, 425). 
Ethnopluralism at its essence argues there are distinct peoples with 
unique languages, cultures and customs worth conserving. Rydgren 
(2005, 479) argues the master frame was: 
i. broad enough to be refined for the peculiarities of specific nations 
 
ii. reflected the mundane concerns over issues of identity and mass 
immigration for a significant portion of the populace 
 
iii. a substantial departure from the racial imperialism of Nazism and 
therefore lacked the political burden of post WWII fascists of various 
orientations 
With the master frame that combined ethno nationalism, populism and a 
defensive position against cultures perceived as hostile, the more ‘savvy’ 
nativists were in a position to develop a significant distance between their 
own populist nativist movements and extreme nationalists who would 
revisit fascism with its redundant, disturbing ideology and aesthetics. 
According to Rydgren (2005, 426) master frames of this type are essential 
as their breadth is responsible for the evolution of new political 
understandings. By developing new “encompassing, generic frames that 
have the potency of constraining more specific (derivative) frames used by 
specific social movements or political parties. Master frames are of 
importance because they have the ability to synchronise – and in fact give 
rise to – families of movements or political parties.” 
Rydgren (2008b, 729) states there are series of interlinking frames from the 
ANPs’ core issue of immigration through to a list of issues like concern with 
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criminality. By merging Hallin’s (1986) model with the notion of interlinked 
frames it joins the issues which appear in consensus, such as democracy, 
secularism and women’s rights, to those considered deviant, such as honour 
killings, or Islamist theocracy. It can place broad issues like immigration into 
the sphere of contested legitimacy. Yilmaz (2012, 377) supports Rydgren’s 
position, arguing the ANPs frame media debates as a demonstration of the 
incompatibility of relatively civilised Western norms in comparison with violent 
and retrograde religio-cultural practices evident amongst some Muslims. Betz 
and Meret (2009) concur. They argue the conflict has been framed as a 
civilisational clash by the ANPs, who represent it as part of a continuing 
struggle between the West and Islam. 
Along with development of ethnopluralism as part of the ANPs’ master 
frame, populism has been a defining aspect, with the ANPs’ media 
strategies aimed at “recoding the political space” (Rydgren 2005, 425). 
The establishment parties, media, academy and those who prospered 
from the process of globalisation, neoliberalisation and the growth of the 
EU, were thereby cast as ‘the elites’, (though it can indeed be reasonably 
argued the policy space between social democratic parties and 
liberal/conservative democratic parties, did, in fact contract). ‘The elite’ are 
framed as the enablers of a failed multiculturalism, deeply problematic and 
divisive Islamism, and unsustainable, inadequately controlled mass 
immigration into Western Europe, which has been feeding the growth of 
the previous two problem issues. 
 
 5.3 Journalism 
This subsection of the thesis will look at the key issues relating to journalism as 
a profession when dealing with the ANPs and their core issues. The 
professional ethos of journalists, as discussed above is most commonly 
understood as one where objectivity is crucial, verification of facts and a 
pluralistic attention to different sides of an issue in question are used as a 
guide. It is said to demand social responsibility on the part of the journalist, 
though in the broad church of journalistic publishing that becomes diminished 
because it is optional, and the idea can be treated skeptically among non-
journalists. As argued by Hallin (1986) this fair procedural approach, ethos or 
system of thought among journalists is largely applied in the sphere of 
legitimate controversy, while journalists tend not to rigidly adhere to such a 
professional ethos when covering issues considered deviant, at least by their 
readership (in this sense what is deviant is radically different in the Guardian or 
the communist L’humanite, or the nationalist Minute). Thus what is judged 
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deviant, legitimate or consensual is dependent on the interplay among 
journalist, media and audience. With the proliferation of social media this has 
become increasingly decentralised, though for the ANPs, in seeking to work 
through the ‘spheres’ of acceptability, those issues considered deviant, 
legitimately controversial and consensual remain the same. 
In one sense the journalists are in a predicament. Prior to the ANPs (and 
libertarian orientated populists like UKIP) there was relatively little discussion of 
issues around mass immigration or national identity for fear of being deemed 
deviant (e.g. racist, fascist), in Hallin’s (1986) sense of the term. Thus there 
was a tremendous concern public figures including politicians would be 
assailed by hostile elements within, or through the news media should they 
discuss issues related to mass immigration, certainly if they were disposed to 
challenge broad consensus on main policies. In Australia’s own circumstance, 
the fact that many of the issues the European ANPs developed were publicised 
by a series of unskillful utterances, and an unskillful politician, Pauline Hanson, 
demonstrates the importance of having competent spokespeople who can 
navigate the nuances of highly contentious topics without ‘self-imploding’, and 
being assailed through hostile media coverage as being deviant. This may 
work in the first instance, as it did for Hanson, with her supporter base being 
adverse to commentators in media who were critical of her, thus possibly 
enhancing her popularity; but the party organisation, leadership and aspects of 
the ideology (internal supply side factors) were not capable of sustaining a 
party in the fashion of the FN, VB, or DF. Interviewee Soren Espersen (2013a) 
remarked he was satisfied with the gradual growth of the DF, as parties which 
rise too quickly, tend to fall just as fast. A part of this is the large amounts of 
media attention parties and social movements of this type can attract, 
projecting them into high-risk, crisis situations, where opportunity competes 
with danger.  
Journalists, including citizen journalists using social media, provide a 
‘gatekeeper’ function to interested parties, including extant and prospective 
voters and supporters, and so they are sought out for attention by the ANPs, 
as they are by all manner of other political actors. ‘Gatekeeping’ in journalism 
is associated with Manning White’s famous study (1964) of journalists filtering 
stories for publication. The concept, and practice produces frustration for 
journalists and for lay critics, as space restrictions demand that a method be 
used, e.g. a ‘news values’ test, by journalists, and much has to be left out. New 
media offering many-to-many communication and abundant space may ease 
the tension, but competition for mass attention continues, putting on pressure 
to keep it short, and much of the mainstream media continues to trade on 
headline news, determined by gatekeeping professionals. Against that 
background, the most important factor for ANPs when considering the role of 
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journalists and the media, is that the ANPs perceive them to be crucially 
important to public awareness in the insurgent phase, and then important also 
for mainstreaming in the incremental consolidation phase, once they can be 
established as an enduring political force. 
 
5.3.1 Example: The Austrian Freedom Party and Kroner Zeitung 
To provide the traditional role of ‘gatekeeper’ according to their broadly 
acknowledged dictums, in a Western liberal tradition in media, journalists 
ideally adhere to notions of balance, fairness, and the verification of facts. As 
discussed in the section on framing (5.1.4) these professional parameters may 
be adhered too, while still providing an agenda, and framing relevant issues 
(e.g. immigrant drains on welfare, criminality, overcrowding, parallel societies) 
to their audience. In this sense the Austrian tabloid newspaper, Kroner Zeitung 
was often seen to be of great significance in the rise of the Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs, FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party), and is one of very few examples 
of open support for an ANP party or social movement by a major media outlet. 
Both Ellinas (2010), and Plasser and Ulram (2003) discern the editorial support 
offered to the FPÖ was crucial in the party’s rise. According to Plasser (2003, 
28) “many journalists at Kroner Zeitung envisaged their professional role as 
‘mobilizing populist feeling’, a journalism directed at the ‘mobilisation of latent 
moods and sentiments.’” Plasser and Ulram go on to identify three phases in 
treatment of groups and their issues (which this research discerns principally 
as two phases: the insurgent, and then the consolidation/growth phase, with 
Plasser and Ulram’s second phase being a feature of both the first and second 
phases).  
FPO’s 3 phases:  
i. Maximum public attention via personalisation and “taboo breaking” – 
personal attacks, flamboyant behaviour by Jorg Haider the party leader 
ii. The politics of resentment – moved from political elites to elites in 
general, including media and cultural elites 
iii. Moderation  
In terms of the news media this demonstrates the insurgent phase is an 
attention-seeking phase while the consolidation phase is a process of 
moderation in order to mature and be considered as a party of government.  
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5.3.2 The News Media 
The news media is at least partially beholden to audiences, circulation figures, 
or clicks in the case of online articles. Journalists consider certain issues, 
topics, and events newsworthy if they fit the news value system of the news 
organisation. Among these values is the standard, much referenced set of 
interest factors or stimulants, for example novelty, a need for drama, the 
importance of actors in a story, exceptional enterprises, timeliness, the extent 
of the populace affected, and conflict (Mazzoleni 2003, 12). This being the 
case journalists are eager to cover cases which involve conflict, including 
political conflict. As a rising group the party family which is challenging to 
established political norms, sometimes with contentious public utterances, the 
ANPs are often attractive to established media. The heads of ANPs who 
articulate their message well such as MLP may have enduring success; the 
less formidable do have appeal and gather a following, but tend to have less 
longevity (e.g. Hanson in Australia). 
 
5.3.3 Broadsheet (Quality) and Tabloid (Popular) Media 
In all democratic countries there exist two main types of news activity that 
reflect the different degrees or shades of integration of the information 
industries with the domestic cultural and political climates: the ‘elite media’ and 
the ‘tabloid media’. Elite media, also called “quality media” are characterised by 
comprehensive coverage, acting as a journal of record. They carry analysis of 
persons and events, they are more likely to appear to try and be unbiased, to 
be seen to report fairly and responsibly, and to be less sensitive to ratings, 
generally not seeking out mass audiences – though in many instances they 
will. They would tend to be less likely to echo populist claims, and would tend 
to frame articles in a way opposed to, or critical of how the ANPs would frame 
them, such as nativist claims based on rights to ownership of jobs (no 
immigration) or the townscape (no minarets). Both ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal 
left’ ‘broadsheet’ newspapers, and other ‘quality’ media, are designed to 
appeal to the wealthier and more educated sector of the market, which is 
hardly the core voter demographic or supporter base of the ANPs, so they are 
set in opposition to those parties. 
Mazzoleni (2003, 9) states:  
“Popular media, on the other hand-such as talk radio, tabloid 
newspapers, and infotainment television news and current affairs 
programs are much more likely to provide sympathetic coverage to 
neopopulist movements and focus more obviously on the personality 
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traits of political actors, on entertainment values, or on the details of 
conflicts, rather at the level of gossip, than at the level of serious analysis. 
These forms of media, are much more likely to be sensitive to ratings and 
seek mass audiences. 
“Notwithstanding their predilection for sensationalism, even the 
commercial-tabloid media, while responding to market driven forces do 
not underestimate the importance of politics, of political institutions and of 
government policies that affect the lives of millions of citizens. The 
implementation of media logic by the news organisations in covering neo 
populist movements and leaders has important implications. The 
movements may turn into media driven realities, responding to the 
expectations of the media.” 
Mudde considers that there is a ‘tabloidisation’ (2007, 15) of the mainstream 
media, which does assist by saturating public consciousness (at least of 
mainstream media audiences) with the issues that are traditionally owned and 
developed by the ANPs. In this sense they serve the function of agenda setting 
and work in the interests of the ANPs, though as noted by Mudde they are 
likely to be hostile to the ANPs as well, due to a strong tendency towards 
provocation - the habit of privileging the news value of ‘the story’ over the 
perceived self-interests of anybody mentioned in it.  
Populism by nature defines itself through a separation between the noble 
‘people’ and a corrupt, venal ‘elite’. Along with the patriotism, the dislike of neo-
liberal wealthy bankers, or left-liberal academics whom they perceive as 
remote from ‘the people’, the following definition suggests how, whatever 
sympathetic coverage has been gained by the ANPs, has been principally from 
newspapers best described as middlebrow tabloid. Even though there is a 
deep well of nationalist intellectual thought, perhaps most pronounced in 
France, inherited from a tradition of involvement by philosophers in the 
leadership of nationalist parties in Europe, the political style of the ANPs is 
reasonably described as a ‘tabloid’ politics. It remains unlikely any newspaper 
with the exception of the London Daily Mail would splash an opinion piece 
titled, “Despite her flaws the only responsible vote next week in France is one 
for Marine Le Pen” (Waghorne 2012). 
 
 
5.4 Populist Style and Its Impact on Media Strategy 
This subsection will discuss populism as it specifically relates to the ‘media 
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tone’ adopted by parties. To improvise a definition, where ‘tone’ may be the 
attitude expressed towards a listener, the ANPs have a clear, ‘populist’ tone of 
voice when appealing for support through mass media, which helps get them 
support. Populism is founded on attacking elites and aiming to represent non-
elite publics accepted as part of ‘the people’. With the addition of nativism and 
authoritarianism this party family and related social movements have a 
particular political style expressed in the (Mudde 2007) media strategy and 
performances of party and social movement spokespeople. This research 
draws on work by Mudde (2007), here referring to the observation that 
populism is a ‘thin-centred’ ideology, which will have an interdependent 
relationship with political communication. This will be a limited, though 
potentially potent foundation. Mazzoleni (2008) describes the populist media 
strategy as direct and straightforward, and so an ideal fit for the sound bite or 
headline. 
Jaegers and Walgrave (2007) argue ‘thin’ populism (populism without an 
ideology attached) is best defined as a political communication style. In its 
most fundamental sense populism: 
“…displays a closeness to the people simply by talking about the 
people. By appealing implicitly to the people, a populist communication 
style stresses the sovereignty of the people and the popular will.  
Political actors speak about the people all the time. They frequently 
use words such as ‘(the) people’, ‘(the) public’, ‘(the) citizen(s)’, ‘(the) 
voter(s)’, ‘(the) taxpayer(s)’, ‘(the) resident(s)’, ‘(the) consumer(s)’ and 
‘(the) population’. By referring to the people, a political actor claims 
that he or she cares about the people’s concerns that he or she 
primarily wants to defend the interests of the people, that he or she is 
not alienated from the public but knows what the people really want. 
The implicit populist’s motto is: ‘I listen to you because I talk about 
you.’” 
Their study reviews broadcasts of Belgian political parties in the 1999-2001 
period, finding utterances in these broadcasts, which are quantitatively 
measured to determine their level of ‘speaking for the people’, and their 
hostility to elites. The researchers were able to determine that the Vlaams Blok 
(later to become the Vlaams Belang) was a classic populist party in its hostility 
towards selected elites. 
Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) argue that for populism to be complete it must 
have these two features simultaneously: a non-elite out group, or out groups 
(e.g. Muslims, criminals), and a dividing line set between the people and the 
elites. This is a schema adhered to in all the case studies. Just as the elites 
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take actions in direct opposition to the will of the people; in their populism, 
nativism and authoritarianism, the ANPs define various enemies to be 
attacked, their attacks mediatised through public utterances in the main media 
and through self-made media.  
It is most useful to understand the populist media style of the members of the 
ANP movement as generally close to, and in sympathy with a tabloid style - 
consciously bombastic and provocative. The ANPs can act as ‘parties of the 
people,’ people who feel hostile towards ‘elites’ that are seemingly in collusion 
with other elites, and using sophistry to prevail against the interests of the 
nation and honest citizens. The ANPs aim to speak to ‘the people’ through 
targeted policy, public utterances and advertising aesthetics that communicate 
a clear and distinct message to a strategic public, whom they see as alienated 
from ‘elite’ opinions. In this they need to be explicit, blunt and contentious –
without moving into positions considered deviant. There are many 
opportunities to mount a critique while, in effect, and to date, always in 
opposition. As the ANPs are often third parties, they may play up the idea of 
collusion between the centre parties (liberal, conservative or social 
democratic), as a feature of their public utterances. As has been argued, such 
positioning will alter as the parties achieve electoral success (e.g. DF’s 
partnership in the Rasmussen coalition). The perception of an outsider party 
‘ready to clean house’ for ‘the people’ will inevitably see some transformation 
should the party make electoral gains, and as it were, itself take on more of the 
responsibility for the household. 
5.5 Blogging and Social Media 
“As soon as we saw the Internet we took it, because we were demonised in the 
classical media.” - Ludovic De Danne, FN Spokesperson for European and 
International Affairs 25.09.13 
The ANPs’ production of their own media content in the digital era is 
considered by Groshek and Englebert (2013, 185): 
“As audiences in general and populist movements in particular create 
(or co-create) and distribute more media widely and quickly, 
understanding what is presented to whom through which channel has 
taken on increasing importance (Shirky 2010). In this context, the self-
representation of populist political movements in online media channels 
may be considered major discursive spaces that exist within the margins 
… In particular, the distances between political actors, citizens and one 
another have been reduced through media technologies (Park and 
Thelwall 2008), while the potential for political organising and 
mobilisation has concurrently increased (Kraidy and Mourad 2010). The 
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parameters for political legitimation and participation have thus spread 
beyond mainstream media and through unmediated, online forms of 
communication that can link networks of citizens (Davis 2009; Zaslove 
2008c). Considering populism as non-elite, more democratically direct, 
and centred on the general will of the people (Abts and Rummens 
2007), advances in communicative technologies dovetail with these 
interests, particularly because online media lower barriers for 
participation (Ignatow and Schuett 2011).”  
This is to be seen with some caution, in that best access to computing and 
advanced operations with new media are also, for obvious reasons a prime 
preserve of the better educated. Nevertheless, there is the factor explained by 
Mazzoleni (2008), which can work in the ANPs’ favour, that due to the 
‘mediatised’ nature of contemporary politics, all politics has taken on a populist 
tone. Further, this trend may be boosted by the vastly widespread use of new 
media, notably social media characterised by free-of-charge communication or 
publishing software (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram), which 
makes for content that is smaller, pithier, easy to follow - ‘tabloid’ in approach. 
Amongst the self–defined ‘counter-jihad’ movement (CJM), including an 
established blogging subculture that favours the platform of the ANPs, there is 
discussion around threats that Islamism will pose to European civilisation and 
its constituent nations. The content of blogs such as Fdesouche (French of the 
Old Stock – Indigenous French), Novopress (New Press) and Politically 
Incorrect are laden with historical references to Islamist violence against 
Europeans, Hindus, Middle Eastern Christians, Animists and Christians in 
Africa, atheists in Muslim majority countries, Israeli and diaspora Jews, 
Buddhists in Thailand and of course autochthonous Europeans and settled 
migrant populations. This is then represented as historical evidence of 
Islamism’s inability to peacefully coexist with non-Muslims, most particularly 
Christians and atheists. Consistent with this, the political organisations forming 
the case study subjects for this research, and the ANPs generally, do 
represent Islam as hostile, often inclined to criminal violence in comparison to 
native Europeans and other settled immigrant groups (e.g. Vietnamese French, 
British Hindus). They are positioned to benefit from such commotion on line. 
 
Social media is appealing to the ANPs as it circumvents the gatekeeper 
function the established media play. In this sense it offers an ideal media form 
to convey messages direct to the public. Like outsider parties and social 
movements that are radical, they perceive the establishment to be hostile, if 
not to their ideas (e.g. concern over mass immigration), certainly to their 
political aspirations. Historically outsider political parties and social movements 
with a popular orientation were reliant on agitprop (gaining attention via 
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provocation, a strategy still used by the BI), posters, pamphlets and public 
meetings to gain media coverage and try to spread their message. Social 
media provides a direct channel to interested individuals, who may be linked to 
others sympathetic to their opinions and the dissident platform being 
developed. The decentralisation offered by social media creates online political 
communities sympathetic to the issues and platform of the ANPs. Thus, 
connections can be made and established most notably amongst middle-aged 
to young populations. The potential for online communities of ideas has been 
realised by the case study subjects: MLP has 950 000+ Facebook (FB) likes, 
the FN has 360 000+, the DF has 65 000+ FB likes Dahl Thulesen has 50 
000+, the VB has 35 000+ FB likes and Dewinter has 9 000+, and BI has 50 
000+ likes with Robert having 5 000+ FB likes. To overcome perceived hostility 
and willful ignorance the case study subjects have invested heavily in their own 
online media. The FN’s own site is Alexa ranked as the 4 112th most popular 
website in France, followed by the Union Pour un Mouvement Populaire (11 
389) and Parti Socialiste (14 679). The DF is Alexa ranked the 5 685th most 
popular with Venstre at 7 889th and the Social Demokraten at 10 443. 
Demonstrative of the decline of the VB is their Alexa rank of 21 160, with the 
Die Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie coming in at 5 914, and the Belgische 
Socialistische Partij coming in at 9 769. The BI’s organisational website has an 
Alexa rank of 115 838, whilst the affiliated online media hub, novopress.org is 
ranked 14 355. The main anti-racism NGOs in France, SOS Racisme and 
Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples, are ranked 82 
043 and 81 421 respectively.  
Political populism and online media use are seen in this study, on the lines of 
Groshek and Englebert (2013, 183), as two interdependent trends, developing 
for decades, that are “central features in rapidly evolving socio-political 
landscapes.” The shift from traditional models of top-down media towards 
many-to-many networks of media production and distribution has noticeably, 
already altered political organisation and campaigning. Similarly, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, differing forms of political populism have increased in presence 
and influence in numerous countries (Zaslove 2008b). 
 
5.6 Regional French Elections 
It is important to understand this research in no way suggests the degree to 
which, if any, the ANPs’ media campaigns impact on electoral results or 
increase in popularity, as a causal relationship is impossible to establish 
considering the multitudes of factors that impact voter choices and social 
movement support. What can be said is the political actors in these contests 
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will investigate every field of action, and doing media work is one field where 
they can get outcomes, which they hope will translate into voter support. They 
consider the coverage they receive as most important and devote large 
resources to their own media production activity. As a further case study and 
example of the parties’ drive to gain electoral success, and build enduring 
support, the FN campaign for the 2015 Regional elections is indicative of the 
efforts it will lay out, putting a strong concentration on media. It had already 
performed well under the leadership of MLP in the 2014 European elections 
gaining an exceptional 24.86% of the vote.  
 
The 2015 Regional elections were heavily contested by the FN, and seen as 
an opportunity to consolidate party growth under MLP. The two round system 
tends to favour established parties as the centre right and centre left form a 
‘republican alliance’ against relatively radical parties, including the FN. The FN 
again performed exceptionally well getting 27.89% of the vote. The Le Pen 
dynasty led the pack in the 12 Regions with MLP gaining 43% of the vote in the 
Calais region, whilst Marion Marechal Le Pen scored around 40% in the first 
round.  The second round saw the combination of a united front against the FN 
by the centre parties, including the withdrawal of candidates by the Parti 
Socialiste to ensure centre right victories. Of particular interest is the 
emergence at the polls of 3 500 000 new voters who had previously abstained, 
but were most likely inspired to vote due to concern about the FN. Even though 
the FN had engaged in a significantly active, sustained media campaign, this 
result is indicative that voter choice, complicated by the mathematics of voting, 
is a profoundly complex idea. Again, no direct causal relationship can be 
demonstrated, but media exposure would be seen to contribute, if in 
uncontrolled ways, e.g. in shoring up already committed support at least, or in 
publicising the identity of candidates. An essential point is that the political 
actors consider media efforts and coverage to be crucial. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has addressed the main focus of the research project, the use of 
media by the ANPs, in the hope of achieving attention, legitimacy and 
ultimately power. It has studied possible, at least perceived links between the 
media effort, and a degree of electoral success being achieved by the parties, 
as well as extensive coverage of social movements. The work has drawn on a 
literature of representation, persuasion and opinion, for example Hallin’s (1986) 
schema of consensus, controversy and deviance to explain the movement’s 
goals; or literature on media dynamics, for example Mazzoleni’s (2003, 2008) 
treatment of the idea that any publicity, even hostile, will work as a first step 
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towards acknowledgment. The structures and operations of news media have 
been studied, establishing such characteristics as the shared influence of 
media owners and journalistic professionals; affinity between tabloid news and 
the ANPs; ‘best practice’ in fair reporting observed in some cases (e.g. for 
consensual or controversial content) but not in others (e.g. for ‘deviant material’ 
involving an ANP), and debates about framing of issues (viz Entman, 
Rydgren). A case study was offered, depicting the expansion of public support 
for the Austrian Freedom Party as factors aiding its legitimisation were 
mobilised, notably editorial support from mainstream, if still ‘tabloid’ media.  
The ANPs have been seen striving to engage with publics and to extend their 
communicative reach, and here they have been able to trade on two 
substantive characteristics, an ethnopluralist view of human society, and 
populism. The media effort would magnify and conveys a message of identity 
and difference among human populations defined by nation and ethnic 
belonging (or acceptability in the case of ‘assimilated’ migrant populations), 
and would signal an intention to allow free rein to democratically elected 
popular human choice as the most appropriate method to deal with political 
decision making. Information drawn from the observation phase of the study 
and through interviews with key actors within the parties, has supported the 
possibility that the effort does contribute to success, at least while it continues 
in a fertile context, for example with ongoing tension in society over mass 
migration and Islamism. In the following Discussion and Review Section the 
case study subjects will be examined in full, and select media artefacts relating 
the ANPs and Islam will be examined providing a manner for answering the 
research question in an integrated fashion.  
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SECTION 6: Media Review 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The discussion and review section is divided into two main parts:  
i) An examination of the four case study subjects with an emphasis on their 
media approach. It will provide a developed understanding of the individual 
groups as they seek power and put their case to widening publics. 
ii) A review and discussion of selected media content to draw out issues 
developed in the literature review and provide further insight into various 
aspects of the case study subjects’ media strategy. This will appear in various 
forms of media including tabloid (popular), broadsheet (quality) and self-
produced content, in textual and visual formats. An array of such media 
products will be examined, on a set of issues that have become central to the 
campaign for advancement of the ANPs, and which have had sustained 
prominence in news media: 
• Islamism in Western Europe Generally 
• The Burqa and Niqab 
• Halal food 
• Mosques 
• Security  
• Demography and Welfare 
The six issues have been identified in the review of literature on the ANPs, and 
in monitoring media coverage of the activities of the four case study subjects, 
where those issues stand out prominently. The case study subjects 
demonstrate their own preference for the issues in question, as matters to 
emphasise in their public utterances and media strategy. It is seen both in their 
relations with professional, mainstream media, and in self-generated media. 
The review and discussion of selected media content related to these four 
subjects presents opportunities to integrate and enforce the literature review 
and fieldwork material with examples from a diverse array of media.   
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6.2 The Case Study Subjects 
As briefly discussed in section 3.2.1 the case study subjects were chosen for 
both practical reasons, and the fact they exemplified different aspects of the 
party families with unique developmental trajectories, levels of success and 
different approaches to modernisation and moderation, which allows for a 
complete and full response to the research question. The parties were also 
chosen because they have different levels of success or failure at different 
points in history. The social movement among them (BI) was chosen because 
of its mediacentric activism, and its focus on Islam in France as a most 
contested field of political activity. It combines the ideology of the Nouvelle 
Droite with non-violent, though provocative, and sometimes illegal spectacles. 
The Front National (FN) was of particular interest because it is the model party, 
(founded in 1972), and makes for an ideal case study on the process of 
moderation and modernisation. Both Jean Marie Le Pen (JMLP) and Marine Le 
Pen (MLP) have been capable leaders for the party, though MLP chooses 
different themes, which are more muted and republican. Both the leaders are 
‘media savvy’ with JMLP claiming his famous 1984 appearance on national 
television led to the establishment of the party in the public consciousness 
(Declair 1999, 76), while his daughter has proven herself an adept performer 
on French media, and some foreign language news services such as the BBC 
and Russia Today (RT). 
The Vlaams Belang (VB – Flemish Interest) is an enduring party, and like the 
FN, has been the recipient of a cordon sanitaire (which in the FN’s case was 
broken in the media sense by Le Pen’s television success; though Jean Pierre 
Stirbois had already won a cantonal election in Dreux in 1982). The party is 
based on the principle of Flemish nationalism, the Flemish being the Dutch-
speaking majority in the northern part of Belgium. Some Flemish nationalists, 
including the VB (Claeys 2013), argue they are politically dominated by the 
French speaking Walloons, in league with immigrants who tend to favour the 
Socialist Party, at the expense of Flemish interests and independent 
prosperity. 
Unlike the FN, the VB has not fared so well in recent years, declining, as 
Flemish nationalist politics has moved in the direction of the liberal-
conservative Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (NVA, New Flemish Alliance). As far as 
‘supply side’ or internal factors are concerned it may be that the VB has not 
moderated its position as successfully as the FN, as appropriate for their extant 
and potential voter base. 
The Dansk Folkesparti (DF – Danish People’s Party) differs from the FN and 
VB, as it is a more recent party, being founded in 1995, and presents itself as a 
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combination of Scandinavian social democracy, social liberalism and nativist 
populism. The party has been electorally successful, and influenced the 
Rasmussen government, particularly in regards to its relatively strict 
immigration policy. The party is unhindered by any perceived or real 
associations with historical fascism. At the same time some of its responses to 
Islamism have been strong, notably among the domestic and international 
reactions to the publication of the ‘Mohammad cartoons’. 
The Bloc Identitaire (BI – Identity Bloc) is something of an anomaly as far as 
the case study subjects are concerned, not being a political party with 
professed electoral intentions. Firstly it is an activist movement consciously 
modelled on Greenpeace, though with a Nouvelle Droite ideology. The BI is an 
ethno-regionalist and civilisationist activist movement, but has publicised 
issues that have moved into mainstream nationalist media strategy. The BI 
consciously engages in a culture war with a nativist and ethno-regionalist 
agenda, and does so with inventive tactics designed to generate media 
attention.  
 
6.2.1 The Front National 
“Here, the notion that the FN is an agenda-setter is vital; a flick through any 
national newspaper will confirm the fact that the party has been effective in 
hoisting its concerns to the top of the national political agenda, and in forcing 
other political formations to react to, and position themselves on, these 
particular issues – most notably of course, immigration.” 
- Peter Davies, 1999, in the National Front and France: Ideology, Discourse 
and Power. 
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Fig 6. From Left to Right, Ludovic de Danne, Marine Le Pen and Aymeric Chauprade 
(http://www.europe1.fr/politique/mais-qui-es-tu-aymeric-chauprade-1914245 First 
published 23.04.14 First accessed 20.10.14) 
 
The introductory section related to the FN will be the longest of the discussions 
due to the party’s considerable history, impact, intellectual depth, and the 
discussion of the issues introduced in the section. As in this sense the model 
party it provides a pertinent foundation for this thesis. 
The FN serves as an appropriate entry point, as it is the oldest in the 
contemporary party family, being founded in 1972. The party’s history tracks 
the evolution of often-conflicting groupuscules, parties and social movements 
emerging after World War II, and coalescing. The party trajectory follows the 
reemergence of various nationalist strains, to the formation of the party under 
JMLP, its growth, split, and then consolidation, till the successful leadership of 
MLP, who leads a party that provides examples in becoming a growing and 
increasingly electorally successful ANP.  The party is also the most 
intellectually and ideologically dense.  
The Le Pen ‘dynasty’ has been a significant factor, in producing two strong 
leaders in succession, and a successful politician in Marion Marchel Le Pen, 
third in the generational line and one of two FN members of the National 
Assembly. Most important is the transition from the old nationalist frame of 
JMLP, to the new more moderate populist, nativist and economically 
protectionist frame developing under MLP. This is perhaps best exemplified 
over the conflict between father and daughter surrounding JMLP’s critical 
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remarks against the Jewish French singer, Patrick Bruel, using language that 
could be inferred as anti-Semitic, though he sought to contest that 
interpretation of his words. Whatever the case it was read by many as being 
anti-Semitic. Those offended included Louis Aloit, MLP’s partner, a moderniser 
and general secretary of the FN, who has Jewish ancestry (Thompson 2010). 
The Le Pen family has been central to the party’s development and evolution 
since its inception. JMLP was orphaned as a child, and subsequently became 
a ward of the state. He is from the Celtic region of France, Brittany, and was 
too young to participate as an active combatant in the WWII. He commands a 
serious understanding of the various intellectual strands of French nationalist 
thought; more so than MLP (Camus 2013). As a young man he studied law 
and was leader of a nationalist student group engaged in street combat with 
militant communist students. His early political experiences involved the small 
business, artisan, farmer, rural and regional orientated, populist Poujadiste 
movement. The aversion to cosmopolitan elites and the notion that the ‘true 
French’ were in fact a version of the regional and rural French are in evidence 
in the Poujadiste campaign. At 28 JMLP was elected to parliament. 
Military experiences would affirm and stimulate a political outlook drawn from 
the background in regional populism. JMLP joined the French Foreign Legion 
and arrived in Vietnam after the French leg of the war was effectively lost, with 
the Vietnamese communists subsequently defeating the United States, and 
later the communist Chinese in the border conflict of 1978. JMLP served as an 
intelligence officer in the Algerian War and has admitted to being aware of the 
use of torture by French forces, though there are disputes as to whether he 
was involved in it himself (The_Independent 2014).  
From his early life JMLP could be characterised as determined, combative, 
provocative, intelligent, and having a pronounced leadership quality among the 
nationalist milieu. As an ABC overseas correspondent, Dr. Duffield, principal 
supervisor for this research, interviewed JMLP in the 1980s, describing him 
from notes as, “big, authentically tough, watchful, perhaps instinctively 
aggressive, and while open to approach, physically imposing, if not 
overbearing.” 
In the post World War II period advocates of French nationalist politics were a 
deeply heterodox grouping, and largely consisted of a number of political 
subcultures, often diametrically opposed in many ways, which were brought 
together under JMLP with the formation of the FN in 1972. The factions 
included the previously discussed ND orientated towards an ethno-pluralism 
and the vision of a pre-Christian European religion and civilisation, 
monarchists, traditionalist Catholics, veterans, revolutionary nationalists, those 
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resentful of the loss of French Algeria (often Pied Noirs (Black Feet), displaced 
former colonists), and some remnants from the Vichy era (Berezin 2007). The 
FN under MLP is populist and not riven to any great degree by competing 
factions (Camus 2013; Davies 2012; de Danne 2013). Significantly for this 
research, of the above mentioned factions the traditionalist Catholics, and ND, 
would inevitably contain opponents of Islamism. Paradoxically the FN was the 
first political party to have a Muslim member elected (de Danne 2013), with 
JMLP being enthusiastic about the harkis, Muslim troops who had stayed loyal 
to Empire in the Algerian War and moved to France at its end. 
MLP has taken the party to a higher level of support than her father managed, 
though that navigation has no doubt been helped by economic woes and 
growing disdain for professional political classes evident across Western 
Europe. Strong public speaking and debating skills have assisted her rise, 
while the time accords with her public rejection of the political class in France, 
left and right, relative decline of Europe in terms of power, and the growth of 
skepticism or hostility towards the European Union as an institution. It appears 
from her public utterances she understands what is acceptably provocative, to 
prospective voters, and can walk the tightrope between too much provocation 
and too little, sensing which particular targets might be considered acceptable 
by the public. It is very much a generalisation, but there is some validity in 
describing JMLP as the insurgent, and MLP the consolidator in Mazzoleni’s 
(2008) two-phase schema. 
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Fig 7. FN Election Results: Blue – European, Red – Legislative, Black – Presidential, 
Grey – Regional. Source: Pierre Brechon, La France aux Urnes 
In MLP’s process of ‘dediabolisation’ the party has expelled all members with 
involvement with Nazi movements. Such associations are the bane of the 
party, associations with racial imperialism and supremacy being classed as 
‘deviant’ in general political discourse. The FN’s ‘proletarianisation’, particularly 
in the economic field has seen the development of an economic policy with 
many parallels to counter-globalist movements more often associated with left-
wing politics. The party proposes a protectionist, nationalist economy designed 
to protect French industry, farmers, artisans and workers from Chinese and 
other Developing World products, to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of 
workers’ living standards. According to MLP this would require reversion to the 
Franc, national preference for French products in governmental acquisition, an 
increase in the minimum wage, and policies designed to protect the character 
and economy of rural and regional France (Shields 2013). These policies are 
aimed at appealing to native, ‘ethnic’ French, and sympathetic immigrants 
concerned about impacts of post industrialism, globalisation and neoliberalism, 
represented as destroying the French nation: economically, culturally and 
politically. The argument is made that French industries will be usurped by 
multi-national corporations, which will see all people as fungible commodities 
and little more.  
In terms of voter intention, Shields’ (2013) analysis of IPSOS polling figures 
show the FN has a strong working class element in its base of support. The 
analysis indicates 29% support from manual workers (with the FN the most 
popular choice), 21% amongst other wage earning employees, and 25% from 
shopkeepers. The figures characterise the FN under MLP being the most 
popular party with those of little earning power and the lowest educational 
levels. Whereas ‘far right’ descriptors are most often applied to the party, 
supporters come from a demographic traditionally linked to social democratic 
parties, and report no affinity for left or right. The FN offers a third position 
found to be viable for those unrepresented by the established centre parties, or 
left politics like those offered by Jean-Luc Mélenchon. 
This move to the left, in the sense of a targeted interventionism in the 
economy, would define the FN as a party that is reasonable in its approach 
and broad acceptability, within the French context. The platform is presented 
as deeply pro-French, as the first priority, and relates this popular theme to 
concerns over mass immigration and Islamism as threatening to France. 
The FN was under a cordon sanitaire in its early years, deliberately ignored by 
journalists and ostracised within the political community. According to political 
lore the first major appearance of JMLP on television was in some way 
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engineered by the centre-left leader, Francois Mitterand (Shields 2013, 128), 
as a tactic to diminish split the right. At that time the party adhered to what 
Kitschelt and McGann (Okrent 2014) described as a winning combination of 
neoliberalism and authoritarianism; the particular combination of ideas, and 
argument in favour of it as a vote winner, no longer applies. In the event 
however JMLP profited from the exposure of his personality and competence, 
obtaining 11% of the popular vote in the Presidential elections, won by the 
Socialist Party’s Francois Mitterrand. 
The party was not supported, and remains unsupported in the established 
media (Camus 2013; de Danne 2013), with no major news outlet sympathetic 
to its platform. Though Minute and Rivarol were both in accord with the party 
their readership was rather small in comparison to the centre-right Le Figaro 
and centre-left Le Monde. In attempts to redefine itself and develop salient 
issues in the political environment of the day - most notably the sovereignty 
issue (French identity against the EU), mass immigration and the related issue 
of Islamism - the party was keen to utilise social media, and to keep 
addressing itself to traditional media sources, with MLP in time becoming a 
regular figure on talk shows. Since taking over the leadership from her father 
she has been a guest on domestic French and international news services, 
including televised debates with Rachida Dati, UMP justice minister, and Cecile 
Duflot of the Greens.  
The party international affairs spokesperson, Ludovic de Danne (2013) 
affirmed at interview that there remained no neutral or sympathetic outlets of 
any considerable size, though they had received coverage from the well-
resourced television chain, Russia Today. The latter was seen to be interested 
in the demand for dismantlement of the EU, social conservatism, criticism of 
neoliberalism, and opposition to American cultural influence – ‘cultural 
imperialism’ in France; matters to be discussed in the review and discussion 
section.  
The FN was the first French political party to have its own Internet web site, 
and by wide consent the best website amongst the French political parties 
(Camus 2013). Its output of publicity material is not only unremitting but also 
impressive in its scope and production quality. Peter Davies (2012, 6) notes 
the FN has a plethora of products designed to attract, from both a ‘low-brow 
and high brow’ perspective. It has a publishing house, offers public lectures 
and produced the relatively sophisticated magazine, Identite. 
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6.2.2 The Vlaams Belang 
The VB are the second oldest of the case study subjects and have moved from 
a high point of being the strongest party in Flanders to falling into a period of 
decline, unlike the DF and FN. The VB began as the Vlaams Blok in 1978 and 
was a radical secessionist-nationalist party concentrated in Antwerp, still the 
party’s base. The party peaked in power in 2000 when they won a third of the 
vote, and close to half of the seats in Antwerp. In 2003 the party received 
17.9% of the vote in Flanders (Norris and Lovenduski 2004). The party has 
gone into decline as the liberal-conservative Flemish nationalists, the NV-A, 
have become established as the focal point of Flemish nationalism. In this 
sense the political space surrounding nationalism has become crowded 
(Pauwels 2011a). The party campaigns with their enduring slogan, ‘Our People 
First’ (Claeys 2013). Of the parties considered the VB has been the most 
isolated, with a 1989 formal agreement among other parties not to ally with the 
VB. This has led the party to spend some 80% of its budget on 
communications, while the Belgian party average is around 20% (Kitschelt and 
McGann 1997). 
The party is led by Filip de Winter, who is considered ‘hard line’ in comparison 
to other senior members of the party (Abts 2013). Dewinter has been an early 
and vociferous campaigner against Islam in Flanders and Europe, and has 
engaged in many protests and media spectacles, making the issue a key 
feature of the party platform, since mass immigration is most visible and 
potentially threatening; a factor amenable to being developed in a media 
campaign. Dewinter has a long history of critical remarks referring to the 
presence of Islam as a ‘Trojan Horse of Islamic fundamentalism’ (Betz and 
Meret 2009).  
The appearance of this long-standing campaign in Flanders is not one of 
unidirectional propaganda put out by the political party, but of a bidirectional, 
mutually reinforcing relationship with publics. That is to say, people voting for 
the VB choose the media most in line with their attitudes, and these media in 
turn strengthen these attitudes and issue priorities in a reinforcing circular 
dynamic. The main aim of the party is an independent Flanders, and secession 
from Belgium, though the leadership has resolutely campaigned on threats to 
Flanders from mass immigration generally, and Muslim populations 
specifically. The party is a radically populist party; with this quote from their 
magazine symbolising their distaste for the political class and urban elites 
(Pauwels 2011b, 111): “We do not want to be part of the establishment. The 
VB is no protest party but a principled programme party. A maverick in Flemish 
politics, we are not welcome in the Belgian salons precisely because we want 
to abolish these salons.” 
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6.2.3 The Dansk Folkesparti 
The DF was formed as a spinoff from the tax protest Progress Party under the 
leadership of Pia Kjaersgaard in 1995. According to party media advisor, 
Yvette Espersen (2013b), Kjaersgaard was inspired to start the party after 
being deeply concerned by the patriarchal nature of some of the Muslim 
immigrant families she encountered while working as a social worker. The 
party changed leadership in 2012, and is performing exceptionally in the 
opinion polls since the changeover to Kristian Thulesen Dahl. 
Of all the case studies subjects the DF is the only one to assist in the formation 
of national government, with the 2001 liberal-conservative alliance led by 
Rasmussen being dependent on the support of the DF. It was during this 
period that Denmark developed the most restrictive immigration policies in 
Western Europe, strongly influenced by the DF. In the interview with media 
advisor, Yvette Espersen, she said the difference between the current state of 
ethnic relations and the relative lack of crime in Denmark was the effectiveness 
of the DF in ensuring immigrants from developing countries integrated into 
Danish society (Espersen 2013b). 
In accord with the party family, generally the DF is strongly anti-EU. It is a 
member of the Reformists and Conservatives in the European Parliament, 
along with UKIP. In party interviews, Anders Vistisen (2013) was adamant the 
party was not of the same kind as the FN, which he argued was “improving”, 
but had too much of a history of anti-Semitism. The DF is the most recently 
formed, of the political parties researched – yet it has arguably been the most 
successful politically, having been ‘part of’ the conservative government, 
binding itself to give it parliamentary support. It actually ‘won’ the 2014 
European Parliament elections with the best result for a party in Denmark 
(European_Parliament 2014a). 
Rydgren (2005) concludes that the DF use the master frame developed by the 
FN of ethnopluralism in conjunction with populism, specifically adapted to the 
Danish scenario. The issues the DF developed in the media will be explored 
fully in the upcoming article reviews. Much is done in English language outlets, 
the use of this ‘Western’, business language held up as symbolic of affiliation 
with Western Europe, in the face of religio-cultural rifts between post-Christian 
Western Europe and some of the Islamic communities appearing in Denmark 
since World War II, growing in number, and moving towards more 
fundamentalist expressions of Islam in some instances. 
Their principal aim is to cement the differences between Islamism and Western 
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norms, in public consciousness, in a fashion that defines the ANPs as 
defenders of a self-defined civilised nation against a historically hostile, 
revitalised politico-religious force that in parts will impose an ideology, mutually 
exclusive with Western norms, and putting forward an ideal that is hostile, in 
way that Hindu, Buddhist or Christian African immigrant groups are not.  
The DF spokespeople interviewed (Espersen 2013a; Espersen 2013b; Vistisen 
2013) all reported the treatment they had received by the Danish media, 
though initially hostile, had changed; the party now appearing to be fully 
integrated into Danish politics, and in fact not as deviant as would be defined 
by Hallin (1986). They compare this to the Swedish mainstream media’s 
treatment of the Sweden Democrats (SD), and believe there is a deeply biased 
media approach to that party. Soren Espersen (2013a) believes the media is 
so profoundly biased towards multiculturalism the Swedes in southern Sweden 
watch Danish TV so as to have a less biased coverage of their own news.  
Rygren (2004) reports the DF has written many articles published in the Danish 
news media, which provide them acceptability, not in evidence in Sweden. 
 
6.2.4 The Bloc Identitaire 
Due to the recent foundation of the BI and the relative dearth of research into 
social movements, there is little academic research into the movement, though 
research into the ND is particularly relevant to the BI, as the BI’s intention is to 
take the ND’s message and “get it out of the salons and amongst the people” 
(Robert 2013).  
The leadership cadre of the party came from an array of radical nationalist 
‘groupuscules’ including Unite Radical (Radical Unity), a revolutionary 
nationalist organisation. Like the FN they are essentially protectionist in their 
economic approach, similar to Distributism, and propose their own 
interpretation of decentralisation, relocating power to extant ethnically defined 
groups within France and Europe (e.g. Bretons, Alsatians, Corsicans, Flemish).  
In this sense they are supportive of a confederate model, perhaps closer to the 
current situation of Switzerland than any other extant political organisation. The 
BI’s programme is constituted by an array of influences from the works of ND 
ideologues de Benoist and Faye, Catholic social teaching, non-Marxist 
socialists such as Proudhon, ecology, Swiss style direct democracy, radical 
decentralisation, anti-globalisation and localism. The BI was originally formed 
as a political party, though transformed into an activist group. Robert (2013) 
reports the movement was based on combining the activism of Greenpeace 
with the ideology of Groupement de recherche et d'études pour la civilisation 
européenne, (GRECE), the Nouvelle Droite think tank led by Alain de Benoist, 
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(previously discussed in section 4.1.2.2.), with an orientation to regionalism. 
The BI are radically different from the three parties used in case studies, but 
serve as a pertinent subject, because as an activist movement they might 
show what may occur when the nativist political space is full with a successful 
and growing party, the FN (a similar social movement, the EDL, developed in 
the absence of a successful party in that political space.) In this sense the BI is 
not in a position to compete with the FN electorally, and the FN spokesperson, 
Ludovic de Danne (2013), and the BI spokesperson, Fabrice Robert (2013), 
were not hostile to each other, considering themselves participants in a 
respectable nationalist milieu, as opposed to the likes of neo-fascist 
groupuscules. They were both hostile to the now banned Jeunesses 
Nationalistes Révolutionnaires (JNR), which was demonstrably neo-fascist and 
violent. 
Points of difference are essentially between the FN as a pragmatic, 
modernising populist party principally interested in becoming a party of 
government, and focusing on French identity, and the BI as a ethno-regionalist 
social movement more radical, and focused on media spectacle and culture 
war. 
 
Fig 8. The Identitarians have adopted the Lambda shield used by the Spartans, made 
famous by the film 300. The sign reads ‘Anti-Global, Pro Local’. At the right front is 
Philip Vardon of Nissa Rebela and author of Lepanto 1571 
(http://reflexes.samizdat.net/une-autre-jeunesse/) 
The BI, and the youth orientated Generation Identitaire (GI) are worthy case 
study subjects because of the overtness of their symbolic representation of 
Islam and its perpetual conflict with the Occident, informed by deep martial 
historicism – and their spectacles specifically designed to attract media 
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attention. In this sense they are the most explicit example of the powerful 
nostalgia (Betz 2008; Betz and Meret 2009) that is a potent factor in the 
communication of nativists. The symbol of Joan of Arc has an enduring history 
of use by the FN, while Charles Martel and the battle of Poitiers was used as 
the inspiration for the GI’s trespass and demonstration at the construction site 
for the Poitiers mosque. 
This may be even more potent at a time when Europe is in economic decline, 
and amongst some there is a concern about economic and cultural changes, 
which may threaten aspects of French life. This is exemplified by one of the 
BI’s most successful and well-covered media spectacles. For the BI the sense 
of loss of physical, economic and cultural security is a constant in their 
communication, and the alternative they offer is one deeply grounded in an 
almost medieval version of history complete with heraldic flags. The BI 
represents itself as a defence against Islam, and as an advocacy organisation 
for ethnic Europeans against historical enemies, Islam, and newer economic 
currents: neoliberalism, globalisation, and the European project. This 
combination of historicity, heritage, and veneration for the ancient and 
medieval, in design style and platform is orientated towards attracting the 
young and fashionable. 
Betz and Meret (2009, 333) describe the Lega Nord’s utilisation of the notion 
that the West must rediscover its roots as a foil to globalisation, and the older 
enemy of Islam,  symbolically looking for a contemporary replay of the Battle of 
Lepanto in which the Venetians defeated an Ottoman fleet in 1571. This is a 
theme well adopted by the BI. Philippe Vardon, one of the founders of the BI, 
and now leader of Nissa Rebela, organised celebrations for the anniversary, 
and contributed to the book Lepante 1571 (Vardon 2011). A book published by 
the BI calls for a confederation of European nations against Islam. The BI 
campaigns heavily on historically significant conflicts between European 
powers with Islamic societies such as the Moors and Ottomans, and aims to 
develop a trajectory to contemporary times, and into the future.  
As with the recent controversy over the journalist and commentator, 
Éric Zemmour, who said a civil war was inevitable unless Muslims were 
deported from France (France_24 2014), the BI spokespeople (Robert 2013) 
interviewed  were concerned about the possibility of a large scale civil war (or 
at least serious civil disturbance) between Islamists and native Europeans, 
should mass immigration continue to occur. The BI is something of an 
anomaly, not wholly comparable with the other case study subjects but worthy 
of examination and investigation, due to stand-out features such as its 
commitment to historical symbolism in its media output and inventive protests. 
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6.3 Review of Articles 
This part of the discussion provides an opportunity to examine media content, 
with the intention of integrating the relevant literature, fieldwork, and the 
content itself so as to consider the research question thoroughly. The 
discussion will be built around a review of three general articles about Islam 
and Islamism linked to, or referring to, each of the case study subjects. These 
will be followed by review articles referring to selected issues where the ANPs 
have been active: hijab, halal, Mosques, security, demography, and welfare. 
Generally there will be one of these for each of the case study subjects.  
As noted the articles have been taken from the media so as to extract themes 
that are significant and evident broadly across the party family and social 
movements, and in the case studies in particular. The content has been 
selected so as to represent an array of media: quality, popular, self-produced, 
traditional and social. Reviewing the social media provides an opportunity to 
circumvent the ‘gatekeeping’ function of journalists and the editorial disposition 
of news and commentary outlets. 
It will demonstrate in parts the provocation, or as Mazzoleni describes it, (2003, 
14) “free advertising”, the subjects engage in to gain media attention, as they 
tend to be less resourced than established parties, and are more concerned 
about transforming salient issues into support, rather than acting in accord with 
the proclivities of a media they perceive as ‘left’ and hostile. This does not 
mean the ANP spokespeople and media producers fail to understand that it’s 
crucial not to engage in areas that are deviant, such as biological racism, 
references to historical fascism and totalitarianism. They will incorporate 
aspects of liberal democracy into their platform so as to broaden their appeal, 
and highlight the perceived hypocrisy of their political opponents, who the 
ANPs may claim, prioritise multiculturalism over issues like gender equality and 
secularism when it comes to certain Muslims. They will take up the notion of 
populism as a radical branch of democracy, to help in a defence against 
charges of totalitarianism. 
In the conclusion to their work on the media and neopopulism Mazzoleni, 
Stewart and Horsefield (Mazzoleni 2003, 273) argue that any media coverage 
is helpful to contentious political figures, as “it enhances their visibility and 
furthers their ends, by producing some kind of legitimation.” In principle this 
would appear true, particularly in the insurgent phase. The caveat is that some 
public utterances are distinctly deviant, as defined by Hallin, and will have a 
negative impact not only on coverage by most established media, but will find 
no appeal to all but a fractional proportion of voters who themselves are 
deviant, in the political sense. Thus the ANPs are eager to frame their media 
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content and performances expertly, particularly as they generally perceive 
established media as intrinsically hostile, due to the disposition of journalists 
and media institutions.  
 
 
6.3.1 Article Typology 
 
As discussed in the Methods Sub-Section section (3.2) the articles for review 
(the term ‘article’ used broadly to cover any relevant media content) have been 
chosen to cover a diverse range of media, written by a number of author 
categories. 
Contained in the following table is a typology of the 28 articles selected for 
review. They are divided into: ‘tone’, ‘type’, ‘media’ and ‘case study’. This 
provides an understanding of the array of article types utilised in the review. 
The different descriptors are indicative of the selection of article types 
numerically and regarding content. It should be pointed out that the items listed 
here are presented as artefacts. They display, and on inspection help to 
explain the range of media activity generated by and about the ANPs. While 
mixed in genre or format, they contain, (i) the material made and published 
directly the ANPs, or privileging views of ANP spokespersons or supporters; (ii) 
in other cases material that may be non-committal, like most general news 
reportage, concentrating on facts and events which involve the ANPs, or (iii) it 
may be material hostile to the party interest. Thus there is a juxtaposition of 
material from the ANPs that might, in a different kind of study, be treated 
separately as primary data from the sources, while the other media content 
might be handled separately, e.g. in a media content analysis. This dissertation 
proposes that communication through media is a disorderly field of very 
diverse messages, all relevant to the generation of awareness about politics. 
The juxtaposed kinds of material are illustrative of this, while also raising 
themes for analysis and points of discussion. It can be seen from the table that 
the items chosen are distributed in such a way that a range of the different 
types of artefact has been allocated to each of the case study organisations.     
‘Tone’ describes whether the article is closer to a broadsheet (quality) or 
tabloid (popular) news service. It’s important for this research to discern 
between these two proximate types as they have a strong relevance to the 
coverage of the party family themselves, and the issues they develop. As 
noted there is a sense that the ANPs are intrinsically tabloid in their media 
output – the directness of the message, the Manichean division between good 
(‘the people’) and the evil (‘elites and their allies’), and the consciously 
provocative approach often apparent. Even though there are multitudes of 
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tabloid critics of the ANPs the issues they raise are often running parallel to 
those of the ANPs, particularly in the breakout phase where outrage is used as 
a tool to hammer away at the ‘repressive politically correct’ civility (as they see 
it) of the centrist parties. The quality or broadsheet services are designed for 
relatively educated audiences and are more likely to be hostile to the ANPs 
due to an infusion of social liberalism in the centre left papers and economic 
liberalism in the centre right papers. 
 
The ‘Type’ refers to the ‘voice’ of the article. With ‘Commentary’, it’s important 
to note the major distinction among the articles is that the majority are opinion 
pieces, often by critical voices. ‘Interviews’, similarly may be hostile or 
supportive; at one extremity they may be sympathetic exchanges designed to 
elicit main points that the speaker from an ANP wants to establish, and may 
appear in both party publications and general media; at the other extremity 
they may be adversarial exchanges in a  ‘probing’ current affairs tradition, 
usually drawing large television audiences. One ‘Documentary’ is listed. 
Political documentary programs tend to be longer-form and focused on 
providing extensive information about the subject. Where seen as an extended 
version of reportage found in current affairs, they similarly may expose the 
party to probing criticism, but also may draw welcome attention, placing it firmly 
on the political agenda. In the ‘Self’ category; as previously mentioned the 
ANPs define themselves as political outsiders, with self-produced media 
content inevitably being important due to their outsider status, which is an 
important part of their appeal and self-identification. ‘Advertisements’ are a 
particular form of self produced content designed to ‘sell’ a message with 
brevity, expressing a point with impact without developing a textual argument, 
conducive to be noticed on social media or posted on the street. The other type 
is the generic news story.  In the fourth column, ‘Media’ refers to format of the 
article under review.  
 
ARTICLE TONE TYPE MEDIA CASE 
STUDY 
6.4.1.1 Quality Commentary News FN 
6.4.1.2 Quality Commentary News FN 
6.4.1.3 Quality Self Online FN 
6.4.2.1 Popular Self Newsletter VB 
6.4.2.2 Popular Self Online VB 
6.4.2.3 Popular Interview News VB 
6.4.3.1 Popular Advertisement Online DF 
6.4.3.2 Quality Commentary News DF 
6.4.3.3 Popular News News DF 
6.4.4.1 Quality Documentary TV BI 
6.4.4.2 Popular Advertisement Online BI 
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6.4.4.3 Quality Self Online BI 
6.5.1.1 Quality Commentary News FN 
6.5.2 Popular News News VB 
6.5.3 Quality Commentary News DF 
6.5.4 Popular Advertisement Poster BI 
6.6.1 Quality Commentary News FN 
6.6.2 Popular Self Online VB 
6.6.3 Popular News News DF 
6.6.4 Quality Commentary News BI 
6.7.1 Quality Commentary News FN 
6.7.2 Popular Commentary News VB 
6.7.3 Popular Advertisement Poster DF 
6.7.4 Popular Advertisement Poster BI 
6.8.1 Popular Self Online FN 
6.8.2 Quality Commentary News VB 
6.8.3 Popular News News DF 
6.8.4 Quality Commentary News BI 
6.9.1 Popular Advertisement Poster FN 
6.9.2 Quality News News VB 
6.9.3 Quality Commentary News DF 
6.9.4 Popular News News FN 
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6.4 Islam and Islamism 
Many of the instances of media considered, and ultimately selected for review 
cover more than one of the specific themes examined in the subsequent 
reviews.  Though there is variety within the ANPs’ platforms and their media 
strategy, the ANPs offer a total vision of politics, as do any party family, or 
social movement. Neoliberals offer a World unhindered by borders, socialists, 
a World free of exploitation, but for the ANPs it is a world where the nation is 
under attack from historic and contemporary foes. The principal goal of the 
ANPs is to defend, rebuild, maintain, and grow their nations, as they 
understand them to be. As the parties are often described as xenophobic, 
exhibiting fears of things foreign, they are also patriphilic, which is to say, 
positively attached to their perception of the historical nation.  Thus there is an 
emphasis on things French, Flemish, or Danish, from literature, gender 
relations, through to cuisine, approaches to satire. Dietary restrictions at 
schools or hospitals to accommodate observant Muslims attending, may mean 
a restriction on the serving of pork for non-Muslims, and are represented as a 
danger to national cuisine as the majority, and historical inhabitants are denied 
their norms for the sake of a minority, in turn represented as historically and 
culturally hostile. Though some of the ANPs may be relatively nuanced in their 
understanding of Islam, with an acceptance of assimilating and integrating 
Muslims, a broad macro level picture of civilisational conflict is depicted 
through their media efforts. 
Islamists, (e.g. Salafists, fundamentalists, those who place religious law over 
secular law), in the Christian and post-Christian West are represented as being 
very hostile and threatening to European nations due to the intractability of 
their adherence, and inability to assimilate in comparison to other immigrant 
groups; Buddhists or Indian Sikhs, for example. For some, such as MLP, there 
is a space within society for Muslims who are willing to move towards 
established French norms and not, as it is seen, entrench themselves in sharia 
compliant ghettoes remote and alien to historical populations. This sectioning 
of Muslims into those who may be ‘successful’ in Western Europe, in the sense 
of being adaptable, and those who may be prone to strife, is a considerable 
theme. The reviews for each issue, concerning the four case study subjects, 
will be in the following order: the FN, VB, DF and BI. 
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6.4.1.1 Front National 1 
Alexander Piquard - Le Monde, PARIS: Avec Marine Le Pen, Le Discourse du 
FN sur L’Islam a Change (With Marine Le Pen the FN Discourse about Islam 
has Changed). Date First Published: 14.01.11 Date First accessed 14.01.11.  
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/01/14/avec-marine-le-pen-le-
discours-du-fn-sur-l-islam-a-change_1465255_823448.html 
 
This article serves as a pertinent place to commence the review as it covers 
the transition towards concern over Islam evident in MLP’s public utterances, 
and the transition from her father’s position, whose focus was on mass 
immigration generally and communism. In the Cold War years the FN was 
profoundly concerned with communism as an intrinsically anti-national 
ideology. According to the focus of the article, by Yves Camus (2013), 
communism has been replaced by Islamism as the concern of the nativist 
parties, including the FN, with MLP expressing this issue so as to improve her 
political prospects by tackling contemporary issues. 
Le Monde is France’s main ‘centre left’ newspaper; for the English reader it is 
tonally similar to the Sydney Morning Herald, Globe and Mail or the Guardian. 
This article was printed before MLP took over from her father as president of 
the FN, on 16.01.2011. It is presented as a series of question and answers 
between the writer and a leading journalist and scholar on French nationalist 
politics, Camus, of the International Institute of Strategic Relations. It focused 
on public utterances by MLP in the lead-up to the FN presidential election, in 
exchanges between the party stalwart and traditionalist Catholic, Bruno 
Gollnisch, and herself. 
In this series of questions Camus develops the line that MLP has moved 
towards criticism of Islamism, as there is a continent wide concern over the 
place of Islam in Europe, and this is a departure from the line of her father and 
the party hierarchy. He argues the concern over Islamism has replaced the 
concern over communism so apparent in the previous platform of the FN, and 
as such, the FN continues to build intrinsically on ideological concerns 
(Islamism is considered an ideology). As nativists that support an intertwined 
civic and ethnic nationalism the ANPs inevitably take issue with any ideology 
that has global aims: Islamism, Communism, and global capitalism. As noted a 
conflict between Islam and Christian Europe can be more viably represented 
as an enduring conflict with historical precedent, while ‘Islam’ is far more visible 
in many of its cultural traditions than the image or behavior of other immigrant 
populations. France is the most robust of the Western European nations in 
terms of its strong and explicit attachment to secularism, this provides a theme, 
which may have potent resonance. 
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In his interview with this researcher, Camus (2013) stated MLP was definitely a 
politician of her time, while her father was exemplary of the French nationalism 
in the post-war era; there was no contemporary  political space for egregious 
attacks on Jews or references to the Holocaust in her public utterances. If the 
party was to be taken as more than a provocation it needed to moderate its 
positions, and as such extremists within its own ranks needed to be expelled, 
while the party needed to focus on the more extreme, reactionary elements of 
Islam in France and abroad. This would provide an opportunity for the party to 
define itself as both secular and modern; and a significant portion of Muslims 
as deviant and hostile to consensus issues in France. Thus it would be 
presenting Islam as an internally divided religion with fundamentalists 
competing with those Muslims willing to come to terms with secular European 
norms; while the FN itself would become a defender of the Republic, and of 
democracy. (Added in, is an appeal for better democracy in the form of 
electoral reform to give the FN an improved return of parliamentary seats for its 
aggregate vote). 
During the interview by this researcher, with Ludovic de Danne (2013), the 
international affairs spokesperson for the FN, he reported that the party under 
MLP had indeed undergone a process of defactionalisation, and was 
essentially a populist party without the deep rifts that had been apparent under 
the leadership of JMLP, (though of course there remained diverse opinions 
within the party). A directional change of generic concern was also manifest, 
about the core issue of immigration, with a shift in the focus of media 
presentations to a threat posed by Islam against the French people. Support 
for this could be found in a situation where Muslim adherents were the most 
visible, discussed, and problematic of immigrant groups in comparison to non-
Muslims, for example French of Vietnamese heritage or migrants from Poland. 
De Danne framed the FN, as does MLP as a party for Muslims, or “real 
Muslims” and not fundamentalists. He mentioned the party’s enduring support 
for harkis, Algerian Muslims loyal to the French empire, who left for France 
after the Algerian war. This was reflecting the ‘new master frame’ (Rydgren 
2005), providing an argument above the level of base prejudice, moving to 
define the party as neither racist nor an intrinsically anti-Muslim party, but 
rather a pro French party which defends the Republic from Islamist theocrats. 
 
The shift identified by Camus (2013) would see concern over Islamism 
developed as an issue related to the core political and policy issue of 
immigration. The inter-linking of Islam, mass immigration, and identity, could 
provide a central platform for the FN. It would flow on from its diagnosis of the 
ailments of the French body politic, and remedies, with the rise of Islamism 
perhaps being the most highly visible of the ‘symptoms’, and the most easily 
developed as a media issue. 
129 
 
 
6.4.1.2 Front National 2 
Dr. Aurelien Mondon - The Independent, London: Le Pen’s Attacks on Islam 
are No Longer Veiled. Date First Published: 27.12.2012 Date first Accessed: 
08.07.14 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/le-pens-attacks-on-islam-are-
no-longer-veiled-8181891.html 
 
This article is suitable for review as it considers the contesting of frames as to 
whether the ANPs are a continuation of fascism, or as they define themselves: 
democratic patriots defending their civilisation and respective nations from a 
backward imperialism being supported by theocrats, funded by petrodollars, 
and aided by remote elites who look to dissolve the French nation.  
Aurelien Mondon is an academic teaching at the University of Bath, with a 
specialisation in nationalist politics in France. He has contributed opinion 
pieces to magazines and papers about the FN and consistently argues that the 
FN remains a party of the extreme right, and is still deeply associated with 
historical fascism, even after the modernisation and professionalisation 
process undertaken by MLP.  
In this article published by The Independent, which tends towards centrism and 
social liberalism, Mondon discusses a range of significant issues in France, 
including the violent response to the film, The Innocence of Muslims, the 
discussion of racisme anti-blanc (anti-White racism), and the adoption of 
aspects of liberalism so as to move the party platform into the sphere of 
consensus and legitimate controversy. The author also sees the party family 
falling back into paranoid public utterances and a media platform better suited 
to times past. Mondon argues that MLP has developed and mediatised a 
strategic attachment to secularism, which she uses to attack the place of Islam 
in France. According to the author the banning of conspicuous religious 
symbols in public places, is consciously aimed at ostracising Muslims who 
choose to dress in an ultra-conservative manner. 
This opinion article was selected as it is demonstrative of the framing practices 
of those opposed to the ANPs, in that it relates the party to historical fascism 
(deviancy) through framing, by referring to the party as ‘extreme right’; and 
directly challenges the FN’s efforts at perception management, by disputing 
MLP’s process of dediabolisation. This framing by Mondon consciously places 
the party as direct heirs to Vichy.  
The author argues along the same lines as Ellinas (2010), though in a partisan 
130 
 
fashion, that the efforts of the established parties of the neoliberal right have 
tried to ‘head off’ the FN on protectionist and nativist arguments increasingly 
popular with a section of the public. The French President Nicolas Sarkozy, 
and Jean-Francois Cope, the President of his party, the UMP (2012-14), in 
their utterances developed themes that were becoming ‘owned’ by the FN. 
With Sarkozy this was a broad discussion of identity and the problems related 
to security often associated with immigrant youth living in the banlieues. Cope 
spoke publicly against anti-White racism, a subject previously beyond the 
realm of centrist politics though well developed by the FN and the BI. 
The article talks about the general growth of the FN, narrowed to gains it has 
made from concerns about Islam in France, which is the central theme of the 
current dissertation. The article considers the focus put on the secular republic, 
with a reorientation of the party’s presentation of itself, and in the thrust of its 
media efforts; all of which has defined MLP in some contrast to her father. Her 
support for the banning of all religious symbols, including large Christian 
crosses, does place her as a staunch defender of secularism, offering a 
constitutionally legitimate reason for resisting any perceived Islamic offences 
against French norms. 
 
As discussed in the literature review there has been a conscious moderation in 
the FN, something verging on a second round of denazification, in which party 
members who were fascists or otherwise suspect, and may have been 
tolerated in the past, were removed from the party. In the case of parties that 
are authoritarian, nativist and populist it is inevitable that media will publish 
critical articles in alignment with their readers views. That might be less so in 
the case of conservative mainstream media, such as le Figaro in Paris or the 
London Daily Telegraph, but more so those with a socially liberal editorial 
position, which can be thoroughly adverse to the politics of the ANPs. In the 
present instance a skeptical article has been published in the Independent 
about the FN’s readjustment of its position.  
It should be noted that Mondon is a commentator with strong expertise, 
offering an informed opinion. His knowledge and background in the subject 
provides him with legitimacy, particularly as a critic of a party and party family 
likely to have little sympathy from the Independent’s readership. More 
generally, coverage of these issues by journalists has been different. With 
articles critical of the ANPs or the FN in particular, there is little backgrounding 
in the sense of a discussion about whether the parties’ expressed concerns 
about Islam are genuine or valid to any degree; rather they tend to be 
represented as a further expression of the trajectory of the extreme right, with 
no evidence proposed in support of such conclusions.  
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6.4.1.3 Front National 3 
Dr. Aymeric Chauprade, MEP France Against the Islamic Question: A Credible 
Choice for a Future France, Realpolitik.tv. Brussels. Date First Published: 
11.08.14 Date First accessed: 12.10.14. 
http://blog.realpolitik.tv/2014/08/la-france-face-a-la-question-islamique-les-
choix-credibles-pour-un-avenir-francais/ 
 
Aymeric Chauprade is one of the intellectuals in the process of redefining the 
new FN in the post-Cold War period. His focus on Islamism, which is broader 
and less pragmatic than MLP’s is indicative of the divergence of opinion within 
the European nationalist milieu on the specifics of the perceived and 
represented threat. Chauprade, an FN Member of the European Parliament for 
the Ile de France region based on Paris, is a political scientist and an advisor 
on international affairs to MLP. He was formerly an instructor with the 
Moroccan and French military, and was relieved of his post at a defence 
college when he was accused of considering ‘truther’ plots around the S11 
terrorist attacks as viable; accusations successfully challenged in court in 
2011. ‘Truthers’ consider the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and 
Pentagon part of a conspiracy, of which US and Israeli agencies are the 
culprits, so as to demand a response in the Islamic World. This relatively 
lengthy article was originally published on Chauprade’s website, realpolitik.tv 
(ranked 30 849 in France on Alexa.com 12.12.14), then republished on the 
leading nationalist/identitarian orientated blog, fdesouche.com (ranked 819 in 
France on Alexa.com 12.12.14). 
Chauprade demonstrates the usefulness of social media by blogging this 
article in the first instance. This allows him the opportunity of communicating 
directly with his audience, as opposed to having his message analysed by 
media generally perceived as hostile (de Danne 2013, Mudde, 2007) to the FN, 
and those of a nationalist disposition. As will be discussed throughout this 
section social media has been useful to the ANPs as a tool to penetrate a 
media perceived as oppositional, and without the seemingly inevitable taint of 
criticism from the ‘liberal left’, or ‘neoliberal’ orientation of a ‘media class’.  
Social media has allowed the circumvention or replacement of old media 
outlets that have been in agreement with nationalist positioning, such as 
Minute (which has declining sales) and Rivarol, both superseded by news 
aggregating services like fdesouche.com and the BI related Novopress, as well 
as the Websites of the FN and the other ANPs. As stated in the literature 
review there has been no obvious support for the parties, aside from the 
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Austrian Freedom Party (Plasser and Ulram 2003), by established media, as in 
the way News Corp newspapers supported the election of Tony Blair in Britain 
or Tony Abbott in Australia. Social media offers more options, as they will also 
sustain other interests, e.g. dissident news services in Australia like the Green 
Left Weekly, and there will be an overlap of problems across the mainstream 
and new media (e.g. foreign ownership of media, impacts of globalisation in 
media agendas or reportage). 
This article by Chauprade was chosen because he is an academic, intellectual 
polemicist. Not all of this intellectual underpinning is welcomed within the 
political party, but the references to history and concept of civilisations, while 
they might be seen as wrong by many of his academic peers, are of interest to 
ANPs. Such work can assist the FN substantially with its drive to see its 
positions accorded more legitimacy among the political community. 
The article itself is a long exposition of ideas and conclusions, pointing out 
broad background to the FN’s representation of Islamism and threats that it 
poses to France and Europe. Chauprade frames the issue as civilisational, in 
some ways reminiscent of the vision of a multi polar civilisational World 
developed in the Clash of Civilisations (Huntington 1996). As such, arguing at 
the macro level, generalisations and simplifications may become necessary. 
For the purposes of review the article is significant in that it expresses the 
intellectual depth of the FN in comparison to the other nationalist parties, which 
might appear more intrinsically populist than the French when it comes to 
identifying an intellectual foundation for nativism and civilisationalism. The 
article also intimates there are still competing strains within the FN, though 
perhaps not as deeply factionalised as those under JMLP (Camus 2013; de 
Danne 2013), where its conclusions are supported in some parts, rejected in 
others. Of particular interest are the positions of the sovereigntists mainly 
concerned with the EU and those concerned with the perceived challenge 
Islamism offers France. These two aims are not mutually exclusive; they are in 
fact symbiotic in the FN’s campaigns, as with the argument that the French can 
have no real control over immigration while the Schengen agreement is in 
force. 
Chauprade’s thesis, outlined in this article under review, differs from 
Huntington’s in a number of significant senses. For ANP media strategy the 
most crucial is his subdivision of the West into Anglo-Saxon and continental 
European civilisations. In his view the United States and France are at odds in 
both a cultural and political sense, a notion that is common in the FN as it 
perceives Americanisation as a serious cultural and economic threat, and the 
US as a country in league with the key supporters of fundamentalist Islam, 
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Qatar and Saudi Arabia, according to Chauprade. There has traditionally been 
anti-Americanism in parties of the committed left (e.g. Parti de Gauche (Left 
Party), or the Communist Party or France), and in the French nationalist milieu. 
Nationalists consider the US as being cultural imperialist (and offering a cheap 
and tawdry option compared to France’s older culture) and eager to engage 
France in overseas wars not in its best interests, Iraq being a prime example.  
Other nationalist orientated intellectuals like Alaine de Benoist and Guillame 
Faye are both critical of the ideology underpinning Anglo-Saxon civilization, as 
they understand it, and its impact on Europe, most notably after World War II. 
They represent it as supporting liberalism, individualism, multiculturalism, 
foreign wars against the national interest, multinational corporations, and 
having a superficial though easily transplanted culture, characterised by 
Hollywood and the McDonalds chain. Like the EU, the US and its global reach 
are treated as a threat to France and Europe. This has led to an orientation 
towards the somewhat authoritarian and socially conservative Putin’s Russia, 
where there are similarities in platform, and mutual ‘enemies’ in the EU and 
US. This relationship is likely to become increasingly significant should the FN 
continue to grow in popularity. 
This consideration has geopolitical ramifications on the support for Shia 
Muslims, particularly Iranians, who have a strong relationship with the 
Russians, in contrast with the Gulf State Sunnis, generally placed as American 
allies. There is overlap here in the domestic situation in France where the great 
majority of fundamentalists and terrorists are Sunni Jihadi Salafists, while Shia 
Muslims have not engaged in terrorist acts in Europe to the researcher’s 
knowledge. In this line of thinking the Shia and Europeans are natural allies 
against Sunni-based fundamentalism. 
Chauprade has taken a ‘harder line’ on Islam than MLP, with remarks that 
Islamism has a deeply destructive impact on older civilisations, “mainly through 
fear” (Tronche 2013); from which the party leader has distanced herself, while 
campaigning to gain votes from Muslims averse to Salafist influence. Among 
his principal concerns is a change in the Islamic and Arab World; due to the 
perceived failures of Arab nationalism, in conjunction with funding from Islamist 
Gulf States, issues of nationalism have been turned into issues of Islamism – 
most notably the Palestinian cause.  
The article becomes emotive, against what normally would be expected of 
work by a political scientist, on the issue of the involvement of Gulf States, 
particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in French social, political and economic 
life. As an example, the ownership of leading sports teams such as Paris Saint 
Germaine, by a Gulf state, has fuelled fears for French sovereignty. For 
134 
 
Chauprade, such trends call for an assertion of a pan Christian civilization and 
solidarity, for instance delivering a pan Christian response to the horrors of the 
Islamic State. It is a second point of difference with MLP, who is more 
committed to the nation state, leading the French party towards a more 
secularist position, supporting the Republic unashamedly. 
Chauprade puts forward an argument based around the theory of the Grande 
Replacement, developed by the author and intellectual Renaud Camus 
(discussed in section 6.8.4). It describes the replacement of the native 
European French population with Muslim and African immigrants and their 
descendants. Here it shares many elements with Jewish writer, Bat Ye'Or’s 
notion of Eurabia - the conscious dissolution of the historical European ethno 
nations by domestic ‘elites’ in collusion with their Middle Eastern and African 
counterparts. The author makes comparisons between the violence and 
destruction of Middle Eastern Christian communities by Islamists, and the 
potential for the destruction of Christian Europe in some generations as the 
demographic weight of increasingly Islamicised Muslim immigrants and their 
descendants grows over time. 
One of the themes drawn out in the literature review was the neutrality of the 
FN towards, if not its support for domestic Jews, and often Israel, in contrast 
with the anti-Semitism in its historical background. Aside from strategically 
offering a strong defence against charges of Nazism this does demonstrate a 
changing environment in which Muslim anti-Semitism is seen as primary. Both 
the FN and Chauprade exhibit this proximate defence of Israel. MLP has 
defended the right of the Jewish Defence League to organise its security 
initiatives, in light of a ‘new anti-Semitism’, alluding to Muslim attacks on Jews, 
often as an extension of the Intifada against Israel. 
Chauprade is a facilitator of the notion that certain Muslims in France can be 
embraced and accepted, dividing the Muslim population into French Muslims, 
and Salafists or fundamentalists who live in France. It is conditional. There is 
space for French Muslims who integrate into France’s Christian foundation, 
and accept secularism over religious edicts. Immigration should be limited to 
those tied by blood and refugees more amenable to integration like Middle 
Eastern Christians, in preference to their Islamic neighbours.  Yet the idea 
provides a rationale for the FN to draw a line of acceptance, and allow itself a 
defence against charges of blatant anti-Islamist prejudice. That stance is 
manifest in the political communication of the party and its media outreach as 
MLP’s public utterances reveal. 
The article by Chauprade is something of a manifesto for use by the leadership 
cadre of the FN. He has held onto ideas of a Christian identity being the 
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foundation of Western nations, especially France, and sees a need for pan-
Christian solidarity against aggression from Islamists. He provides a position 
on accommodating Muslim people who are in Europe, some to be defined as 
acceptable, on strictest terms, others not at all. He provides a position on 
Judaism as well, perceiving Jewish people as allies in a global confrontation, in 
need of defence against the common adversary; in the process showing the 
party how it should jettison the burden of anti-Semitism. He also sorts out 
perceived internal and external threats, arguing that the issues of sovereignty 
and counter Islamisation are not mutually exclusive. Here perceived external 
threats such as the economic influence of Qatar and Saudi Arabia are joined to 
concerns about Salafists in France. 
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6.4.2.1 Vlaams Belang 1 
 
VB Ann Sofie Dewinter in Burqa and Bikini, the Flemish Republic Jan/March 
2012  
Date First Accessed 10.04.13 
http://www.flemishrepublic.org/files/flemishrepublic_2012-31.pdf 
This particular article and accompanying image are significant as they are 
indicative of the provocative, tabloid nature of some of the ANPs’ media 
product, in comparison to the highbrow nature of Chauprade’s essay (6.4.1.3). 
Of the political parties used as case study subjects the VB is possibly the most 
tabloid in their media output. 
The Flemish Republic is the main organ of Vlaams Belang’s English language 
outreach. It is produced roughly biannually and is free to download in .pdf 
format.  The VB is the only case study subject which has an English language 
publication, and seemingly the only non-English language ANP that funds 
media outreach in the English language, being an indication of the isolation the 
party suffers in Flanders/Belgium.  
The cover features Ann Sofie Dewinter, the daughter of party leader; Filip 
Dewinter dressed in a niqab while revealing a bikini-clad body underneath. The 
image is accompanied by the text of party president, Bruno Valkeniers, who 
engages in a ‘brand differentiation’ between the VB and the rising Nieuw-
Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA – New Flemish Alliance). He defines the VB as the 
authentic party of Flemish nationalism, which supports the independence of the 
Flemish ethnonation, and defends against current threats such as mass 
immigration, Islamism and rampant crime. 
The VB (both as the Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Belang) has experienced a 
cordone sanitaire, commencing in 1989, which effectively quarantined them 
from coalitions with other parties. This formal agreement established the media 
tone with no positive, or even neutral coverage, as reported for this study by 
VB MEP, Philip Claeys (2013) and political scientist Dr. Koenraad Abts (2013). 
The formal cordon sanitaire was designed to counter the VB’s rise, which may 
have added to the party’s increased popularity in the mid 2000s, as the decline 
of the party is most closely linked to the rise of the liberal-conservative 
nationalist Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (Abts 2013; Claeys 2013). As noted the VB 
was once the premier Flemish nationalist party – in the 2009 Flemish elections 
the party had been reduced to 15% of the vote from 24%. The number of 
MEPs was reduced from three in 2004 to one now.  
According to Claeys (2013), the cordon sanitaire set up around the party was 
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mimicked by the press, and the party was either ignored or treated with a great 
deal of hostility; though again, the tabloid press did reflect some of the issues 
campaigned on: bogus welfare claims, immigrant criminality, and concerns 
around Islamism. Claeys (2013) supports the notion there was a broader array 
of media opinion some years ago with divergent editorial tone, but with a 
convergence of media ownership there is no space for dissenting voices. In 
Hallin’s (1986) terms the party cannot frame itself in the sphere of legitimate 
controversy, due to media hostility, according to Claeys (2013). This is why the 
VB spends nearly 80% of its budget on media product (Abts 2013; Claeys 
2013) in comparison to other parties which spend around 20% (Abts 2013). 
This isolation experienced by the VB has led to such a heavy investment in 
media, with an array of regular postage delivered newsletters being sent to 
addresses throughout Flanders.  
Claeys reported the media barrier around the VB was so profound the party 
was unable to buy any advertising space in papers, nor was he personally able 
to attend European Parliament press socials due to the hostility directed 
towards the VB by Walloonian parties (French speaking Belgians). Journalists 
would tell him it would upset the other parties too much, and make press 
related gatherings awkward, effectively ostracising them from this useful 
gathering. According to Claeys (2013) the Internet has been a huge boon for 
the party as postage and printing are expensive, and the VB must find as many 
ways to circumvent a media perceived hostile as possible.  
 
For an enduring party that has managed to survive and grow since 1979, (Abts 
2013), the party leadership still engages in media spectacles designed to 
attract attention not seen in either the DF or the FN. It is likely the relative 
radicalism and engagement in street actions (closer to the BI than the other 
parties studied) suggests the strategic use of provocation to gain media 
attention in the light of a conscious avoidance by the established press.  
The current leader of the party, Filip Dewinter, was the most radical of the 
contenders and the leader of the party faction considered Lepenist (at the time 
of JMLP), by intra party opponents (Abts 2013), due to his emphasis on 
immigration. The various protests engaged in by the VB have attempted to 
raise the media profile of the represented threats of Islamism, in Belgium and 
Europe, pointedly, provocatively, so as to own the issue, and raise its level of 
salience. The young woman in niqab and bikini is one such instance. 
The copy on Ms. Dewinter’s body reads “Freedom or Islam? You Choose”. The 
image, which featured as a poster, was circulated on Facebook and twitter, 
and was republished in newspapers including De Morgen (Morgen 2012), 
developments indicative of many of the features of the VB’s media strategy.  
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Firstly, it reveals the tabloid nature of some of the political communication 
evident in their output. Barely clad women have been a historical mainstay of 
the tabloid in decades past (while the Page Three girl has largely disappeared 
from tabloids, she has been replaced with scarcely clothed celebrities in some 
instances), and that image combines risqué sexuality juxtaposed with Islamic 
garb. The headlines provided inevitable contention, by defining the difference 
between Western norms for acceptable female dress, and the most extreme 
form of Islamic female covering. This was consciously provocative as is the 
case in the insurgent phase of campaigns.  
With this image the VB has highlighted a number of issues considered in the 
literature review aside from drawing the sharp distinction between what is 
acceptable in the relatively liberal Western tradition in contrast to what is 
deemed appropriate by the most conservative Muslims. The VB were 
successful in their when a spokesperson for the militant Islamist social 
movement, Sharia 4 Belgium (modeled on the UK based Islamist organisation 
which has received considerable coverage, and whose protests led to the 
formation of the English Defence League – EDL); suggested that Filip de 
Winter had “pimped” out his daughter (Dewsbury 2012).  
As will be demonstrated in further reviews the VB is more ‘hands on’ than the 
DF and the FN, in that they attended street protests against Islamification. For 
an already successful party with an established core support of Flemish 
nationalists it is possible their public utterances were somewhat excessive - 
were too much, rather than too little, seeing the ‘insurgency’ was already 
complete. When considering the VB and its decline, it is possible the party has 
not been able to manage the process of mainstreaming and consolidation as 
successfully as the FN and DF, due to a combination of supply and demand 
side factors, of which their media strategy and continuation of media 
spectacles, more in line with an activist movement than a political party may be 
significant. This may be demonstrative of the success of the cordon sanitaire in 
forcing them into too radical a position in order to gain press coverage. 
 
6.4.2.2 Vlaams Belang 2  
VB, Antwerp, Cities Against Islamisation, (Website). Date of first access: 
17.07.13 
http://www.stedentegenislamisering.be/En/   
This article is pertinent for review and discussion as it is indicative of efforts to 
increase popularity by taking a leading role on a continental level. Again this 
content was developed online, so as to overcome the established media 
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perceived as particularly hostile (Abts 2013; Claeys 2013; Mudde 2014b). The 
Cities against Islamisation website is part of the media outreach of Filip 
Dewinter, designed to provide a pan-European agenda, raise the VB’s and 
Dewinter’s profile, and to act as something of a lightning rod to the self defined 
‘counter-jihad movement’ (CJM). 
The site contains a photo of Dewinter himself, surrounded by a group 
protesting against mosque construction; most notable amongst them is Heinz 
Christian Strache of the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs  (FPÖ – Austrian 
Freedom Party). The website covers related news, and presents Islam as an 
ideology with a religious façade:  
“Islam is a violent, imperialistic and totalitarian ideology with a 
religious halo. Islamic doctrine is elaborated in the Quran and the 
Hadith, and is specified and determined by the sharia. The sharia is a 
complex of rules Islam imposes on both Muslims and non-Muslims: 
an inhumane and anti-Western justice system, characterized by 
barbarous prescriptions which conflict with the generally accepted 
tenets of European civilization.” 
 
Dewinter principally developed the Cities Against Islamisation (CAI) initiative, in 
conjunction with the FPÖ, the nativist-regionalist Alsace d’abord (Alsace First), 
the German anti-Islamist ProKoln (similar in tone to Wilder’s Party for 
Freedom), and the German Republikaner (a more traditionalist nationalist 
organisation) party.  
 
The CAI initiative is an effort at the Europeanisation of the ANPs’ efforts to 
confront the perceived threats of Islam, and describes the approach to the 
place of Islam in Western Europe as understood and presented by the ANPs in 
their public utterances and media output. 
 
There is a considerable online movement attached to the ‘counter jihad 
movement’, which overlaps with political parties like the case study subjects, 
social movements like the BI and the English Defence League, and blogs like 
the Gates of Vienna (gatesofvienna.net), fdescouche (fdesouche.com), 
Politically Incorrect (pi-news.org) and Islam vs. Europe (now the European 
Observer), and Europe News (europenews.dk). 
This example of self produced ANP content is useful in that it presents the 
continental ANPs’ civilisationist representation of their conflict with Islam in 
Europe, as theorised by Huntington (1996) and Chauprade (2014), in which 
there is a broad and enduring historical struggle between Islam and the West; 
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taken up as a factor worth campaigning on to achieve contemporary political 
goals. 
The internationalisation of nationalist parties is a paradox, but in terms of 
developing interlinked issue frames it serves as a powerful media tool. It 
presents the tensions around Islamism in Europe, with comparisons among 
Germany, Flanders, Belgium and other European nations. This is designed to 
prove evidence its simply not a local, domestic issue, but rather continental. 
This outreach to other nations develops the party profile domestically, as they 
are presented as being capable of diplomacy and conciliation while adhering to 
their core interest, which is Flemish nationalism, and the defence against 
threats to it. Thus they place themselves in the sphere of legitimate 
controversy, while framing Islamists as anti-democratic, intrinsically deviant, 
and by association Muslims. 
Rydgren’s (2005) master frame combines Nouvelle Droite ethnopluralism and 
populism. Another important component of this frame is ‘civilisationism’, in 
which there is consideration of European wide commonalities. This 
civilisationism was formulated by the Nouvelle Droite intellectuals like Faye and 
de Benoist, though principally explained through the lens of the Greco-Roman 
civilisation and the pagan folk traditions of other European peoples (e.g. 
Germans, Celts, Basques). Building on this is the arrival and spread of 
Christianity in Europe, which is a theme developed on by those who see the 
conflict in religious terms, with Catholic traditionalists still being a force within 
the FN (Betz 2013; Davies 2012). (Later iterations of European civilisation 
might look to the Renaissance and the emphasis on scientific method as a 
further example of mutual exclusivity of Islamism and European norms; sure to 
lead to a troublesome, if not outright conflictual relationship among native 
Europeans, settled immigrant groups and Islamists.) With this train of thought, 
an unusual conglomeration of Nouvelle Droite thinkers focusing on Indo-
European paganism, (just a fraction of the broader nativist scene (Camus 
2013) - though significant as intellectual leaders), those Christians concerned 
about Islamism from a religious perspective, as well as secular atheists (e.g. 
the French group Riposte Laique (secular counterattack)), can find a common 
enemy in Islamism.  
Of note, the secessionist parties, and social movements, the VB, Lega Nord, 
and the BI, are perhaps the strongest supporters of this civilisational approach 
in their confrontation with Islamism. This may be because it takes the focus 
away from the  extant state, which is the most apparent block to Flemish 
nationalism; the Italian state, the most apparent blockage to Padanian (north 
Italian) nationalism, and for the BI, the French nation, even though they will 
revere for historical reasons; the BI being eager to decentralise power to 
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regional ethnies, while focusing on historic conflict between Occident and 
Orient, such as Persians contra Greeks, and Franks contra Moors. This focus 
on an enduring continental and civilisational struggle against Islam may 
broaden calls for a pan-European identifier, and may lead in the future to calls 
for an alternative to the EU, which would be confederalist, and nativist in a 
European wide sense. 
 
6.4.2.3 Vlaams Belang 3 
Russia Today, Television, ‘Belgian Muslim State - After Election Win’ (Interview 
with Philip Claeys MEP) (Date of broadcast 30.12.08 Date of First accessed 
12.10.14) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1T_15IDAg8 
 
This media product was principally chosen as the focus of the segment, Philip 
Claeys, Member of European Parliament, was also one of the interviewees for 
this research. As might be anticipated for an elected representative and career 
lawyer he was an intelligent, erudite, reasonable spokesperson for his party, 
and fluent in English, his third language. His tone was moderate and 
measured. In this sense he did not present as a polemicist or as innately 
contentious (as demonstrated in the Russia Today (RT) interview), as is often 
the case with ANP spokespeople, most certainly during the insurgent phase. 
 
The interview for the Russian state sponsored RT discusses the recent 
success of an Islamist party, which had two councilors elected in areas of 
Brussels with a concentration of Muslim voters. Claeys describes his concerns 
about the rise of Islamism in Europe and Flanders, including Sharia4Belgium. It 
should be noted that Sharia4Belgium is not a moderate party, but rather a 
radical Salafist party with views, and presentation radically divergent from, and 
hostile to currently accepted European norms.  
RT provides an interesting insight into likely areas of media and related support 
for the ANPs as part of Putin’s geostrategic interests. RT provides an outlet for 
various commentators and politicians who draw attention to issues to do with 
the EU and America, Russia’s two global competitors. The ANPs are the most 
successful Eurosceptics and have the greatest potential for achieving a 
dissolution of the EU. As such they have been given relatively neutral or 
supportive coverage by RT, and provide an alternative to mainstream news 
services, perceived as generally hostile to the ANPs. It has the funding to 
provide much more sophisticated production values than ANP self-made media 
content, and the web based media outlets and aggregators which are self 
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funded.  
In the discussion with the FN’s spokesperson, Ludovic de Danne (2013), he 
suggested there were no large television news organisations within France 
remotely sympathetic or even neutral to the party, and as such RT provides a 
space for some of the ANPs to express their views. The tone of the interviews 
with MLP has been less adversarial than those on the BBC. According to de 
Danne there is a large space in France for such a well-resourced news outlet, 
which could cover the ANPs’ core issues in a neutral or sympathetic fashion. 
This demand may be met by Russia Today which is reported to be spending 
€29.3-million (A$46.079-million; xe.com, 21.10.15) on a French language 
version of the station (Davies 2012; The_Moscow_Times 2014).  
 
During the RT interview, the journalist, apparently not intrinsically hostile, asks 
Claeys if it is not inevitable that an area with a large Muslim population will 
have a Muslim party. His response is much in accord with the arguments and 
points of differentiation considered in the literature review. Claeys argues: 
 
“We’ve always predicted this. Up till now Muslim people mainly supported 
socialist parties and other leftist parties, but now they feel apparently confident 
enough to make their own party. This is really worrying I think. 
“People coming into the EU should adapt to a set of values, should respect the 
separation of the church and the state, be in favour of equality of men and 
women, and in favour of the rule of law and freedom of expression. When 
people don’t accept this and they are going to be candidates in elections I think 
that’s a big problem.” 
 
From his response it is apparent he has defined European norms as 
essentially secular and liberal. It is a value set which has been adopted by the 
ANPs in their media self-representations, so as to frame their arguments as 
emanating from the sphere of consensus. During the interview with the 
researcher (Claeys 2013) he understood the adoption of liberal arguments by a 
socially conservative nationalist party were unusual; gay rights for example. He 
stated that the VB might not be the most supportive of gay rights, but he had 
no wish to see gay people hurt or ostracised, and was highly supportive of the 
gay Dutch sociologist, Pim Fortuyn, who was perhaps the first of the Islamist- 
critical politicians to achieve mass support, prior to his murder. Thus, the VB 
spokesperson places the party as a defender of ideas, which may be 
considered progressive, while developing an understanding these values are 
not held universally in all civilisations, though worthy of protecting from 
Islamists, internally in this instance.  
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These developed binaries pitting the relatively evolved, relatively free, relatively 
wealthy West against Islamism serve four principal functions: they highlight the 
perceived mutual exclusivity between Islamism and the described Western 
norms, they define the VB as a non-fascist party, they demonstrate they are in 
the business of defending European civilisation and the Flemish nation from 
hostile agents, and they aver that parties of the left which support 
multiculturalism are enabling the development of illiberal, reactionary forces of 
the most extreme kind, as evidenced by Sharia4Belgium, with its open call for 
an Islamic state in Europe. 
 
As noted in the literature review the core issue for the ANPs is mass 
immigration, which Claeys ‘segues’ into the concerns about Sharia4Belgium; 
thus interrelating symptoms can be made to point to the foundational argument 
of the VB in particular and the ANPs generally. From this point the argument 
used by Eurosceptic liberal-conservative populists like Nigel Farage, is 
developed by the nativist populists: with the EU we have no control over our 
borders, hence, we must split Belgium along national lines, and in independent 
Flanders can control immigration, while the Walloons (or a Wallonia as part of 
the greater French nation) can control theirs. Thus the path between 
sovereignty, mass immigration and the defence of the historical Flemish nation 
is readily apparent, and Russia Today has provided an opportunity for such a 
trajectory to be expressed to an English speaking audience. 
 
 
6.4.3.1 Dansk Folkeparti1  
The Danish People’s Party, ‘I Am Denmark’, Date First Uploaded 31.12.12 
Date First Accessed 10.08.14 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sGAH1wGNqJM 
The Danish People’s Party produced an advertisement that identifies the 
historical Danish nation, and what behaviours are acceptable within Denmark 
as defined by the DF. The advertisement, produced in English (so as to be 
understood by potential refugees) and Danish, initially describes the history of 
the Denmark through the Viking period, as the World’s oldest monarchy, and 
as a place willing to offer refuge to those in need. The second part of the 
advertisement states that Denmark has a defined culture, including gender 
equality, freedom of speech and the rule of secular law, saying those wanting 
to move there should abide by these laws and traditions. These images 
supporting the voice-over commentary present a multiracial reality of the new 
Denmark, and include an image of Mohammed, while discussing freedom of 
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speech. The voiceover confirms that Denmark will not back down, and will 
“defend my own culture”. The second section of the broadcast is essentially a 
stance against violent Islamism, and includes images of burning Danish flags 
(from the response to the Mohammed cartoons), and a woman in the niqab. As 
a contrast the broadcast concludes with the image of a bikini-clad woman 
resting at the beach and a group of children with a snowman. 
 
Two of the interviewees had involvement with the development of the 
advertisement: Soren Espersen (former journalist and party president), who 
aside from assisting with the script and images performs the voiceover, and his 
wife, Yvette Espersen who has a heavy involvement in the media strategy for 
the party, and who works in marketing in her professional life. The 
advertisement, which presents itself as a guide for the newcomer to Denmark, 
presents a liberal view of Denmark in accord with the ‘nationalisation’ of the 
liberal secular values, which have developed. It is apparent from the images 
and the voice-over that this advertisement develops on the themes expressed 
by the ANPs, as creating a clear distinction between contemporary Europe and 
what is acceptable within Islamism, as much as a distinction between two 
civilisations, and a warning about collision between them - especially with 
Scandinavia being seen as the most liberal part of the World in relation to 
sexuality and gender equality. In this sense liberalism has been integrated into 
Danish and broader European civlisational identity by the DF, while Islamism is 
portrayed as violent and dangerous, and in direct opposition to European 
norms.  
Unlike the FN and VB, the DF’s roots are that of a protest party, rather than a 
nationalist party with some rather ‘sharp edges’. In this sense the DF have 
adapted consensus liberal values to their framing of Islamism in Denmark and 
Europe. They support a culturalist, values laden view of Denmark, as opposed 
to an ethnic vision. 
 
6.4.3.2 Dansk Folkeparti 2  
Politiken, Copenhagen: Jacob Stig Jorgensen, Israels Ven Nummer Et Soren 
Espersen (Israel’s Greatest Friend Soren Espersen), Date of Publication: 
19.07.13 Date of First Access: 19.03.14 
http://politiken.dk/navne/foedselsdage/ECE2026198/israels-ven-nummer-et/ 
 
The article documents an interview between the journalist, Jacob Stig 
Jorgenson and the deputy leader of the DF, Soren Espersen, on his strong and 
enduring support for Israel, his own career as a journalist, and even his 
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personality and personal warmth, to which was imputed an ability to work 
effectively with politicians from other parties. Politiken is a liberal left orientated 
daily, similar in tone to the ‘centre-left’ style of The Sydney Morning Herald. It is 
located in Copenhagen, generally considered a liberal city in terms of voter 
orientation. It stands in comparison with the right of centre Jyllands Posten, 
which is based in the more conservative Aarhus, on the island of Jutland. 
This article on interviewee Espersen, who was also interviewed a year later by 
the researcher for the present study, provides a pertinent opportunity to 
discuss one of the defining issues of the ANPs, and one of the more visibly 
symbolic alterations in European nativist platforms - and public expression of 
that development over time. The DF in comparison to the other parties or 
movements researched has had an enduring support for Israel, the Jewish 
people generally, and Danish Jews in particular. When discussing the issue of 
the Jewish community in Europe, and Israel, Anders Vistisen MEP (2013) and 
Yvette Espersen (2013b), both firmly supported the Jewish community and 
Israel, with Espersen dedicating a portion of her spare time advocating for 
Israel, while Vistisen was due to travel to Israel, expressing pride in Denmark’s 
record in regards to the Danes’ rejection of Nazi anti-Semitism under the 
occupation. 
In the interview with Espersen (2013a), he described himself as once having 
been of the left (and still is a strong supporter of the welfare state), but was 
deeply shocked into a position of being concerned about Islam while working 
as a journalist in England. Espersen reported he was having a chat to the 
owner of his local milk bar who was of Pakistani heritage about the fatwa 
against Salman Rushdie by Ayatollah Khomeini. Espersen reported the milk 
bar owner was normally a mild mannered and easy going man, but did agree 
that Rushdie should be murdered for his supposed slight on Mohammed. This 
incident led the interviewee to further investigate Islam in Europe and his 
reactions led to his becoming an instrumental member of the party. Espersen’s 
concerns over Islamism in the West integrates well with his enduring support 
for Israel, specifically as some Muslims in Europe have adopted a strongly pro-
Palestinian position, with the conflict in the Middle East being a salient issue in 
Western Europe.  
Principal historic targets for European nativists have been various European 
Jewish communities, or Jews in totality, as they were perceived and 
represented as an enemy within, with allegiances beyond those of the nation. 
They were described as the principal intellectual force behind communism, 
liberal capitalism, and overrepresented in banking, the media, in academic 
fields critical of the homogenous nation, while being eager to corrupt the 
gentile family unit. The accusation was that Jewish interests were intent on 
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destruction of national identity so that international Jewry would have no 
opposition in a quest to feed off the body politic of various European (and 
other) peoples (Espersen 2013a).  In this sense extreme nationalists would 
often represent Jews as clannish, manipulative, scheming, untrustworthy, and 
unscrupulously greedy – with a premier commitment to their own people (and 
Israel since 1948) at the expense of native European peoples.  
In interviews with current spokespeople from the VB and the DF there was a 
deep  support for European Jewish communities, while Ludovic de Danne 
(2013) of the FN supported a two state solution for Israel-Palestine and 
commented the party had ejected anti-Semites and those with fascist 
sympathies. Vistisen (2013) (now an MEP) concurred that the FN under MLP 
was heading in the right direction; though it would take a number of years for 
the party to be considered reformed enough to join in an alliance with the DF.  
Thus philo-Semitism and Zionism of the DF, much like Wilders’ stance in the 
Netherlands, is one of the defining factors of this iteration of European nativism 
for some of the party family, wholly different from the fascisms between the 
wars. As noted, issues like Holocaust denial and a retrospective sympathy for 
the war-time Axis are distinctly deviant issues in a Western European context. 
The ANPs appear earnest in their outright support for, or at least 
rapprochement with Jewish communities in Europe and Israel – serving the 
purpose as well of negating claims of fascism. There is also the common 
enemy in Islamists; the Palestine-Israel conflict is highly politicised within 
Europe, usually with ‘the Left’ and some Muslim activists supporting the 
Palestinians, against ‘the Right’ and some Jewish activists.  
 
There is an argument that suggests the ANPs must always be able to define a 
viable threat (or at least anomaly) within the body politic, to justify their 
defensive rhetoric. Such an external threat is represented in the promotion of 
nativism, with the identification of groups perceived to be hostile to the nation, 
of which visible Muslims are the chief example. However the Western 
European Muslim populations cannot be considered a competing elite, with 
undue influence in the professions, arts, academy and finance. In this sense 
any analogy between an Islamist threat, and Jewish communities as assailed 
in historical Western European anti-Semitism, would not be viable. 
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6.4.3.3 Dansk Folkeparti 3  
Ray Weaver – The Copenhagen Post: No More Muslims Say DF Leaders Date 
First Published: 27.01.14 Date First Accessed: 22.01.15 
http://cphpost.dk/news14/politics-news14/no-more-muslims-say-df-
leaders/014692.html 
The article demonstrates the importance of the welfare state in a Scandinavian 
social democracy, with the DF developing a concern over the number of 
refugees and the sustainability of the welfare for ethnic Danes or established 
immigrant communities. The Copenhagen Post is an English language news 
and general media site orientated towards English speaking immigrants in 
Denmark, or for those looking for Danish news in English. The article focuses 
on the DF’s objection to the number of Muslims in the country, and how that is 
to be answered by the DF, with then a critical response to the DF’s position by 
a pro-immigration, anti-sectarian campaigner. 
In accord with the literature review it can be demonstrated the DF, and the 
party family in general, is most popular amongst working class and lower 
middle class ethnic Danes. Those who have the most to lose if the welfare 
state is abandoned, and those who are likely to be in closest proximity to 
refugees, in this sense working class Danes, and those who rely on support 
from the state, may feel the most threatened. In a meeting with Soren 
Espersen (Espersen 2013a), he remarked to the researcher that “there is only 
a limited amount of money for welfare, and with more refugees and immigrants 
there will be less cost for others.” This pits extant Danish citizens against 
newcomers, particularly Muslims as damaging to the economy of Denmark, 
most pointedly towards the working class, and lower middle class Danes, who 
are the voter base for the DF (Espersen 2013a). Thus the DF has acted to 
represent voters supportive of the welfare state for native Danes and 
assimilated immigrant populations (economically ‘left’), while being culturally 
conservative (though with a degree of liberalism on a spread of issues in the 
Danish case), and so linking together represented threats to the economy and 
culture.  
 
6.4.4.1 Bloc Identitaire 1  
Yemaya Productions, Paris – an independent news agency and production 
house. Enquete Exclusive – Nouveaux Look, Nouveax Dangers: Le Retour des 
Extreme Droits (New Look, New Dangers: The Return of the Extreme Right) 
Date Uploaded 14.09.12 First Accessed 15.09.13 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cD58gGYGi6E 
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This extended report focuses on social movements described as extreme right: 
the fascist, and now banned, Jeunesses Nationalistes Révolutionnaires (JNR), 
the English Defence League (EDL), the Italian new-fascist inspired social 
movement Casa Pound (CP), violent Hungarian anti-Roma militants, and the 
BI. As the title suggests the program develops on the themes of the 
renaissance of extreme nationalists, with the JNR, CP and Hungarians being 
ideologically, and in the use of symbols, the descendants of Mussolini’s Black 
Shirts.  
The broadcast covers the most notable aspects of the evolution and growth of 
the BI, and the associated youth movement, Generation Identitaire (GI). After 
discussing Fabrice Robert’s history in radical nationalism, it considers other GI 
activists, Damien Rieu, who argues that Islam is the principal threat facing 
France, and demonstrates the creation of Internet enabled political actions 
designed to attract media attention and support. These include the La Marche 
des Cochons (The March of the Pigs), and the meeting against Islamisation 
addressed by the Swiss People’s Party politician Oskar Freysinger, amongst 
others. 
By its very title this report does strongly indicate the groups are examples of 
‘old master frames’ as defined by Rydgren (2005) that have not developed into 
viable political entities such as the FN, VB or DF. Qualitatively there are 
significant differences between the activists in the BI and EDL, and the fascist 
inspired Hungarians, Italians and French. The EDL, though its marches and 
protests have descended into mayhem on occasion (inevitable in an 
organisation founded by football casuals), are specifically aimed at Islamism in 
Britain. Some of their marches have non White British as participants, as well 
as special ‘divisions’ for gays and Jews, in an attempt at a broad alliance of 
anyone who potentially might have reason to be in opposition to Islamism. This 
allowed them to frame their campaign as a united front of diverse Britons 
against tyrannical fundamentalism and the elites that allowed it to go 
unchecked. In this sense it was a populist, ‘liberal-nationalist’ social movement 
that did develop issues around Islamism, which it believed the mainstream 
press and politicians were ignoring. The rise of the EDL as a social activist 
movement suggests the British National Party was not successfully filling the 
space in the party political spectrum. This is not the case in France. 
When considering the BI, the FN spokesperson for international affairs, 
Ludovic de Danne (2013), considered the party as an ‘acceptable’ 
organisation, though ideologically distinct. While he stated the FN wanted 
nothing to do with parties like the JNR, which were deviant in both the FN’s 
understanding, and that of the broader community. As previously discussed the 
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BI is radically different from the other case study subjects, in the sense of its 
programme, ideology, orientation, their transition from a political party to a 
decentralised, activist, social movement, with a strong focus on non-violent 
protest, media spectacles, and the regional identities in France. In this sense 
they provide a useful comparison to the political parties, and the FN in 
particular. The BI are also a worthwhile study due to their focus on media 
activism, and a well developed sense of design aesthetics that operates at a 
professional level. 
As discussed in the broadcast the interviewee and president of the BI, Fabrice 
Robert (2013), has an enduring history of involvement in radical nationalist 
organisations including Unite Radical, which was disbanded after a mentally ill 
affiliate, Maxime Bruniere, attempted to assassinate French President, Jaques 
Chirac, in 2002. During the interview Robert (2013) admitted to being an 
activist in revolutionary nationalist circles, in almost a confessional sense, then 
discussed the political evolution of the BI. 
There is an implicit juxtaposition between the two French movements in the 
report. As intended the broadcast does consider the evolution of radical 
nationalists, as the inaccurately named Jeunesses Nationalistes 
Révolutionnaires, are presented as a band of middle aged fascist skinheads 
who have failed to mature, either politically or personally. In this sense the BI 
can be seen as a comparison, as a movement that has adapted to new 
communication technologies and aesthetics, with an ideology that departs from 
the ‘bullyboy’ fascism of earlier decades. The BI, though still a peripheral 
movement (Robert 2013), can be seen as one that has adapted to 
contemporary concerns and approaches, while still maintaining its radical bent. 
In that regard, it principally focuses on the resurrection, maintenance and 
growth of native European ethnies, and a view of broader European 
civilisation, against numerous foes, specifically Islamists, globalists, and forces 
that would be eager to destroy the various native European identities as they 
see them. The BI, principally under the leadership of Robert, and Philip 
Vardon, now of the ethno regionalist organisation Nissa Rebela (based on the 
identity of the Nice area), has developed a nativist agitprop, which has seen 
the movement, and its methods spread to other parts of Europe. They are a 
consciously decentralised organisation ideologically in tune with the rhizomic 
nature of social media, and have made it a focus of their efforts.  
The themes represented by the BI in their media spectacles are perhaps closer 
to the ideas of Faye, who moved away from the support of national 
revolutionary movements to a concern with native European peoples and 
broader European civilisation (Robert 2013). In his works he supports a 
Eurasian political powerhouse that runs from Ireland to Vladivostok. He 
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perceives the greatest threat to this resurgent Europe would be its external and 
internal Muslim populations, including the grande replacement, whereby native 
Europeans are being consciously replaced by Muslims and Africans (as 
covered in the BI article related to demography (6.4.4.3)) acting in collusion 
with the US and related globalist forces. 
Robert (2013) claims the BI is avant garde, in that it develops issues through 
protest and media spectacle which are adopted by political parties including 
the FN, and even the UMP, with the issue of racisme anti-blanc (anti-White 
racism) adopted by Jean-Francoise Cope, the party leader (Cope 2012). The 
issue also featured in the public utterances of MLP, relating to the inability of 
both the PS and the UMP to tackle the anti-French, anti-White racism, that 
“ravages” the banlieues, the immigrant dense satellite cities (Mestre 2012). BI 
activists have engaged in activities such as a “die in” where those involved lay 
on the ground in white shirts spattered in fake blood to protest against racisme 
anti-blanc.  
As a street protest and media activist organisation founded at least partially on 
the ideology of the ND, and based on the model of Greenpeace, the BI does 
provide a space for those radical nativists who wish to disassociate themselves 
from the horrors of Nazism, and the street violence associated with them. It 
has been developing an aesthetic nostalgia, and a platform based on tradition, 
a mythologised ethno-regionalist past, melded with contemporary social media 
agenda setting skills, deploying well developed production values. The struggle 
against Islam in Europe is the most dominant feature in their media strategy. In 
this sense they reflect one of their ideologues, Faye, who talks about a future 
in which the archaic traditions of Western Europe and cutting edge technology 
are combined in the hope of providing and rebuilding their version of Europe 
(Faye 2010). 
 
6.4.4.2 Bloc Identitaire 2  
Generation Identitaire – Un Declaration de Guerre (A Declaration of War) 
The Declaration was first uploaded to YouTube in late 2011. It was taken down 
as the soundtrack’s owners made a copyright complaint; it was reposted in a 
voice only version on 20.01.13.  
The clip with soundtrack is available on a number of online sites including Live 
Leak. 
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=aea_1349608822  
The self-produced video, originally posted on YouTube, and taken down due to 
copyright infringement, was created in the lead up to the occupation of a 
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mosque at Poitiers by GI activists. The declaration is notable because of its 
unusually high quality for the media output of European nativist social 
movements, and defines what the Identitarians are for and what they are 
against. Essentially they describe a betrayal by the previous generation (the 
68ers as the generation is known), and describe economic, cultural and 
political despair they themselves experience as native Europeans, in light of a 
multicultural, globalised utopia they represent as most deluded, and an 
immense failure. The script is read aloud by various young identitarians, male 
and female, filmed in close up, and black and white. The script is as follows: 
  “From “The Generation of National Identity” - A Declaration of War 
  We are Generation Identitaire. 
  We are the generation who get killed for glancing at the wrong person, 
  
for refusing someone a cigarette, or having an “attitude” that annoys 
someone. 
  We are the generation of ethnic fracture, 
  total failure of coexistence, and forced mixing of the races. 
  
We are the generation doubly punished: condemned to pay into a social 
system 
  so generous with strangers it becomes unsustainable for our own people. 
  
Our generation are the victims of the May ‘68’ers who wanted to liberate 
themselves 
  from tradition, from knowledge and authority in education. 
  But they only accomplished to liberate themselves from their responsibilities. 
  We reject your history books to re-gather our memories. 
  We no longer believe that “Khader” could ever be our brother, 
  We have stopped believing in a “Global Village” and the “Family of Man”. 
  We discovered that we have roots, ancestry and therefore a future. 
  
Our heritage is our land, our blood, and our identity. We are the heirs to our 
own future 
  We turned off the TV to march the streets. 
  We painted our slogans on the walls. Cried through loudspeakers 
  for “youth in power” and flew our Lambda flags high. 
  The Lambda, painted on proud Spartans’ shields, is our symbol. 
  
Don’t you understand what this means? We will not back down, we will not 
give in. 
  We are sick and tired of your cowardice. 
  
You are from the years of post-war prosperity, retirement benefits, S.O.S 
Racism and 
  “diversity”, sexual liberation and a bag of rice from Bernard Kouchner. 
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  We are 25 per cent unemployment, social debt, multicultural collapse 
  and an explosion of anti-white racism. 
  We are broken families, and young French soldiers dying in Afghanistan. 
  You won’t buy us with a condescending look, 
  a state-paid job of misery and a pat on the shoulder. 
  We don’t need your youth-policies. Youth IS our policy. 
  Don’t think this is simply a manifesto. It is a declaration of war. 
  You are of yesterday, we are of tomorrow. 
  We are Generation Identitaire.” 
 
The online broadcast was successful in the euro nativist milieu, the highest 
number of views received by a self-produced nativist known to the researcher. 
It received in excess of 200 000 views on YouTube prior to being taken down. 
The GI frame their grievances in the area of legitimate controversy for their 
prospective supporters. 
In an interview with the researcher, political sociologist, Jan Erk (2013), 
commented that a greater divide than that between ethnic groups, was 
between the young and the old. With the old (many belonging to the 68ers), 
having enjoyed a period of relative prosperity and security, the youth are in a 
relatively precarious situation in economic and political terms. He then went on 
to comment that if you could develop a movement that melded ethnic tension 
with generational resentment it would be potent. The GI is the most apparent 
fusing of the ethnic tension with youth grievance amongst the nativist milieu. 
This grievance against the 68ers is apparent in the video, while their other 
activities include mosque occupation, youth camps where they engage in 
combat sports, media training and history lessons framed in an identitarian 
perspective. 
The script and the responses to the perceived current political scenario it 
represents, are evident; more vociferous and charged than the public 
utterances and media content of the ANP parties that are case study subjects. 
In this sense it defines itself as a social movement forcefully in opposition to 
the political paradigm developed by the ‘68ers’, as the generation that inspired 
radical liberal left changes in France, and more broadly. The identitarian 
spokespeople (both male and female) say that a utopia promised by 68ers has 
not materialized. Rather, they paint of a picture of poverty, ethnic tension, a 
parlous economic circumstance for French youth, and the conscious 
destruction of the ethnic French population by ideologically driven 
multiculturalists, remote from the represented reality that has occurred in light 
of mass, and specifically Muslim immigration, experienced by young native 
French. 
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The identitarians talk about a deliberate destruction of French traditions and 
culture by those on the ‘comfortable left’, often castigated as ‘bobos’ 
(bourgeois bohemians). As a youth orientated movement the broadcast is 
designed to appeal to potential recruitment prospects by raising salient issues 
in a provocative manner, expressing perceived youth anger and alienation from 
liberal globalism, and the previous generation. The spread of this 
communication was initiated via Facebook and Twitter. This broadcast via 
social media would have formed part of the build up to the occupation of the 
Poitiers Mosque site, which will be discussed fully in a further review (see 
6.6.4.1). 
 
6.4.4.3 Bloc Identitaire 3  
Guillame Faye – Novopress: Islam et Barbarie: Le Pire est a Venir. France en 
Premier Ligne? (Islam and Barbarism: the Worst is Yet to Come. Is France the 
Front Line?) Date of Publication: 29.11.14 Date of First Access 29.11.14 
http://fr.novopress.info/179118/islam-barbarie-pire-venir-france-en-premiere-
ligne-guillaume-faye/ 
This article is particularly useful as it tracks the thought of perhaps the most 
radical of the ND intellectuals as it relates to Islam. Guillame Faye is one of the 
two leading veteran intellectuals of the French Nouvelle Droit. In comparison 
with the other, Alain de Benoist, Faye has represented an Islamic threat more 
intensely. His article on the current state of Islam, published on the identitarian 
site, Novopress, provides insight into the positioning of a significant intellectual, 
and provides an occasion to discuss ‘insurgent’ nativist media like Novopress.  
In the article Faye uses the rise of the Islamic State (IS) as his entry point to 
present an argument that Islam is intrinsically violent, barbarous and 
totalitarian. He goes on to denounce the argument that this totalitarian Islam is 
not the real Islam, but rather it is a more accurate representation of Islam than 
more humanist orientated iterations, backed up by history, tradition, law and 
textual foundation from the Koran and Hadith. He states the United Nations 
focuses on Israel and Putin, while ignoring severe human rights violations 
evident in many countries with Islamist governments. He then considers the 
expulsion and brutality towards Syrian Christians by IS, suggests a realistic 
possibility of problems for native French should the Muslim population reach 
critical mass, and talks of a civil war resulting from mass immigration – 
represented as an unthinking destructive program facilitated by elites.  IS 
provides an ‘ideal’ expression of violent, brutal, imperialist, and profoundly 
retrograde Islamism for the self-defined ‘counter-jihad movement’ to attack. It is 
an example of Islamism so horrific and extreme, it suits the purposes of 
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nativists to demonstrate a mutual exclusivity of Islamism with any other 
civilisation, most pointedly Pagan, Christian, and secular Europe. 
The claim that the ‘real’ Islam is practiced by the IS, Taliban and other 
totalitarian expressions of Islamism is a common position amongst the 
nationalists of various orientations. This literalist interpretation is in accord with 
conservatives and fundamentalists within the Muslim community who are keen 
to adhere to a rigorous and textually based Islamism that follows strictly the 
Koran, not allowing for innovation, liberalisation or Westernisation. This 
provides the identitarians and other nativists with a distinct defining line 
between their ethnic and civilisational norms contra Islam.  
The President of the BI, Fabrice Robert (2013), in an interview with the 
researcher, reported his view of media intensely hostile to nationalists in 
France, and specifically towards the BI. He concurred some commentators, 
like Eric Zemmour were sympathetic to some of their views, but none had an 
identitarian orientation. The social movement described by the party president, 
is characterized as an ‘activist 2.0 movement.’ In this sense he was referring to 
the reliance of the identitarians and ANPs more broadly in developing their own 
media outlets to make contact with prospective supporters. The identitarians 
(Robert 2013) discussed a number of websites which were congruent with their 
perspective – amongst them the popular Fdesouche, Polemia, the veteran 
Minute, Radio Courtoisie and most notably their own news aggregation and 
commentary website, Novopress (New Press). 
 
Interviewed for this research, the administrator and editor of the Novopress 
site, Yves Le Jeunne (Charles 2013; l'Jeunne 2013) (a nom de plume as he 
was concerned with professional ramifications relating to his membership of 
the BI) reported his concerns with the orientation of mainstream news, very 
eager to be sympathetic, and even apologetic to immigrant populations and 
Muslims, while being relentlessly critical of any expression of ‘patriotic 
sentiment’. Le Jeunne said there also needed to be outlets for professional 
level media sites for commentators such as Faye, and Renaud Camus 
(considered in 6.8.4). Though distantly behind the leading nationalist site, 
fdesouche.com, with approximately 2 000 000 views per month (as taken from 
similarweb.com on 11.11.14), the roughly 200 000 views on Novopress.info (as 
taken from similarweb.com 11.11.14) is a considerable penetration noting the 
apparent content linking between this array of nativist/ethno nationalist news 
and commentary sites. The scale and ubiquity of the French sites sympathetic 
to various nationalist orientations is ample in comparison with English speaking 
news services - considering the FN website receives approximately 750 000 
visits per month (as taken from similarweb.com 11.11.14).  
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In the researcher’s interview with Le Jeune (2013) he had noted a growth in 
traffic over time, and believed the Internet was the only way for ‘ideas rich’ 
movements such as the BI, which lacked the material resources of established 
parties, to develop. Like Robert (2013), Le Jeune described an activism that 
was reminiscent of a ‘patriotic’ Greenpeace – whereby non-violent spectacles 
worthy of media attention were engaged in, in order to spread their message. 
This focus on non-violent activism has provided the BI a degree of legitimacy. 
He also reported it was necessary to provide a news service of high quality that 
could match the established news services. Novopress is strong evidence that 
the ANPs have been quick to harness the World Wide Web as they have felt 
they are the perennial outsiders in terms of press coverage. He reported media 
spectacles, and their legal fallout were the only way to get coverage from the 
established news media, and Islamism was a potent topic in France. 
 
6.4.5 Conclusion: Islam & Islamism 
The above examples of media product demonstrate there are broad similarities 
among the case study subjects. Firstly the issue of Islamism in Europe, 
particularly as it relates to literalist, reactionary interpretations (e.g. Salafists, 
Wahhabis, those who support the introduction of sharia in Europe) is a core 
issue for the case study subjects. As demonstrated in the subsequent article 
reviews, there are specific issues resonant with the potential supporters which 
can be developed by agenda setting frames, including provocative public 
utterances and self-developed media content. These issues are interlinked, 
and provide a total picture of the threat represented by the case study subjects, 
and altered to appeal specifically, to extant and prospective audiences of the 
party family. Their intention is to frame themselves with consensus values like 
peace, security, employment and democratic secularism in opposition to their 
presentation of the deviant perils of Islamism in Europe. 
 
Apparent in the broad sense is the conflicting worldview of the ANPs and their 
political opponents, with the ANPs supporting a variation of the Clash of 
Civilisations theory (Liang 2007), while their major opponents tend towards a 
globalist position, however nuanced. This being the case this essentially sees 
the ANPs represent a struggle in their media output, which pits the national, 
(and the continental) against the global, with Islam in Europe being the most 
highly visible and apparently threatening instance, with a degree of historical 
weight. In this sense it heavily presents a number of issues suitable for 
framing, so as to place the ANPs media strategy in the place of consensus, or 
at least legitimate controversy. Offering frames to contest the viability of 
Muslim populations in Europe has done this, and the controversy surrounding 
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the conflict is inherently newsworthy (Hallin 1986). With the exception of the 
DF, the case study subjects feel they are treated as media pariahs, and this 
being the case they have invested heavily in self-made content, featuring the 
Western struggle against Islamism as they perceive it.  
 
The following media content reviews develop on specific key issues that have 
arisen from this broad view of civilisational conflict.  
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6.5 Modesty: ‘Ban the Burqa’ 
One of the most telling aspects of the transition to the new populist master 
frame has been a nuanced adoption of liberal values, as part of national and 
European values, so as to contrast them to Islamists. Like the rapprochement 
and earnest Semitophilia evident in some parties the defence, or at least 
neutrality towards gender equality and gay rights does play a significant role in 
the public utterances and the media campaigns of the ANPs. Aside from 
separating themselves from the old master frame this allows them to criticise 
the ‘liberal-left’ over hypocrisy, with a seeming mutual exclusivity between 
elements of Islamic law and some points evident in Western feminism. 
In discussions between the researcher and a longstanding member of the DF, 
Yvette Espersen (2013b), an English born woman with a Jewish background, 
reported party founder, Pia Kjaersgaard, originally started the DF because of 
her dismay at the treatment meted out to some women in ethnic communities 
of the Muslim religion, mostly Turkish and Arab, as Kjaersgaard was working 
as a social worker at the time. Having a female founder and leader (also from a 
relatively humble background) does provide the party some degree of 
legitimacy in terms of issues around gender. The DF has called for a ban on 
the Burqa and refer to it as “a rejection of Danish society” (Espersen 2013b).  
There is a sense the issue of the burqa most symbolically defines the 
difference in gender roles between relatively liberal Europe and the deeply 
conservative approach evident in literalist strains of Islamism, which are radical 
in a Western environment, and even in some liberal or traditional Islamic 
environments. The debate over whether or not to “ban the burqa” has been, 
aside from terrorism, perhaps the most heavily mediatised issue in the ANPs’ 
campaign on the perils of Islamism in Europe. 
 
6.5.1 Front National 1 
The Guardian – Flachra Gibbons: What Sort of French Republic Needs the 
Protection of Marine Le Pen? Date First Published: 29.11.12 Date First 
Accessed: 29.11.13 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2012/sep/26/marine-le-pen-
jewish-kippas-ban 
 
Flachra Gibbons was formerly the Guardian’s art editor and also writes on 
European issues. The Guardian is a significant, international voice, and has an 
editorial tone that is liberal left, and as such, the article is well situated for 
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review. The article was selected because Gibbons includes many of the frames 
used against the ANPs in general, and the FN and MLP in particular: the 
association with historical Nazism and the fact MLP is more ‘dangerous’ than 
her father due to her relative smoothness and political sensitivity. Gibbons also 
argues there is a secular fundamentalism, as oppressive as rigorous Islamism. 
One of the principal developments of the modernisation and moderation 
process has been the conscious expulsion of any traces of historical fascism 
from the party, as platforms and aesthetics (or symbols use), reminiscent of, 
and sympathetic to historical fascism would be classed as deviant using the 
typology of this study. As such they can be politically disastrous for the ANPs 
in question. Their opposition, including those in media adverse to the ANPs are 
very eager to link the parties to deviant issues, such as racial anti-Semitism, 
while all the case study subjects have transitioned away from anti-Semitism 
where it has existed, and as mentioned have often framed themselves as the 
most ardent defenders of Jewish people, particularly against Islamists. Yvette 
Espersen (2013b) reports having been called a Nazi at anti-DF protests, 
though there is no evidence that the DF has any association with Nazism, and 
she is herself Jewish. 
Though framed as an attack on secularism by MLP, this article relates to the 
broader issues of female head coverings in France, the first European country 
to ban the full-face veil. Jean Yves Camus (2013) argues that there are those 
within the party who have not modernised and have attitudes that would not be 
out of place under the Vichy regime, including base anti-Semitism. He sees 
them dying off and retiring from the party, as a younger generation move into 
the party, who are eager for professional progression, and have not been 
inculcated into anti-Semitic ideas as some party members in the past were. 
Though this move to ban the kippah may resonate with some of the old guard, 
it is best understood as a measure against visible Islamism. The media contest 
over the full face veil, whether burqa or niqab, is often framed as an issue of 
freedom of choice, or the right to religious expression, contra the oppositional 
frame of oppression of women, security, secularism, and the perceived 
extremely anti-social nature of the garb, cutting off non-verbal communication, 
and alienating fellow citizens; the former prevailing in English speaking 
countries, while the latter has prevailed in France and Belgium.  
The ban on the veil was brought in by the Sarkozy government in 2011, and is 
seen, by the FN as an attempt to limit its political opportunity structure, by 
moving towards issues considered ‘owned’ by the FN. In this sense Ellinas’ 
(2010) theory is that the rise of the ANP type parties, is dependent on centre 
parties ‘playing the nationalist card’, the consequent media interest, and then 
not being able to maintain their patriotic trajectory, due to moderating 
159 
 
centripetal forces. Parties with an ‘authentic’ nationalist disposition and 
supporter base might then still run with the issue, while the neoliberal right 
would be unable to maintain momentum in campaigns related to identity. In this 
sense it is possible the media attention the Sarkozy government brought to 
issues of security, Islamism and identity, has greatly assisted the FN. Instead 
of stealing the FN’s support they have managed to assist the FN in its agenda 
setting process, while not being able to take advantage of those issues as the 
FN has, (due to pressure to retreat to more moderate public utterances on the 
issue). The message the FN offers through the ban of visible religious symbols 
is ‘you’ may belong to France, but ‘you’ must abide by ‘our’ rules and values. 
Opinion pieces, such as Gibbon’s, are not required to meet the journalistic 
value of balance, as they argue a particular view, (though the deployment of 
reasoning and sound information may yet help greatly with their credibility). In 
this sense they frame the issue considered in accord with the news outlet’s 
editorial tone. There is a tendency amongst news services to engage in 
focusing on the most extreme variants of their ideological opponents, whether 
nationalists or Islamists. Gibbon’s article lays the blame for the attack on 
nationalist terrorists prior to police investigation, when it was subsequently 
discovered to be an assailant called Mohammad Merah. 
 
6.5.2 Vlaams Belang 1  
De Standaard: Filip De Winter Premie Van 250 Euro Voor Wie Boerka Spot en 
Aangeeft (Filip De Winter Offers 250 Euro to Burqa Spotters)  
Date First Published: 05.06.12 Date First Accessed 07.07.14 
http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf2010605_074 
 
De Standaard is a daily paper written in Flemish. It has the civic-minded tone 
of a broadsheet, though it has been published in tabloid size since 2004. The 
article is significant as it is indicative of the populist, contentious tone often 
evidenced by the VB’s media strategies and outputs. Along with France, 
Belgium was one of the two countries to ban full-face coverings in public in 
2012, a move essentially designed to make it illegal to wear the burqa or niqab 
in public. Subsequent to the ban a woman refused to remove her veil and was 
arrested. In response a riot occurred after which the leader of the VB, Filip 
Dewinter, posted a private €250 bounty for those reporting the crime (Reuters 
2012). 
 
As noted, acts of provocation in a hostile media environment offer a viable 
option in gaining coverage. Along with self-produced media and social media, 
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in which VB invests heavily (Abts 2013), it is their only option. For this reason 
the VB has perhaps engaged more in media spectacles, more vigorously than 
any of the other ANP parties. The VB MEP, Philip Claeys (2013) reported that 
they struggled even getting coverage that he considered hostile, let alone 
neutral. Of note is the fact that the VB, like the FN, is a mature party, and 
should have moved past Mazzoleni’s (2003, 10) ‘insurgent phase’ of ANP 
politics, as was the case with the FN, seeing they were numerically the most 
significant party in Flanders till the rise of the N-VA. As is often the case, Abts 
(2013) reported, there are no mainstream media outlets offering coverage 
congruent with the VB’s policies, though tabloid news sources do take up 
issues developed by the VB, such as immigrant crime, concerns about 
Islamists, and opportunistic welfare claimants from immigrant communities.  
This shunning by the other parties, and a perceived hostility by the media may 
have forced the VB into an enduring and episodic practice of ‘insurgency’. That 
in turn would be seen as politically damaging to it in the long term, as the 
continuous engagement in provocation can lead a party to be perceived as too 
radical to be a natural party of government. A period of moderation and 
mainstreaming is crucial once fully established, so as to move ANP theory and 
policy into a position of relative consensus; to move from being outsider 
provocateurs to the accepted (or at least acceptable) norm. Protest and 
provocation may see the party’s ideas once again considered contentious 
rather than ‘normal’, and worst of all for the VB, deviant according to Hallin’s 
(1986) schema. 
 
The VB has been overtaken by a party perceived similar, though relatively 
moderate, and by turns liberal or conservative in comparison (Abts 2013). As 
with the dressing up of Dewinter in a niqab and bikini, the offering of a bounty 
for those wearing a burqa or niqab, or some of the protests to be reviewed in 
this discussion section, it is possible that such spectacles may appear as acts 
of desperation committed to gain attention – in this instance leaving the VB in a 
bind, as to the balancing act between being perceived as being too moderate 
or too radical for voters. Where being ‘too moderate’ will not afford them any 
coverage from the established press, being too radical looks to have put them 
into an unfavorable contrast against the N-VA. 
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6.5.3 Dansk Folkeparti 1 
Jyllands Posten - Steen Jorgensen: DF vil forbyde skolepiger at gå med 
tørklæde (The DF Will Ban the Wearing of Headscarves at School) Date First 
Published: 19.08.14 Date First Accessed: 19.10.14 
http://jyllands-posten.dk/politik/ECE6951369/DF-vil-forbyde-skolepiger-at-gå-
med-tørklæde/ 
 
Jyllands Posten is internationally known as the publisher of the ‘Mohammed 
cartoons’, which was responded to with numerous acts of violence. Along with 
acts of terrorism, the murder of Theo van Gogh, and street protests by anti-
Islamist movements (e.g. EDL, Riposte Laique (Secular Counter-attack)) the 
international response to the cartoons depicting Mohammed is of considerable 
importance in the development of the ANPs and was of considerable ‘use’ to 
those critical of the place of Islamism in Europe, and globally. The impact of 
cartoons will be discussed fully in the review on the DF and their poster 
featuring a portrait of Mohammed (6.7.3). The paper is based on the island of 
Jutland, which is rural, and a somewhat more conservative region than 
Copenhagen (Petersen 2013; Sokoler 2013). 
 
The article reports the then party leader, Pia Kjaersgaard, had suggested there 
was no place in Danish society for the veil in public. The article reports 
Kjaersgaard found it ‘grotesque’ (Espersen 2013b)  that schoolgirls would wear 
religious headgear, though she never considered legislation. The article goes 
on to describe the approach suggested by party spokespersons whereby 
headscarves would be banned from being worn by public administration 
officials such as social workers and school administrators as well as 
schoolgirls. To ensure schoolgirls aren’t forced to wear the scarf or more 
substantial face covering they will not be able to wear head coverings while at 
school under the DF’s plan. 
The article reports the DF spokesperson, Martin Henriksen, arguing that there 
is no point in being concerned with Jews wearing a kippah as they do not form 
ghettoes and there are no issues with integration into broader Danish society. 
It is made plain that the concern is with female head coverings generally, and 
full-face covering worn by some of those who adhere to extremely conservative 
forms of Islam common in the Gulf States, West and South Asia, and where 
those politico-religious movements have spread, including Western Europe. 
The DF supports a general ban on face veils, but this article focuses on the 
ban for schoolgirls, an area of gender relations in which conflicts with Western 
norms and Islamist has been most apparent. Further examples would be 
segregated classrooms, being excused from school sport, and in some 
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instances being sent to the familial point of origin to get married at an early 
age. Opposition to the full-face covering has been justified on a number of 
grounds: security, and integration and socialization the principal factors. In this 
instance the ANPs tend to consider the full-face coverings worn by some 
Muslim women as more a social barrier and a conscious effort to avoid 
integration and Western norms, so Islamism is represented as a cultural 
barrier.  
The DF’s media advisor, Yvette Espersen described some of the treatment of 
women amongst Muslim immigrant communities as ‘medieval’, and suggested 
there must be a will for Muslims to integrate into the Western nations they 
settle in, of their own volition. She argued, “Westerners would not be walking 
around Muslim countries topless”, and as such Muslims living in the West must 
respect European norms, and if incapable of doing that, move to a country 
where sharia law is established. That sentiment was echoed by Anders 
Vistisen MEP (2013). Through this issue, the DF has adopted the position of 
defending robust liberalism, and gender equality, as an assertion of Danish 
norms, in opposition to conservatism and gender inequality (as defined by 
European norms) evident among some Muslim immigrants, their descendants 
and converts.  
 
6.5.4 Bloc Identitaire 1 
Philip Vardon: ‘Ni Voile, Ni Viole – Touche Pas a Ma Soeur’ (No Veils, No 
Rape – Don’t Touch My Sister) Date First Published: 20.10.08 Date First 
Accessed: 23.11.13  
http://soutien-vardon.blogspot.com.au/2008/10/ni-voile-ni-viole.html 
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Fig 9. ‘No Veil, No Rape, Don’t Touch My Sister’ 
(http://www.voxfnredekker.com/archives/2007/06/03/5169121.html First published 
01.10.07 First accessed 10.10.13) 
This pamphlet, produced and distributed by identitarian, and now leader of 
Nissa Rebela, Philip Vardon, is significant in terms of the media campaign of 
the identitarians. It led to successful legal action against his group by state 
funded anti-racist watchdogs, SOS Racisme and Le Mouvement contre le 
racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples (MRAP).  It resulted in a successful 
conviction including a €5000 fine for Vardon, and a suspended jail sentence of 
four months. The text of the leaflet is translated as follows (Vardon and 
Jeunesses_Identitaires 2008): 
“NOT VEILED! OR RAPED! From ancient deities to the Virgin Mary, 
to the tradition of courtly love and women who have marked the 
history (as Catherine de Medici, Joan of Arc or the Irish 
revolutionaries of 1916), women have always been respected and 
protected in Europe. And well before feminism.  
“European women, especially young girls, have become primary 
targets and the first victims of the Islamisation of our society and a 
new form of violence, tinted with both sexism and anti-White racism 
including the famous “gang rape”, a most odious event. 
 
“We don’t want to see veiled women in Europe, we have had enough 
of gang rape, physical attacks and verbal abuse in Europe: DON’T 
TOUCH MY SISTER!” 
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This image with its text, also spread on the Internet via Facebook, Twitter, and 
Novopress, interlinks a set of frames used by the ANPs, and as would be 
anticipated from a radical, activist, social movement is provocative. The 
interlinked media frames are namely the second class treatment afforded to 
women in Islam, a threat to the identity of Europe posed by Islamism, and the 
combination of regressive religiosity and criminality, particularly as it relates to 
gang rape. 
Innate in the ANPs’ political communication is the notion of being defenders of 
the native community against hostile threats, both internal and external. 
National heroes who have reached mythic status are evoked, such as the FN’s 
use of Joan of Arc (who was ultimately burned to death for heresy) 
(The_Local_France 2014b), the use of the Danish crusading knight, Holger 
Danske, as a symbol for the DF’s youth movement, and BI’s use of Charles 
Martel, to be considered in the section on the occupation of the Poitiers 
mosque site (6.9.4). The role of the BI as defenders of the native population, 
and settled immigrant groups in some instances, is intrinsic in their message. 
When interviewed for this research the Paris region spokesperson, Simon 
Charles (l'Jeunne 2013), remarked the GI/BI, aside from its political role, was a 
refuge for native French who were on the receiving end of violence from 
gangs, principally of Muslim and African background. This included females 
who were the victim of sexual harassment and actual sexual violence, which 
he reported was common in several areas of France, particularly to non-
Muslim females in the banlieues – satellite cities with large populations of 
Maghrebi and other African origins. 
The BI promotes the issue of dress codes for Islamic females as being 
designed to promote modesty, thus the more compliant and hidden the female 
form, the more modest. A perception of extreme modesty is presented, with the 
whole of the female form hidden, contrasting with Western norms where it is 
not uncommon for women to wear revealing clothes. The BI’s argument and 
campaign theme is that in comparison to ‘modest’ Muslim women, the figure of 
a Western woman will be seen as inevitably immodest, and sexually available. 
This contrast between bears on the various interpretations of female modesty 
on the part of Muslim women, and most particularly those who might be 
pressured to dress in that fashion in by the males in their circle, for which the 
law provides a severe fine - €30 000. The BI’s strategy is provocative and 
contentious, so as to distinguish the party from the FN, while defining itself as 
legitimate, by framing itself as a defender of women’s rights, against an alien 
civilisation, intrinsically repressive, deviant and hostile. 
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6.5.5 Modesty: Conclusion 
There are two aspects of the ANPs, which come together in this instance, in 
part an example of the merging of traditional approaches as demonstrated by 
the BI and contemporary liberal approaches, as demonstrated by the DF. In 
the sense of strategic media communication, the portrayal of Islamic notions of 
women’s modesty provides an excellent theme. The ANPs can position 
themselves to detail apparent hypocrisy of the ‘left’ and ‘liberals’, who tend to 
be the most ardent advocates of gender equality. They will set out to develop 
the tension between multiculturalism and certain Western understandings of 
feminism. 
 
This dress issue will continue to be developed, as it has already resulted in the 
passing of laws in both France and Belgium, and because of the fact of modes 
of dress so apparent and radically different from contemporary modes of 
European women’s fashion. In a cynical view of politics, issues like the burqa 
and niqab are crucial to the ANPs, in the same way issues like the 
disappearance of the elephant or tiger are most effective for conservation 
groups. They are core visual, symbolic reminders, which are easily mediated.  
The issue attracts the attention of journalists because of the news values 
inherent in the controversy, particularly the ongoing presence of conflict. 
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6.6 Halal: ‘The War of the Pigs’ 
 “The France of my childhood and education is dead. I have a sense of 
being an émigré in my own country, which has become a foreign 
territory.”  
Brigitte Bardot (Davies 2012, 146) 
Unlike the campaigns developed around the issue of female head covering in 
their respective countries, the issue of halal meat is not visually spectacular; it 
is portrayed as insidious by the ANPs. Halal food in Western countries has 
been a particularly sensitive issue and is represented by the ANPs as an 
example of the quiet spread of the Islamic culture in the West. This is perhaps 
most pronounced in their concern over the ubiquity of halal products in 
supermarkets and public places like schools and hospitals – most pointedly 
when it hasn’t been labeled as such in an easy to discover fashion. Pork 
products hold a high place of importance in the traditional European cuisines, 
including French, Flemish/Dutch and Danish, and as such halal has become a 
point of contention when those products have been removed from menus from 
public services like schools or hospitals. In this sense halal products are 
represented in Europe by the ANPs as effectively a tax on the non-Muslim 
population by the Islamic agencies, which perform halal certification.  
Halal food may also be defined as inhumane, but this offers a problem for 
groups wanting sympathetic association with Judaism as halal and kosher 
approaches to food are similar. As such parties trying to avoid the stigma of 
anti-Semitism have to tread carefully in their media output. 
 
6.6.1 Front National 1  
Lawrence Samuel – Le Monde, Paris: Laïcité à l’école: l'arnaque de Marine Le 
Pen sur les cantines (Secularism at Schools: Marine Le Pen’s Racism Scam) 
Date First Published: 07.04.14 Date First Accessed: 10.07.14 
http://www.lemonde.fr/lesdecodeurs/article/2014/04/07/porc-a-la-cantine-l-
arnaque-de-marine-le-pen_4396864_4355770.html#A1hEBdEEfFpDuok5.99 
Since MLP became leader of the FN, there have been two significant media 
issues related to halal. The first is centred on her claims that all of the meat in 
the Ile de France (Paris area) could be suspected of being halal, which was 
subsequently adopted by Sarkozy as a point of debate. MLP set the agenda 
and framed her concerns as an issue of freedom from religion; those who are 
non-Muslim should not be forced to eat meat according to the traditions of a 
religion not their own (RFI 2012b). 
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The second issue referred to the controversy related to the serving of halal 
food in public school canteens. An election candidate supported by the FN, 
Robert Menard, brought this to the fore (Metro_News 2014). He suggested that 
there would be no more halal meals served at school cafeterias, in the town 
where he’d become mayor, Béziers. Menard hails from an Algerian Pied Noir 
family and was a founding member of the media advocacy service, Reporters 
Sans Frontiers (Journalists Without Borders). Menard has been involved in a 
number of nationalist orientated publications, such as Boulevard Voltaire, and 
has spoken at BI events. 
MLP has sought to redefine the Front as the party of a forceful secularism, 
drawing on the foundations of the French Republic. She has framed the FN as 
the party that combines elements of both ethnic and civic nationalism, in that 
French law is the product of the French nation – the organic state. This 
remodeling by MLP develops a position where she can provide legitimacy in a 
populist sense. By contrast, enablers of globalisation, ‘elites’ who have become 
increasingly wealthy at the expense of the broader French population, are 
characterised as representing the less desirable aspects of liberal trade 
regimes and globalization. In the ANP thesis the public will rally to a party that 
offers economic and cultural security; the stance provides a strong definition of 
what is to be considered acceptable and what is not. Her new firm secularism 
has been ‘nationalised’. The fact that the French party is no longer so heavily 
factionalised (Camus 2013), and that Catholic traditionalists are less significant 
under MLP than under her father, may provide MLP the option for the FN to 
adopt a more vigorously secular position. The public utterances related to 
secularism have focused principally on Muslims, though French Jews have 
been affected as well.  
This conception of secularism under MLP, would seem to truly breach the 
traditional left-right dichotomy, and place a renewed FN as the party of the 
national left in some senses, in opposition to both the relatively conservative 
framing of Islam, and the globalist neoliberalism of the parties established at 
the centre. In the ANP thesis, secularism has become attached to French 
identity, and is presented as the heart of universal issues in the Enlightenment 
tradition, framed as being the beliefs of the nation. In reply the FN frame 
themselves as defenders of the Republic against radical and insidious 
intrusions from hostile elements, against the multicultural ‘elites’ of the centre 
left, and the neoliberal ‘elites’ of the centre right, and those who, in some 
instances, rigidly adhere to the Islamic religion which, in its literalist strains, is 
antithetical to the values of the Republic. 
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6.6.2 Vlaams Belang 1 
Filip Dewinter’s Blog: Vlaams Belang is Campaigning Against Ritual Slaughter 
and Organises a Haram Reception Date Published: 05.03.13 Date First 
Accessed 07.07.14 
 
Fig 10. http://www.filipdewinter.be/tag/halal  
The VB maintains cordial relations with both the FN and the BI. As the FN has 
interest in reintegrating the French speaking area, Wallonia within France, and 
an aversion to the EU, the VB and the BI are similar in their regionalism and 
protests. The BI is more media centric and creative in its development of media 
spectacles, while the VB has a more tabloid tone. This culinary protest runs on 
a parallel theme to the BI’s soupes identitaires and the apéro saucisson-pinard 
discussed in the BI subsection (6.6.4). 
In this post on Dewinter’s blog, he recounts a speech he made at a VB haram 
(forbidden in Arabic) event, during which participants drank alcohol and ate 
pork products. In the speech Dewinter initially describes the halal process as 
inhumane and that the religious exception for this inhumane method of 
slaughter is an example of sharia law taking precedence over national, secular 
law. He then says it is always the host society, which is called upon to 
accommodate the new comer, while in the contemporary situation the Muslim 
immigrants are expecting all their demands to be met. He goes on to call Islam 
regressively mediaeval, and the VB will not bend to their demands. 
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This exercise is intended to affront. It very sympathetically presents traditional 
European fare, and then asserts halal is evidence of the Islamisation of 
Europe.  
The ANPs’ new master frame as defined by Rydgren (2005) offers an essential 
ethno-pluralist argument; that distinct national groups have the right to a 
geographic space, where the particular nation can evolve at its own pace while 
maintaining its essential characteristics. He declares a preeminence of the 
importance of the national identity and civilisational identity. The VB is primarily 
a secessionist party, which is why it may focus on civilisational issues, so as to 
take the primary identifier away from the state, which does not correspond to 
the Flemish nation.  
 
6.6.3 Dansk Folkeparti 1 
Ekstrabladet – Thomas Posta Svensson, Peter Jeppesen: Hospital indfører 
halalkød: Her på Hvidovre Hospital kan patienterne kun få oksekød, der er 
halalslagtet (hospital introduces halal meat: at Hvidore hospital you can only 
get halal beef) 
Date First Accessed: 21.07.13 Date First Accessed: 38.07.13 
http://ekstrabladet.dk/nyheder/samfund/article4510001.ece 
 
Ekstradbladet is a Danish tabloid newspaper with a circulation of around 60 
000 and was ranked as the 6th most popular Danish website (Alexa rank 
12.12.14).  A DF media advisor, Yvette Espersen (2013b), stated it was the 
only news outlet that was sympathetic to the issues raised by the DF. She 
agreed with Mudde (2007; 2014b) and Mazzoleni (2008) that the news outlet 
was not friendly to the party as such, but would run stories that focused on 
their core issues, and would assist in the agenda setting process where an 
ANP had issue ownership: some of the negative consequences of immigration, 
particularly in Muslim immigrant communities and the apparent conflict 
between Danish culture and Islamism; the concerns around halal being 
another prime example. 
 
The article starts with the Muslim declaration, “In the name of God. Allah is the 
greatest.” It then goes on to say the blessing is one that all beefeaters at 
Hvidore hospital “sink their teeth into”. It then interviews a Turkish Dane who 
argues it is a misplaced policy, as trying to accommodate Muslims may 
ostracise others, such as atheists and Christians. The article then takes a 
critical stance towards a hospital spokesperson who argues that it is inefficient 
to make two different beef meals, and that the hospital serves diverse 
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communities. He concludes there is no concern over chicken, which is all halal 
slaughtered. Then there is a text-boxed section of copy, which describes halal 
meat, including the fact the animals have their necks slashed, and are bled out. 
The issue of traditional Danish cuisine, including pork meatballs, has been one 
of the cultural conflicts which has gained media traction as an issue in 
Denmark, ultimately leading the Social Democrat Prime Minister, Helle 
Thorning-Schmidt, to state there should be traditional Danish pork food in 
hospitals and schools (Maheou 2014). In one electoral deadlock the DF’s 
candidate in a mayoral election was willing to assist the Social Democrat 
candidate to become mayor, on the proviso they would ensure traditional 
Danish foods, including pork remained on the menu in all public institutions 
(Kaae and Cordsen 2013). It was a move to frame the party, as a reasonable 
party, but one that had Danish identity at the forefront of its concerns. 
 
6.6.4 Bloc Identitaire 1 
Able Mestre and Caroline Monnet – Le Monde, Droites Extreme - Sylvie 
François: Une Farce Alsacienne des Identitaires? (The World, Extreme Right – 
Sylvie Francois: An Identitarian Alsatian Fraud?) Date of First Publication: 
28.06.10 Date of First Access 20.07.12 
http://droites-extremes.blog.lemonde.fr/2010/06/28/lapero-goutte-dor-ou-la-
farce-alsacienne-des-identitaires/ 
 
The BI has been a consistent and provocative campaigner on the issue of halal 
food, and has engaged in a number of strategic acts that have attracted 
considerable media attention: most notably the soupes identitaires, the actions 
against fast food outlets selling halal products, and l’apero discussed in the Le 
Monde article. The article describes the party (a sausage and plonk party), 
organised by the group on social media, as being a media prank created by the 
BI as a means of boosting its position subsequent to poor electoral results 
(prior to their becoming an activist organisation only). The article discusses 
some challenges amongst the leadership cadre. The centre-left Le Monde has 
a special section, Droites Extremes (extreme right), devoted to the democratic 
ANPs, and the more radical parties. The fact a leading news source has an 
entire page devoted to the parties and social movements of various 
descriptions does indicate the prominence the issue has, at least in media 
circles. It is also indicative of the framing of nationalists of various orientations 
as extreme right – and deviant.  
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The BI’s first attempts at creating a media spectacle, while performing a 
charitable function for everyone except observant Muslims, Jews and 
vegetarians were the soupes identitaires. The soups included pork and were 
fed to the homeless (Le_Parisian 15.11.2010). These distributions date back to 
2004 and led to legal challenges in the Alsace region. There were actions 
focusing on the sale of halal food at fast food restaurants, including entering 
restaurants en masse wearing pig masks (Lyon_Mag 2010). 
 
The campaign originally developed from a now revealed fictional Facebook 
account of ‘Sylvie Francois’. ‘Sylvie’ was created and developed as a native 
French resident of the Goutte d'Or (Moreira 2011).  The area has a 
considerable Muslim population who illegally engage in street prayers. The 
account holder organised a party to coincide with Friday prayers, which would 
feature traditional French food including wine and pork sausage – as a 
peaceful and open expression of French culture. The party was banned in due 
course after complaints, and an alternative venue was located on the Champs-
Elysees.  
This sequence of events is a prime example of media agitprop, which 
combines entertainment with a distinctly political message, and is a conscious 
effort on the part of the BI activists (Robert 2013). In this sense the strategy 
was developed sequentially: a salient issue was developed, concern 
surrounding street prayer; a peaceful, though provocative and symbolic act 
was created as a protest over the issue, being spread through social media; 
social media would then feed into mainstream media; political opponents would 
make a legal counter protest; and ‘elites’ would ban the protest due to 
complaints from various community sectors, with the commotion being put up 
as evidence that French elites had allied with some Muslim French; with 
conflict being the pre-eminent news values in play, and issues that relate to 
Muslims becoming more newsworthy. Coverage of the issue will then spread to 
a national and international level, including Australia (Blair 2011); the site is 
changed, while the publicity developed adds to the size of the culinary protest. 
This strategy of disruption requires a considerable degree of political sensitivity 
and skill to understand underlying issues, which are contentious, and protests 
against them must be framed in terms of the sphere of legitimate controversy, 
rather than the sphere of deviance to gain the best coverage possible, by news 
outlets prone to be unsympathetic. The BI’s strategy is to link contentious 
issues, such as Islam in France, to aspects of French life, perceived as 
disappearing, and so with a strong appeal to nostalgia. Robert (2013) referred 
to the sausage and plonk party as the BI’s most successful campaign so far. 
He did discuss the occupation at Poitiers as comparable, though the GI youth 
wing is a separate entity that develops its own media actions. 
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6.6.5 Halal Conclusion 
For the ANPs their key media goal is to represent practicing Muslims as being 
engaged in practices exclusive of, and dangerous to European norms. There 
are also ethical concerns about the method of butchering (though these do not 
extend to native practices such as factory farming), which have been, and will 
most likely be used in the future to highlight the ‘backwardness’ of Islamic 
norms. This merging of the issues may be used to portray halal as cruel, 
backward, different and insidious, and presented also as becoming 
commonplace in Western Europe. 
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6.7 Security 
 
“It is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists, but it is equally certain, and 
exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims.” 
-Abdelrahman al Rashid, Managing Director of al Arabiya News Service 
Of all the negative associations made against Islam, its relationship to 
terrorism is the strongest. Though other violent terrorist groupings have 
engaged in attacks, such as the National Socialist Underground in Germany, 
militant left groups in Latin America and India (e.g. Shining Path and the 
Naxalites), separatists in the Basque country and Corsica, the vast majority of 
attacks against the West, in terms of numbers killed has had an Islamist point 
of reference, mingled as it may be with nationalist concerns, or other 
preoccupations.  
 
The most significant terrorist event in the West was the horrifically spectacular 
‘9-11’, which is perhaps the most televised news event in this century so far. In 
Europe there were subsequent attacks such as the public decapitation of 
soldier Lee Rigby, the London bombings, the attacks by Mohammed Merah in 
France and the train bombing in Madrid. Terrorism is partly a media directed 
activity, as it sets an agenda, and aims to make the terrorists issues’ known via 
the uptake of the story by mainstream and social media. However, it is a 
profoundly deviant phenomenon, and will only be considered legitimate by 
those prone to be considered deviant themselves, in the terminology of Hallin 
(1986) terms. 
The ANPs set out to take a strong stand on law and order issues (Mudde 2007, 
223), as an expression of their authoritarianism – direct and overt suppression 
of a problem by application of power. In this sense the party family make 
serious efforts to frame themselves as most apparently security conscious. 
They are willing to act against a liberal state they frame as offering numerous 
legal and human rights to criminals, and few to victims. From Marine Le Pen’s 
consideration of the death penalty (Connexionfrance 2011), through the 
Generation Identitaire’s Guardian Angel style vigilante actions on the Lyon 
Metro, there is a prevailing concern with the state of physical insecurity, often 
related to gangs of a Muslim background, and the thoroughly politicised 
Islamists willing to wage Jihad within Europe - though fractional in numbers,  
considering general European Muslim population. 
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6.7.1 Front National 1  
The Guardian - Nabila Ramdani: When Schoolgirls Dream of Jihad Society 
Has a Problem. Look at France. Date of First Publication: 03.10.14 Date of 
First Access: 03.10.14 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/03/schoolgirls-jihad-
society-problem-france-burqa-ban 
This article is pertinent as it demonstrates the arguments of those most critical 
of the ANPs and their theories as they relate to Islamism. Ramdani is a French 
journalist of North African origin who speaks English as a sophisticated native. 
She is frequent guest on the BBC, and a commentator in news outlets, 
including The Independent, and The Guardian from which this article is taken. 
The Guardian is the best established of the British liberal left and middle class 
orientated papers with an international reach (according to similarweb.com as 
of 20.05.15 the site ranks 382 globally in general ratings, and is the 7th most 
popular media site with 112 500 000 hits per day). The Guardian has been 
supportive of multiculturalism and mass immigration.  
In this article Ramdani develops a notion the current wave of Jihadists leaving 
France to join the Islamic State is related to the ban of full-face coverings in 
2011. The FNs has achieved success where it utilises the behavior of young 
Islamists fleeing to Syrian and Iraq as potent weapons in their media 
campaigns about the threat to France Islamisation holds. As the work of a 
French writer of North African heritage principally concerned about Arab and 
Islamic affairs, the article is written as a comparison on the merits of the British 
and French approaches to concerns around the relationship between Muslims 
and the native population (while this is extended to other settled migrant 
communities too). It is done by considering the motivations of those embracing 
the Jihad, either as mujahedeen, or the women offering themselves up as 
wives of fighters.  
The argument developed by Ramdani is that banning full face covering, as is 
the case in France and Belgium, is at least partially responsible for the 
movement of alienated Muslim women to a place where their right to wear the 
veil will be respected, as will be their other religious practices. Thus Ramdani 
frames herself as being in the camp of freedom of expression, against an 
oppressive secularism. Ramdani notes that MLP and the FN understand and 
present the nominal resistance against the law (e.g. women flouting the law in 
front of the police as an act of civil disobedience), which bans visible religious 
symbols, as evidence of the threat of Islamisation. This is a common line of 
argument amongst those critical of the ANPs – that violent Islamism is either a 
response to the suffering of the Muslim population caused by the West, such 
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as the disastrous Iraq war, (as is the case with the Jihadis from Britain), or 
alternatively Islamism is principally a reaction to repression of Muslims within 
France (as is the case with the youths discussed in the article).  
 
As considered in the literature review there is a widespread hostility towards 
the ANPs across most news media, evident in media commentaries. Though 
this article doesn’t specifically focus on the FN, it is one of many symptoms of 
perceived French heavy handedness in the struggle against assertive Muslims, 
and more pointedly Islamists in France. The principle elucidated in many of the 
opinion pieces, such as this, is that Jihad, and terrorism are at least in part a 
response to the Western approaches to Islam, and an intractable 
‘Islamophobia’ evident in Western nations, of which the rigorously secular 
France is the most pronounced. Therefore the plight of these young Jihadists 
in Syria is ultimately the fault of the West, and the political groups most wanting 
restrictions on Islamist practice are connected by implication at least.  
 
6.7.2 Vlaams Belang 1 
Gazet van Antwerp – Lex Moolenaar: Islamophobia is a Duty for Everyone.  
This article originally appearing in the Gazet van Antwerp was republished on 
Filip Dewinter’s weblog. Published on Dewinter’s blog: 02.03.2009. Date first 
accessed 06.08.12. 
http://www.filipdewinter.be/“islamophobia-is-a-duty-for-everyone”-gazet-van-
antwerpen 
 
This extensive interview with Filip Dewinter marks the publication of his new 
book on threats posed by Islam, Inch ‘Allah (alluding to the insidious spread of 
Islam as he sees it, and the Islamic exclamation, ‘God Willing!’). In the 
interview he talks about a number of issues that have been covered or will be 
covered in this discussion section: demographic challenges, mutual exclusivity 
of European norms and Islamic norms, and perceptions of a reforming Western 
Islam, which he perceives as a profoundly false and dangerous delusion. In 
this interview he contends that Mohammed was a terrorist, and that for earnest 
Muslims, violence and terrorism are legitimate means for Islam to conquer the 
World. He then goes on to say his framing of Islam is attacked by elites, and 
the VB has in fact functioned as a whistleblower on the issue, while being 
contained in a cordon sanitaire. He reports he is respectful of Geert Wilders, 
and like Wilders’ film, Fitna, he is eager to provoke a debate about the place of 
Islam in Europe. 
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Along with Wilders, Dewinter has the most ‘perilous’ view of the extant and 
impending situation between Muslim and non-European Muslims, and the 
increased risk to security for the citizens of countries which allow mass 
immigration from Muslim countries. Describing Mohammed as terrorist, is 
contentious and obviously provocative, and places the founder of the Islamic 
faith in a position of deviance according to Hallin’s (1986) schema. The 
interlinked frames from the founder of the religion through to the contemporary 
era of street crime and terrorism by immigrants and their descendants create a 
trajectory of hostile deviance. It would define Islamism in particular, and by 
association, Muslims in great numbers, as a threat to the historical and 
assimilated populations of Flanders and Europe. As a contribution to the media 
efforts of the ANPs’ Dewinter’s intervention provides a worked out 
rationalization for the party’s supporters to adopt and replicate in debates, a 
classic leader-opinion exercise. 
 
6.7.3 Dansk Folkeparti  
DF Election Poster, “Freedom is Danish, Censorship is Not.” 
DF Poster With Illustration of Mohammed, “Freedom is Danish, Censorship is 
Not” First accessed 10.12.12  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Danish_People%27s_Party_(Freedom_of_spe
ech_is_Danish,_censorship_is_not,_2007).jpg 
 
In Islam iconography is forbidden. Pictorial representations of any human, 
Mohammed in particular, are specifically forbidden so as to stop the veneration 
of any physical object instead of God. This being the case representations of 
Mohammed may offend some Muslims, as iconography is strictly forbidden 
(Newby 2013). 
The advertisement was created for the DF during the November 2007 election 
campaign, after the media spectacle, political crisis and violence that occurred 
over Jyllands-Posten’s series of cartoons depicting Mohammed. In an interview 
with the researcher (2013) Alexander Sokoler, a junior journalist with Jyllands-
Posten reported the outlet’s offices were fortress like, and the security was 
comparable to a military base subsequent to the publication of the cartoons 
with numerous death threats directed at employees. One of the cartoonists, the 
75-year-old Kurt Westergaard, awoke to find a Somali immigrant trying to 
break into his house and kill him with an axe, in response to the caricature he 
had published. While at the DF party conference Yvette Espersen (2013b) 
informed the researcher there was a security service presence, and that the 
party founder, Pia Kjaersgaard, was under a constant security watch due to 
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consistent and credible threats against her life. 
With the electoral advertisement the DF intended to frame itself as forcefully 
liberal, and define its defence of Western norms that recognise and privilege 
satire. In this sense it does portray Mohammed in a flattering light in 
comparison to Westergaard’s cartoon. There is no hint of violence, rather a 
relaxed, regal figure bearing resemblance to an Ottoman sultan. During the 
interview with Yvette Espersen (2013b) she reported they had no interest in 
offending Muslims by portraying their prophet, but was keen to assert that 
Danish norms stood in Denmark, with a limit to the accommodation afforded to 
Muslims.  This paradoxically ‘reasonable provocation’ was designed to appeal 
to target demographics, supportive of the European norms, while at the same 
time not being seen as excessively provocative to the level of deviance. The 
controversy over the cartoons was framed as one of two sometimes competing 
principles of journalism (Espersen 2013b), freedom of expression and the 
ability to opine on contentious issues, the other being social responsibility.  
  
6.7.4 Bloc Identitaire 
Bloc Identitaire: “Un Chance Pour France, Mohamed Merah” First accessed 
08.10.14 
http://www.bloc-identitaire.com/produit/21/mohamed-merah-chance-france-
autocollants  
 
Fig 11. A Chance for France Poster & Social Media Meme (first accessed 08.10.14 
http://www.bloc-identitaire.com/produit/21/mohamed-merah-chance-france-
autocollants) 
 
As part of its ongoing social media campaign highlighting failed aspects of 
Muslim immigration into France the BI has developed the Internet meme, 
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‘Chance Pour Le France’ (A Chance for France). The term comes from 
Bernard Stasi, a French politician of immigrant origin who wrote a book of the 
same name, which framed immigration in positive terms. The meme relates to 
Mohamed Merah, a young criminal who became politicised and murdered a 
number of French soldiers and Jews, including three children. The text refers 
to Merah’s criminal and terrorist tendencies. The intent of the meme is to focus 
on the false, and utopian claim as BI represents it, publicly uttered by 
proponents of mass immigration, that France is in need of immigrants to 
increase economic growth. That is put in opposition to claims of the nativist 
activists wanting to ensure a policy of the ensured continuation of the 
European peoples in the ethnic, historical and cultural senses, as they perceive 
them. In accord with principles for the Nouvelle Droite ideology, they argue 
they have no problems with Muslims, on the proviso they inhabit Muslim lands, 
which should not include Europe in the BI’s opinion (Robert 2013). 
 
The BI President, Fabrice Robert (2013), was eager to confirm that with a 
resurgent Islam, it was perilous to allow any more Muslim immigration into 
Europe, and that there was a historical precedent of repatriation when more 
than a million pied noirs moved from Algeria to France, after the success of the 
nationalists in the Algerian war. He was keen to ensure it was understood this 
wasn’t part of the BI platform, but an underlying principle that different peoples 
and civilisations were entitled to their own geographical spaces to grow with 
relative autonomy. 
 
The BI media strategy is to use brief pithy, political advertising that will attract 
prospective supporters, and then direct them to a web site, from which point 
they could be immersed in the broader program of the movement, and 
bookshop, so as to acquaint visitors with the intellectual foundations of the 
party, for those who may be attracted to that position. With the success of the 
FN it has been essential for the BI to differentiate itself from the leading nativist 
party in Europe, with memes like these offering a more radical vision, designed 
to appeal to the young. 
 
 
6.7.5 Security: conclusion 
Security is a defining concern of the ANPs, as they have a tendency to express 
the nativist, authoritarian and populist aspects of their platforms in terms of law 
and order, as a form of media strategy. Utilising Hallin’s theory, violent 
criminality is intrinsically deviant. As such it is a natural target for the ANPs to 
attack, via framing the crimes as an expression of Islamism, and/or the failure 
of multiculturalism in a Western context. As the argument proceeds, without 
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liberal immigration laws there would be no communities within ‘their’ native 
space, which they consider often enough to be hostile in a political, sectarian, 
cultural and simple criminal sense. 
It is in the best interests of the ANPs to penetrate into the sphere of legitimate 
controversy by framing the apparent and represented criminality as an 
outcome of the process of mass immigration, supported by elites, and 
perpetrated largely by criminals who are of immigrant background. This 
concern is amplified by the religio-political expression of Islamists who have 
criminal backgrounds such as Mohammed Merah. 
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6.8 Demography and Welfare 
“The Flemish working class is the first victims of mass immigration” 
 - Philip Claeys, Vlaams Belang MEP (2013) 
Davies (2012) reports that veteran French nationalist, Jean Yves Gallou, gave 
a lecture entitled, “Islam et Francite, deux cultures incompatiables [Islam and 
France are two incompatible cultures].” Gallou argues that demographic 
expansion was a natural byproduct of Islam: an “‘integriste’ and ‘conquering’ 
religion that seeks the ethnic and ethnocultural power in non-Islamic lands.” 
The growth of Islamic populations both inside and outside of Europe is a 
constant preoccupation of the ANPs, and those in the self-defined ‘counter 
jihad movement.’ It features in media output, and is central to the mediatised 
opposition to mass immigration. 
There are several well-considered authors in the nativist milieu who discuss 
the demographic impacts of mass immigration into Europe, particularly from 
Muslims, and the impact on native Europeans and other settled immigrant 
groups. Key amongst them is Ba’et Ye’or (discussed in section 6.4.1.3) who 
developed the Eurabia thesis, which holds considerable weight within the 
counter jihad milieu, and the openly gay intellectual, Renaud Camus, whose 
notion of a Grande Replacement (Great Replacement) posits the conscious 
exchange of native French people and culture, for populations principally from 
Africa and the Muslim world. His work is well known in identitarian circles and 
the FN. 
There are two coinciding aspects to this view of reality, the relative dearth of 
young native Europeans (and accepted, assimilated immigrant groups) and 
relatively high birth rates in African and Middle Eastern countries (World_Bank 
2014), who move to Europe as immigrants, and more dramatically as refugees 
seeking asylum. These immigrant groups, particularly those who are Muslims 
are highly visible, due to the apparent racial differences, and the religio-cultural 
markers that have been discussed in this thesis. Concerns over the survival 
and growth of the nation, both in the ethnic and civic sense exist, either 
implicitly or explicitly. There is an understanding that some immigration is 
reasonable when it is appropriate for the national good, though there was a 
concern at excess numbers of immigrants, who cannot be assimilated (or even 
integrated) into the broader nation, according to the nativist position. In that 
sense immigration becomes colonisation. They are perceived as potentially 
hostile and a burden on an already buckling welfare state, leading to calls for 
‘welfare chauvinism’ (Mudde 2007). For the young and less skilled citizens, 
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one of the target groups for the ANPs, they may be perceived as competition 
for low skilled jobs in a time of high unemployment. 
It should be noted there is both a qualitative and quantitative element to this 
perception, that there are too many persons, and there are cultural conflicts 
within a subset of those, most notably observant Muslims. Those who are more 
religiously observant are framed as increasingly unable to merge with the 
broader host nation, or those who feel alienated, though a second or third 
generation might become more observant in a search for identity, and in the 
worst cases will veer into violent jihadism. Immigration has become a heavily 
mediated issue, with the ANPs having issue ownership, though in certain 
instances this may in turn cause a lack of media interest. Tenna Petersen 
(2013) , working for a northern Jutland media outlet, reported the DF are 
predictable in their immigration policy, so she is more likely to get in touch with 
them regarding welfare issues. It is another issue where they compete against 
the social democrats, and one they present as deeply impacted by 
immigration. Soren Espersen (2013a) of the DF reported it was common sense 
as there are only so many people who could be maintained on welfare, and 
those that pay into the system should have the first option. 
 
6.8.1 Front National 1 
Marine Le Pen’s Twitter Account: Le censure de #Zemmour par @itele est 
detestable! #CanalMoins MLP (The sacking [Censorship] of Zemmour is 
detestable!) Date First Published: 20.10.14 Date First Accessed: 20.10.14 
 
Fig 12. Marine Le Pen’s Tweet: The censorship of Zemmour is detestable 
The FN is an enthusiastic user of social media as a method to circumvent 
media gatekeepers perceived as hostile. MLP has 439 000 Twitter followers, 
and has tweeted 4 250 times (as of 08.01.15), in comparison to the 808 000 
followers of President Hollande, who has tweeted 4 359 times (as of 08.01.15).  
The media campaign has been organised by the FN Mayor of Fréjus, David 
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Rachline (de Danne 2013). 
This tweet focuses on the sacking of the French journalist, Eric Zemmour. 
Zemmour, of Algerian Jewish heritage, is a popular and ubiquitous media 
figure who appears on TV and who has recently published a best seller, 
Le Suicide Français - Ces quarante années qui ont défait la France (The 
French Suicide – forty years that defeated France). This work compiles 
particular episodes in French political life that have led to the destruction of 
France as a nation in Zemmour’s view. Essentially all developments attributed 
to the ‘68ers’, (the radical minority of the ‘Baby Boom’ generation to whom 
have been attributed great influence and many powers), held responsible in 
this instance for the decline of France: aggressive feminism, guilt, 
multiculturalism, ‘government sponsored racism’, and ‘ethno masochism’ led 
by intellectuals. There are similarities to the BI Declaration de Guerre political 
advertisement (see 6.4.4.2). In an interview with the Italian magazine, Corriere 
della Sera, Zemmour made remarks about the parallel Muslim communities in 
the suburbs, with his remarks about the expulsion of Muslim immigrants that 
caused him to be sacked from a leading talk show on the TV station, iTele 
(Lexpress 2014).  
The ANPs, including the FN, have developed a media strategy in which they 
present themselves as representatives of the true people against the elite, a 
definitively populist line of action. Not only is the elite represented as inhabited 
by post-national global citizens, who are removed from the people, and have 
little affinity for parochial notions of national identity; they are perceived as 
paradoxically, repressively liberal. With the ANPs they appear very resentful, 
feeling that elites are ostracising those who disagree with them on issues 
around identity, or attacking an ‘ordinary public’ with laws created to ensure the 
perpetuation of a multicultural society (e.g. Laws against religious vilification, 
discrimination).  
This tweet by MLP is indicative of her support of a figure, with a reactionary 
and nationalist posture in some senses, whose treatment is interpreted as an 
example of elite repression in the professional sphere. Zemmour is by no 
means a marginal figure in the French media, himself a journalist, as well as a 
polemicist, with his book being a publishing sensation. In this sense he frames 
himself as a threat to the elites and is repressed accordingly. Like Zemmour, 
MLP skilfully uses provocation and populist rhetoric. This allows them both to 
challenge those elites they represent as responsible for the parlous state of 
affairs (e.g. terrorism, conflict with some Muslim communities, unemployment, 
economic insecurity, increasing wealth inequality), and take the position of 
martyr when their provocations are responded to by cultural or judicial ‘elites’. 
In this sense they can set agendas and create strategic sympathy against an 
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unpopular government. The prevailing left liberal social construct, in 
conjunction with neoliberal economics on the capitalist right, is not providing 
the results for some French who look for the root causes of their 
dissatisfaction, and for viable alternatives. Intelligent and capable foes of those 
represented as the core of this paradigm, portray themselves as defenders of 
the people – in an almost Robin Hood like sense. This media strategy seems 
only to magnify their support considering Zemmour’s books sales (Lexpress 
2014) and MLP’s polling results (Taylor 2015). 
Professional journalists are among those who perceive a closing-off of open 
debate, and read it as a problem for democratic politics, lending some support 
to the view taken by ANPs. In an interview, Lorenzo Consoli (2013), a veteran 
correspondent at the EU media centre in  Brussels for Italian news service TM 
news, described widespread concern over the rise of Islamism, which was not 
being meaningfully dealt with by established politicians, and as such, this 
created a political opportunity structure for ANPs. He also reported that 
amongst citizens generally there was a need for views to be heard, and that 
the taboos around issues described as ‘politically incorrect’ had led to an 
uncomfortable vacuum, which would be filled by parties and social movements 
like the case study subjects. Geoff Meade (2013), an ex-journalist and now 
media trainer at Brussels concurred. He said that it was essential for all voices 
to be heard, and that debates needed to be had, less suppressed issues might 
fester and lead to deviant behaviour. All of the journalists interviewed (Consoli 
2013; Meade 2013; Petersen 2013; van Walsum 2013), considered the liberal 
journalistic tenet of reporting all newsworthy topics, was crucial considering the 
issues at hand, which may make people uncomfortable, but were of great 
public interest and importance.  
 
6.8.2 Vlaams Belang 1 
Paul Belien – The Brussels Journal: Vlaams Belang Goes to Washington Date 
First Published: 13.02.2007 Date First Accessed: 12.10.09  
http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1900 
The Brussels Journal, founded in 2005, was one of the earlier Web logs –blogs 
- featuring traditionalist conservatives, and nativist perspectives set up as a 
means to overcome the lack of supportive media and opportunities to publish. 
The journal was founded by Paul Belien, and is produced in both Dutch and 
English. Belien’s wife, Alexandra Colen, was formerly a party secretary of the 
VB. This article, though published in 2007, is still relevant as the VB still keeps 
essentially the same trajectory, with perhaps even more emphasis on 
countering Islamism and immigration, rather than Flemish separatism. The 
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article is essentially a brief introduction to the party in English, heavily framed 
in terms of ethnic conflict, and the political impact that immigrants have on the 
native populations (Walloons and Flemings, but particularly the latter). The 
party discusses the cordon sanitaire and the hostility to the VB displayed by 
other parties, including pressure that forces the party to re-form. 
This following quote is telling of the concerns over demographics on the future 
of ANPs, as they must have citizens who identify as natives to maintain 
themselves and grow politically. As nativist parties, particularly secessionist 
parties, it suits their political purposes to maintain a high of percentage of their 
own ethnie in the general population, as they are their only natural voters. 
Concern about being overwhelmed by immigrants hostile to the ethno nation is 
a well-developed theme in the media output and public utterances of the ANPs. 
“The party does realise, however, that its ability to keep winning 
elections depends on demographics. Its electoral potential will 
decline when the number of indigenous voters goes down. The 
Vlaams Belang was the only party in last October’s local elections 
that did not put forward Muslim candidates. 
“In Antwerp, Flanders’ largest city, it won 33.5% of the vote, 
compared to 33.0% in 2000. This may look like a small gain, but it is 
significant since the demographic makeup of Belgium’s cities is 
rapidly and dramatically changing. The municipality of Antwerp has 
half a million inhabitants. Every year on average 4000 indigenous 
Flemings move out of Antwerp, while 5000 immigrants settle there. 
Most immigrants are Muslims. These people do not vote for a party 
that has no Muslims on its list, that opposes multiculturalism and 
demands that immigrants assimilate and respect the values of their 
host country.” 
Such a presentation of facts to a native population, who may be concerned, is 
one method of outreach, and may be particularly effective to that part of the 
native population most impacted by the mass immigration, the more 
economically challenged. As noted by Philip Claeys MEP, interviewed by the 
researcher (24.09.13), many of the middle and upper class Flemish nationalists 
have switched to the N-VA, providing the VB a narrower working class 
constituency, and they are the “first victims” of mass immigration according to 
Claeys (2013). In this case they may well be more responsive to ‘tabloid’ media 
content, and the relatively provocative and hard line stance the VB has taken, 
to differentiate themselves from the N-VA may. This trend stands to solidify but 
limit their prospective voter base.  
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6.8.3 Dansk Folkeparti 1 
Katherine Dunn – The Local Sweden: Danish Love Refugees Flee to Sweden 
Date First Published: 09.14.11 Date First Accessed: 13.12.14 
http://www.thelocal.se/20110914/36128 
When interviewed for this project the members of the DF (Espersen 
2013a; Espersen 2013b; Vistisen 2013) were keen to point out differences 
between the media in Denmark, which they considered liberal, and Sweden, 
which they considered deeply biased and politicised towards a left liberal 
position. They concluded there was no reasonable debate about identity, mass 
immigration or multiculturalism in Sweden. According to Mrs. Yvette Espersen 
(Espersen 2013b) the DF are the reason why Denmark does not have the 
same level of crime, and problems with integration. They are able to offer a 
voice to the debate, which is accepted in Denmark, while being rigorously 
suppressed in Sweden.  
Yvette Espersen reports the most significant impact of the DF during their 
support of the Rasmussen government of Denmark, giving it a parliamentary 
majority, was their impact on the immigration policy, deemed to have become 
the most stringent in the EU (Espersen 2013a; Espersen 2013b; Vistisen 
2013). She reported the DF was able to communicate the power of its 
influence, and that a vote for the DF was not wasted. The impact of the law 
was contentious, deeply appreciated by their own supporters, and prospective 
voters concerned about mass immigration. Although not explicitly excluding 
Muslims, the DF inspired legislation was implicitly designed to keep Muslims 
out of Denmark (Reimann 2011). The issue was publicised in terms of 
economic savings, which are of particular interest to the DFs core supporter 
group, older working class and small business Danes, who are concerned 
about limited welfare budgets.  
The brother party of the DF, the Sweden Democrats, produced an 
advertisement, which was banned. It developed the media strategy to a richly 
symbolic level, provided a strong indication of who their prospective voters 
were, and illuminated the fears they might have. The advertisement 
(Sweden_Democrats 2010) depicts a group of cold bureaucrats counting out 
the welfare budget, as a senior Swedish woman on a walking frame begins to 
make her way to the counter for her pension. She is overwhelmed by a 
plethora of niqab-clad women charging towards the welfare office with prams. 
There is the targeted, express provocation in conjunction with a message 
aimed at a particular demographic, common for the ANPs, an ideal message 
for the insurgent phase. The notion that native Europeans are being 
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overwhelmed with mass immigration, frames the issue as a threat to the 
nation, and its vulnerable citizens 
 
Fig 13 Sweden Democrats Ad: Pensioner Being Chased Down by Burqa Clad 
Mothers 
Date Published on This YouTube Source: 27.08.10 Date First Accessed 20.10.14 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pumIT31qqQQ 
 
6.8.4 Bloc Identitaire1 
Liberation - Amos Reichman: Le Remigration des Identitaires aux Portes du 
FN (The Remigration of the Identitairians to the FN’s Doors) Date First 
Published: 18.11.14 Date First Accessed 19.11.14 
http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2014/11/18/la-remigration-des-identitaires-
aux-portes-du-fn_1145502 
Liberation (8 900 000 daily hits and the 358th most popular French website 
according to similarweb.com on 20.05.15) was originally a paper of the radical 
left, but is now approximately social democratic in its tone. In this sense it is 
inevitably hostile to the positions of the BI and FN. The selected article is 
significant as it discusses a BI sponsored event on remigration; the forced 
repatriation of all immigrants legally on French soil, with a particular emphasis 
on Muslims. Amongst the speakers at the event was the previously mentioned 
intellectual Guillame Faye, who writes about the demographic threat, and the 
writer Renaud Camus. The article proceeds to link the BI to the FN, and 
suggests there are still some within the FN who are willing to engage with the 
relatively radical BI, though MLP has an ambivalent view. 
Of particular interest to the media strategy of the BI is the role of Renaud 
Camus. Camus is a gay author, somewhat reclusive, who aside from his 
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considerable literary output has developed and publicised the Grande 
Réplacement  (GR), an issue, which has been adopted by the BI. The notion 
behind the GR is that in a very brief space of time, immigrants are systemically 
replacing the native French, principally from outside Europe, and most often 
Muslim. Though individually a sophisticated man, Camus does develop a 
notion that is intrinsically populist. According to Camus the GR is an elite led 
phenomenon; both of the new left and the neoliberal right, in which there is a 
conscious effort to de-culturise, and to disaffiliate native people, rooted in 
history and environment, so as to afford the new global capitalist feudalism – 
creating a worker and consumer without deep affiliation to people or place.  
Ethno nationalists often define themselves as occupying a third position, as 
they are neither socialists nor capitalists. At a 2012 FN rally, the crowd 
chanted, “neither left, or right” and, “this is our home, this is our country” 
(Chrisafis 2012). In this sense they are concerned by the notion of 
rootlessness. They perceive and present mass immigration, particularly from 
areas with considerable religio-cultural difference, as causing a ‘forced’ 
acceptance of these differences as ‘tolerance’, and anti-racism, while in fact 
the French nation as they would know it is being replaced. This would entail 
the loss of identity for those French of the ‘old stock’, and in this sense break 
ethnic solidarity and historical continuity, in order to produce worker/consumer 
units with no sense of belonging or enduring identity. The new consumer 
citizen would fill the void with the superficial pleasures of an atomised 
capitalism. 
 
Although themselves beyond the appeal of the general ‘tabloid’ audience, 
intellectuals like Camus provide a foundation for media production. BI founder 
and president, Fabrice Robert (2013), sees his organisation as a populariser of 
such ideas. In this view the BI activists are spreading the relatively dense ideas 
of sympathetic intellectuals into posters and memes to appeal to a broad 
audience. They expect that ideally they will be drawing in new members, or at 
least putting out ideas and setting agendas.  
 
 
6.8.5 Demography and Welfare: Conclusion 
Underlying concerns over demographic changes in Western Europe expressed 
by authors such as Camus and Ye’or are demonstrative of concerns about 
immigration becoming a process of colonisation, principally by Islamic 
populations. In this scenario there is concern the extant European ethnies will 
be overwhelmed by large numbers of immigrants from Islamic countries, in a 
political context where Islamist movements are resurgent, and may be 
188 
 
attractive to a percentage of Muslim immigrant populations and their 
descendants. This concern is amplified by the relative low birth rates of native 
populations in Western Europe. 
The supporters of the ANPs tend to be from working class and lower middle 
class native populations. Considering their socioeconomic circumstance they 
are potentially the most challenged by large immigrant populations in both the 
cultural and economic sense. These concerns will be inevitably represented by 
the ANPs in the hope of garnering support from socio demographic groups 
who consider themselves unrepresented by centrist parties, in an absence also 
of social movements to support them. 
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6.9 Mosques: ‘Our Minarets are Our Bayonets’  
“The mosques are our barracks, 
The domes our helmets, 
The minarets our bayonets, 
And the faithful our soldiers…” 
 
- President Recep Erdogan of Turkey 
 
The victory of the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei (Swiss People’s Party – 
SVP), in their referendum against new minaret construction was an indication 
of the importance of political advertising and issue framing in their defence of 
the perception of the nation (von Rohr 2009). The image of the mosque, along 
with the burqa/niqab are the two most visible symbols of Islam in Europe and 
have featured heavily in media campaigns and public utterances by 
spokespersons. Campaigns against mosques are prevalent aspects of the 
media strategy of parties and social movements, as a visible and permanent 
symbol of Islam in Europe. Their construction represents the spread of Islam, 
and according to those who rally against them, provides strong evidence of the 
Islamisation of Europe. 
Aside from the physical presence of mosques, they are also represented as 
memetic vectors for the spread of Islam, and cultural centres around which 
Muslims will inevitably locate themselves. There is also considerable concern 
about the funding of mosques, and the training of those leading prayers and 
offering sermons within them. This focuses on those from the Gulf States, such 
as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who advocate literalist strains of Islam, and 
promote them with oil wealth. Here they are framed as vectors disseminating 
an Islamism deeply hostile to European norms, not unlike, in former times, 
perceptions of the spread of communism in some intellectual and trade union 
circles. The protests against mosques by the ANPs have been both street 
protests and provocative public utterances, which have attracted a 
considerable degree of media attention. Amongst the most prevalent is MLP’s 
comment that the street prayers of Muslims in Paris are analogous to the 3rd 
Reich’s occupation.  
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6.9.1 FN1 
FN 1 Non a Islamisme: Le Jeunes avec LE PEN (No to Islamism: the Youth 
are with Le Pen) Date First Accessed: 09.10.13 
http://www.ithaca.edu/rhp/programs/cmd/blogs/posters_and_election_propaga
nda/tags/front_national/ 
 
Fig 14. Front National Poster for the 2010 Election Date First Uploaded: 15.03. 10 Date First 
Accessed: 09.10.13  
From observations made during the field work in France it is apparent that the 
tradition of political bill boarding is still prevalent, with many of the walls in 
public spaces replete with posters, and advertising on public space 
demonstrates ownership of issues. Political advertising of this kind condenses 
what it would take many words to convey into a stark and readily apparent 
message. This image was developed under JMLP’s presidency, and 
considering the process of modernisation undergone by the FN since MLP’s 
leadership began, it is quite possible the image would not be replicated today.  
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Fig 15 Alexander Segert’s Original Design for the Swiss People’s Party Anti-Minarets 
Campaign http://www.pi-news.net/2011/10/islamhetze-vorwurf-segert-freigesprochen/ 
The image is based on the poster design produced for the Swiss People’s 
Party (SVP) by designer Alexander Segert (Wysling 2011). It is the defining 
image of the contemporary ‘counter-jihad movement’, and has been replicated 
by other anti-Islamist movements aside from the FN, including the German 
National Democratic Party (NPD), which draws heavily on ideas and symbols 
associated with Nazism, much like Jobbik or Golden Dawn. The FN’s variant 
explicitly expresses two of the concerns evident in the original: over an 
overwhelming demographic force of Islamists, and the alien nature of the faith 
as evidenced by the image of the burqa clad figure. But unlike the original they 
offer a third issue for concern: the take-over of France by Algerian Muslims, 
hence use of the Algerian flag. These three elements define key visible 
concerns of the ANPs as discussed in the literature review related to Islamic 
mass immigration into France – and easily understood in a moment. As 
Mazzoleni (2008), has argued, in the insurgent phase the ANPs are principally 
interested in attracting attention via provocation. Both the original and the 
subsequent variations were noteworthy in the bold fashion in which they dealt 
with contentious issues. Over time as noted by interviewees, Yves Camus 
(2013) and Ludovic de Danne (2013), there has been a reorientation towards 
Islamism during its increasing salience, particularly in the 1990s, with an added 
emphasis on increased acts of terrorism.  
MLP’s public utterance regarding the prevalence of Muslims engaging in street 
prayers was of considerable media interest – and her framing of the issue is 
indicative of major refocusing. The utterance, its significant media coverage, 
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and the subsequent loss of legal immunity decided by the EU serves a number 
of functions for the MLP and the FN. As part of her programme of 
dediabolisation she has defined Nazism as a distinctly negative and anti-
French phenomenon; she has sought to frame Islam as a totalitarian occupying 
regime (and therefore deeply deviant); she has gotten an immense amount of 
media coverage, and the EU actions allow her to frame herself as being 
repressed by an institution not popular with extant or prospective supporters. 
The utterance was at the Lyon conference of her party (Davies 2012, 46), prior 
to the vote between Bruno Gollnisch and herself for party leadership, and as 
such she framed herself as a candidate as potentially media centric as her 
father, in provocative public pronunciations, while publicly displaying an 
awareness of the limits of what was acceptable to appeal to prospective voters.  
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6.9.2 Vlaams Belang  
Reuters – Published on the tabloid newsite, hln.be: Vlaams Belang Lanceert 
Internetspiel Minder, Minder, Minder (Vlaams Belang Release the Internet 
Game, “Less, Less, Less”) Date First Published: 28.04.14 Date First Accessed: 
10.10.14  
http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/17781/Regeringsvorming/article/detail/1867425/2014/0
4/28/Vlaams-Belang-lanceert-internetspel-Minder-minder-minder.dhtml 
http://filipdewinter.be/mmm/ 
Geert Wilders, is perhaps the most vociferous and radical in his criticism of 
Islam (he does not separate Islam from Islamism, but does separate Islam 
from Muslims) among electorally successful ANPs. In a speech in March 2014 
his audience chanted “less, less, less”, in regards to the number of Moroccans 
in the country. It was a significant tonal jump as religion is generally considered 
a reasonable target for criticism, while attacks on ethnies or racial groups have 
generally not been. 
 
Fig. 16 Screenshot from “Minder, Minder, Minder” featuring a mosque with minarets, a 
Muslim on a carpet, and a criminal, from Filip Dewinter’s personal website 
(filipdewinter.be first accessed: 08.08.2014) 
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Wilder’s contentious utterance inspired the VB to release a flash video game of 
the same name, “Minder, Minder, Minder.” The flash game attached to 
Dewinter’s personal website essentially involves swatting criminals, Muslims 
(cartoon character with turban, scimitar on a magic carpet), and minarets. The 
game design is not particularly advanced, and has limited production values.  
The ‘minder’ (meaning ‘less’ in Dutch) in this instance refers to less 
immigration, fewer Muslims and less criminality. This consciously provocative 
game may be amusing for young supporters of the VB, and possibly the 
mature aged as well, but it serves a greater purpose of attracting media 
attention over the issue. The more provocations, whether mosque protests, or   
bikini girls in burqas/niqabs, the more coverage the VB will receive and the 
more it will ‘own’ the issue of mass immigration in Flanders.  
The more base and lowbrow these media efforts are the more likely they are to 
see extant and prospective voters move towards the alternative party the N-
VA, while retaining a cohort of ‘hardcore’ supporters, intensely focused on the 
issue of mass immigration and Islamism. Whether the party can manage to 
develop concerns around Islamism in Flanders into an electoral renaissance is 
likely to be dependent not so much on core supporters, but rather on 
broadening their appeal and taking votes back from the N-VA. Whether the 
tone of the media product increases electoral support, in the future, when it has 
not in the immediate past remains to be seen, and the outcome will be 
determined by the intersection of current affairs as they relate to Islamism, and 
the trajectory of the party as it stands.  
 
 
6.9.3 Dansk Folkeparti 
The Economist: Of Mosques and Meat: Denmark’s Largest Minority Gets its 
First Proper Prayer House Date First Published 17.08.13 Date First Accessed 
07.07.14 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21583660-denmarks-largest-religious-
minority-gets-its-first-proper-prayer-house-mosques-and-meat 
The Economist is a news magazine / web site aimed at well-educated people 
in business and politics. Its editorial tone tends towards neoliberalism and 
globalisation, and in this sense it is adverse towards the ANPs. This article 
focuses on the issues around the construction of a large mosque in 
Copenhagen, of which the DF will feature. The article features two areas of 
concern, the first being the construction of such a large mosque, and the 
second the mosque’s source of funding: Qatar. 
Perhaps in the light of success of the SVP’s referendum on the banning of 
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minarets, the DF wants to provide citizens with a similar option in the building 
of ‘mega-mosques.’ To highlight the banning of a mosque the DF placed 
advertisements in a number of newspapers asking for such a referendum. The 
advertisements featured a picture of the Turkish blue mosque with crossed 
scimitars above them (Rasmussen 2012). This approach by the DF is 
indicative of a broader media strategy commonly employed by the ANPs. The 
party frames itself as ‘authentically democratic’, by the demands for a 
referendum against an issue with perceived salience for the DF’s supporter 
base or prospective supporters, while demonstrating a level of provocation to 
its political opponents so as to receive repudiation. In this sense they define 
themselves as a party that defends ‘the people’ against ‘elites’, by offering 
those who are opposed to a visible Islam a flag to rally around, while proving 
concerns that the strain of Islam being supported and preached will reflect the 
Qatari sponsors version. The DF party leader, Kristian Thule Dahl, developed 
the concern over the literalist strain. On the party blog he foreshadows conflict 
over the ideas emanating from a Qatari sponsored mosque, and associates it 
with the Muslim Brotherhood. The DF is able to frame both the issue as a 
visible sign of Islam in Europe, and a vector of the potential ‘insidiousness’ of 
Islamism as a contrast to liberal Scandinavian values.  
 
6.9.4 Bloc Identitaire 
France 24 – Ben McPartland: France’s Racism Watchdogs Demand Action 
After Mosque Stormed Date First Published: 10.10.13 Date First Accessed: 
03.07.14 
http://www.france24.com/en/20121021-french-anti-racism-campaigners-
demand-ban-far-right-groups-mosque-islam-poitiers-charles-martel/ 
The occupation of the Poitiers Mosque by Generation Identitaire (GI) activists 
was indicative of the agit-prop strategies engaged in by the BI/GI. This illegal 
protest was the most radical of the Identitarians’ actions and succeeded in 
receiving national and international coverage. The article is from, France 24, 
the French equivalent of the BBC, which tends to be tonally neutral. Poitiers is 
the place where the Frankish king, Charles “the Hammer” Martel, had a victory 
against a Moorish force, pushing them back into Spain. It is considered as a 
significant event, and marked the limit of Moorish expansion into Europe. The 
732 displayed on the GI’s banner is the year it occurred. For nativists the event 
is symbolically considered as a terminal event, defining the limits of penetration 
into Europe by the Moorish forces, which had demonstrated a capacity and 
intention to go further. 
This occupation provided an opportunity for the GI to frame itself as a non-
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violent radical youth movement. They frame themselves as non-violent and 
activist, by engaging in spectacles of nativist civil disobedience that will cause 
media coverage, set their agendas and ideally attract support, but without 
egregious vandalism or street fighting. In this sense the GI consciously 
replicate the strategies of Greenpeace (Robert 2013).  The occupation led to 
the arrest of the activist leadership by the gendarmes, and they were 
subsequently tried.  The trial is ongoing. 
The mediatised historicisation of conflict is a key aspect of the Identitarians so 
as to frame their struggle in a continuing, enduring sense. According to Robert 
(2013) the GI activists had alerted journalists that there was a spectacle 
planned so they could receive the appropriate media coverage before the 
event occurred, ensuring widespread coverage before police could stop the 
protest. The GI, like MLP with her referendum proposal for the death penalty, 
and the call for a referendum on mosque construction by the DF, works 
towards the framing of the ANPs as populist. They frame themselves as giving 
citizens a chance to decide on immigration, which they know is statistically 
unpopular at a time of recession, with concerns about Islamists being the most 
significant problem identified in that zone. This ‘extra’ democratic approach is 
part of the rhetorical toolbox that assists the ANPs in establishing a populist 
legitimacy – as defenders of the people against those ‘elites’ remote from their 
day to day struggle. 
 
Though unverifiable, Robert (2013) reports there was a significant jump in the 
number of memberships and general interest in the party, which led to a 
particular spurt in growth for the movement at the time of this instance of 
agitprop. As a youth orientated social movement, the GI can afford to engage 
in such acts of provocation. As the strategy goes, once they have attracted 
enough media attention, the provocations can decrease and adopt a milder, 
less confronting tone.  
 
6.9.5 Mosques Conclusion 
As the visible focal point of Muslim communities, and the memetic vector of a 
diverse array of Islamic thought, including Salafism, as well as more liberal 
strains, the place of mosques in Western Europe may be contentious, 
particularly when they produce radicals and jihadists. Just as they prove a focal 
point for Muslims, they prove a potential focal point of protest for the ANPs, as 
a stationary and apparent symbol, as they see it, of the expansion of an alien, 
and often enough hostile creed at odds with contemporary Western European 
life.  
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SECTION 7: Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
The conclusion of this research was marked by the assassination of staff at 
Charlie Hebdo, a tragic bookend to the thesis. A focused attack by Islamist 
jihadists on an iconoclastically left media hub heighten the contest of frames 
and counter frames offered by the ANPs and their opponents. The ANPs’ 
opponents viewed the terrorist jihadists as an aberration, condemned the act 
rigorously, yet held to an understanding that Islam overall is a ‘religion of 
peace’. The ANPs had no such compunction, and remain likely to continue 
developing frames that suggest Islam overall is incompatible with the ‘West’, 
(though individually there may be space for a moderate, relatively secular 
‘Western’ Islam, accommodating to contemporary European norms as 
perceived by the ANPs). These media strategies will develop over time as new 
instances arise, bringing the issues discussed into tight focus, and currently 
prevalent themes look set to evolve in the media strategy of the ANPs.  
This conclusion section considered the literature, the fieldwork including 
interviews and the review of articles. The interviews and articles were 
understood within the theoretical foundations of the thesis: the highly influential 
referent, Mudde (2007; Mudde 2004; Mudde 2010, 2009; Mudde 2011; Mudde 
2013a; Mudde 2013b; Mudde 2014b, 2014a), Hallin’s (1986) work on 
perception management and journalism in the media, and Entman’s work on 
framing (1993, 2007). The conclusion examined the themes extracted in the 
discussion in accord with the research question. The work was a qualitatively 
researched academic study of an issue with essential mass and social media 
aspects. As such it did not have empirical claims, though it is evidence based 
and analytical in approach, with empirical data used as support where 
pertinent.  
The research was unique in that it used interviews of the party family 
members, activists, area academics, and journalists as a key input into the 
thesis.  As far as is known, this research is the only such material that used 
interviews as a method for collecting data about the ANPs’ media strategy at a 
time when the media and Islam in Europe is of increasing global significance.  
The ANPs researched made progress in electoral contests, with alternating 
gains and losses, but overall they consolidated their position as an ongoing 
parliamentary presence. They have made strong progress in their campaign for 
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dissolving the taboo that surrounds them, to varying degrees in different 
contexts. In this way they became increasingly palatable to publics over time, 
used voter intention polls and electoral results as a metric (McDonald Gibson 
2014). Of the three political parties used as case study subjects both the FN 
and the DF have continued to increase their organisational strength and 
electoral support, while the VB has fallen behind the liberal-conservative 
upstart N-VA – viewed by Philip Claeys MEP (2013) as playing ‘dog whistle’ 
politics with issues that the VB is willing to address directly, such as immigrant 
criminality. (The research would suggest the forthright approach of the VB may 
have been too direct for growth, its party leadership maybe seen among the 
public as activists rather than politicians.) 
Under MLP the FN had further established itself as a force. By 2002 JMLP 
before her had trumped an unpopular Socialist Party government, getting 
through to the second round of voting against the conservative leader Jacques 
Chirac. In 2014 the FN, with his daughter as leader, became the front-running 
party in the popular vote, with 24.86% and 23 seats in elections to the 
European Parliament (European_Parliament 2014b); in 2015 that continued, 
with similar results in 43 of 98 Councils in Departmental elections. There the 
party encountered a ‘lock-out’ effect in the electoral system, excluded in ‘run-
off’ votes between two leading candidates, the more centrist parties directing 
voter support to each other. It nevertheless had a large increase to obtain 220 
out of 4108 departmental seats. It has two seats in the 577 member National 
Assembly, seen as a break-through against the voting system. (One of the 
members is Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, niece of the party leader, the other a 
lawyer, Gilbert Collard). All opinion polls in late 2015 had it retaining its lead 
position in the popular vote. 
The DF also has made significant gains under a new leader, Thulesen Dahl, 
with the DF, like the FN in France ‘winning’ the 2014 European Parliament 
elections (European_Parliament 2014b). The DF scored an exceptional result 
in the 2015 national elections receiving 21.1% of the vote, only beaten by the 
Social Democrats with 26.6%. It raised its allocation of seats from 22 to 37 in 
the 179 member house becoming the second largest party. 
Other members of the party family such as the Sweden Democrats, Wilder’s 
Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the northern Italian Lega Nord, the 
Swiss People’s Party and the Austrian Freedom Party appeared to be 
entrenched in the political environment of their respective nations. They were 
at the very least a strong political force, often enough a viable party of 
government in coalitions, or in support of a coalition, or leaders of the 
government itself at a province or local level. With the intensification of the 
refugee crisis from the Middle East and Africa, and continuing political tension 
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over economic issues surrounding the EU, they are positioned to be an 
influential force into the immediate future. It is the perception of the 
interviewees for this study that the media efforts of the parties have been 
crucial to their reconfiguring of themselves in the public mind, so as to be 
considered a reasonable choice to meet contemporary challenges, by a large 
percentage of the voting public - whereas in the mid-1980s they had been 
largely peripheral actors. 
The research comes at a point when the party family broadly is at a ‘tipping 
point’, with the growth of a political zeitgeist that is supportive of their broad 
thrust by an increasing number of voters in most of Europe. This research 
considers the ANPs’ own efforts in the media field to be a contributing factor to 
the development of that zeitgeist - though hardly quantifiable for reasons 
covered in the previous sections and highlighted in this. 
As noted in the introduction Mudde (2007) points out that there was a dearth of 
research related to supply side factors – those factors which the ANPs have 
under their control like media strategy. This thesis contributed to addressing 
this lack. The conclusion elaborated in the following sub-sections points to a 
party family (and thematically associated anti-Islamist social movements) that 
evolved to be increasingly palatable to popular opinion. This occurred at a 
point of confluence with a range of key issues in the European political 
environment of which sovereignty, mass immigration and Islam in Europe were 
the most significant, and were exaggerated compared to current economic 
woes on the continent. The degree of prescience and political sensitivity 
displayed in the evolution of this iteration of Western European nationalism is 
considerable in the successful instances dealt with here. 
It is the conclusion of this research that the ANPs have generally successfully 
transitioned to be parties supported by a growing portion of the populace.  
Where parties of this type have not been successful there has been a social 
movement or party that tends to address the same issues in an implicit (e.g. 
UKIP) or extreme (e.g. Golden Dawn) sense. The British example is notable, 
based on the sudden rise of the EDL, and the success of the libertarian 
populist UKIP, finding political and social popularity instead of a viable ANP. In 
Italy the Lega Nord, one of the earliest and most successful of the ANPs was 
interested in separating northern Italy (Padania in their terms) from the rest of 
Italy, while the fascist inspired social movement, Casa Pound (Pound House, 
named after the famous American modernist poet, and fascist sympathizer, 
Ezra Pound) engaged with the issues at a street level in Rome. 
 
The organisational, programmatic, and heavily media-centric change enacted 
in this iteration of European nationalism has demonstrated that the parties and 
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social movements that have undergone an evolutionary metamorphosis, 
freeing them from the taint of WWII, have had success. In some circles, 
however, the ANPs remain highly controversial.  The beliefs of the ANPs 
shifted from the sphere of deviance into the spheres of legitimate contest and 
consensus - enough for a significant portion of the population to vote for them. 
Of course the degree of this transition depends on time, place and audience, 
but those voters wanting to restrict immigration and challenge overt 
assertiveness on the part of sections of the Muslim community, had found a 
group of viable parties they could turn to. Those parties at the same time were 
themselves engaged in a process of professionalisation, moderation and 
modernisation. This evolution of nationalist parties and social movements has 
converged with external factors as previously discussed (for example, an 
economic situation, perceived EU democratic deficit, acts of Islamist terrorism, 
examples of Islamist brutality outside of Europe such as Boko Haram and 
Islamic State), to form a potent combination of supply and demand factors. In a 
sense this thesis provides a map of the evolution of the ANPs and their own 
strategizing and expression of it through media.  
With the strong commitment to populist democracy (which is expressed in calls 
for direct democracy and referenda) the ANPs differentiate themselves from 
the racial imperialism of the Nazis and their vassal states (e.g. Ustashe, Vichy), 
and this difference was expressed heavily in the media strategy of the ANPs. 
Nativism was presented as essentially a defensive response to the perceived 
threat of an internal non-native enemy (in this case Islam and Muslims, though 
this is often more nuanced with the threat being Salafists, radicals, terrorists, 
while there is acceptance of ‘moderate’ Muslims). The tone is not racial, but 
rather cultural and religious: historical European nations can rightly defend 
themselves against perceived alien and hostile cultures and creeds. That these 
immigrant groups seen as hostile have entered the country legally adds to the 
populist notion that they have been admitted by remote elites.  
Traditional Islam is in many ways conservative in comparison with the social 
liberalism apparent in most of Western Europe. Hence the ANPs ‘nationalised’ 
aspects of liberalism so as to make the division between Islam and Western 
norms more pronounced in their output; as an example, issues like gender 
segregation at swimming pools, comparative approaches to female modesty 
and the treatment of gay citizens. The interviewees who were party members 
and activists commented they had not been interviewed by academics 
previously. They found the interviews novel and the material provides new 
insights into their media strategy specifically, and broader party outlook and 
organisation more generally, helping to fill the research space regarding the 
supply side issues. 
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The following sub-sections respond to the research question by reporting how 
the ANPs generally, and the case study subjects specifically developed their 
media strategy to assist them in spreading their message in order to gain 
popularity. The principal conclusion is that the successful ANPs who do have 
some historical association with the extreme nationalism of the 20th Century 
have evolved into democratic populist parties that do not follow the same 
program as neo-fascist parties like Golden Dawn. It was posited that such 
parties failed in Western Europe because of the terrible events associated with 
that political orientation in the public mind. This democratic populist argument 
became increasingly compelling and accentuated with ever-increasing wealth 
disparities between elites and the masses. 
 
7.2 Defining the New Nationalism 
There were several issues that the ANPs engaged with to ensure growth in a 
climate that remains difficult but was no longer intractably hostile to their 
program. These principally revolved around concern about mass non-
European immigration into the continent and the related issue of national 
sovereignty as it relates to the EU, (i.e. can a national government ever 
circumvent EU legislation on migration?). As discussed, the principal drive was 
towards mainstreaming, so as to break through taboos surrounding nationalism 
in Western Europe related to the mass death and tyranny caused by extreme 
nationalists in the early and mid 20th Century. These taboos were previously 
maintained by what the ANPs almost universally experience as a hostile 
established media. The reality of the degree of continuity between the extreme 
nationalists and the ANPs depended on individual parties and social 
movements at any given point in time. The research agreed with Mudde’s 
position that the ANPs are a new class of parties. It is not productive or 
enlightening just to continue to consider them as crypto fascist. 
It is worth noting that the fascist movements of the period 1920-45 had no 
patience for ‘mainstreaming’ or legitimising activity. Their totalitarianism was 
tonally and ideologically anti-democratic, pitched towards hysteria, street 
violence and war, in the throes of the unresolved continental conflict, the Great 
Depression and the deep trauma left in the wake of WWI. It was open to huge 
distortions in an economic and social crisis, much of the rank and file derived 
from generations of bereft and brutalised ex-soldiers. The identity politics of 
that tumultuous era could focus on an array of represented enemies: 
communists, Jews and homosexuals, the Western allies who had won the war 
(and the perceived lack of Italian gains from their part in the war against the 
Central Powers), and crucially the Bolsheviks in Russia. 
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The animus of the defeated and aggrieved made reference to strong 
intellectual fashions: extreme historical theories, apocalyptic ideas, nostalgia 
for a grander past, nationalistic mythologies brewed up in the disorientating 
decades of the industrial revolution and formation of the nation-states. Those 
preceded the fascist political movements but encouraged them to excess. The 
ANPs of the late 20th and early 21st Century, were products of the ‘post-war’ 
era of a general peace, democracy, prosperity and extended opportunities for 
individuals, since 1945. (See Judt 2006 on ‘Postwar’ peace and prosperity, and 
the new generations). The ANPs are not fascist parties, though they are 
nationalists of a kind, and this is expressed in their media strategy.          
The experience with mass media followed similar lines. The fascist movements 
produced spectacles of many kinds and once in government both censored the 
press and commandeered the early radio networks. The effort was reckless, 
driven by ideology rather than any sophisticated knowledge or appreciation of 
audience behaviours. The radio was heavily used by publics and in the 
absence of opposition commentary or neutral sources of information, might 
have been highly persuasive. That would be more so where the ‘product’ was 
propitious (e.g. where the policies of the regime were successful in producing 
work for workers, or in militarily defeating a neighbouring, potentially hostile 
state). Mass media was ‘few-to-many’, with very few channels, and there was 
an immediate past history of tight government control in the broadcast sector, 
even under democratic governments. Yet queries would have to be raised 
about the persuasiveness of the crude content – long political harangues, 
programs abusing Jewish or other victims. Once contradicted by the fact of 
allied air raids, hunger and invasion, once the ‘product’ being sold was fully 
identified, and broken, the media content would be devalued.   
The restraint and sophistication of the contemporary movement, and its 
essential differences to historical fascism, are reflected in its media product: 
they exploited chances in the ‘many-to-many’ environment created by new 
media, carefully crafting media inputs to develop issues favoured by certain 
mainstream outlets, published on line on its own account, applying a rational 
interpretation to opinion polls and worked to realisable goals within a 
democratic framework, while their issues are becoming central.  
As for the overlap between the ANPs and some of the themes evident in the 
programme, and media output of the extreme, violent, and extra democratic 
nationalists in the first half of the 20th Century; both are nationalists, though of 
a different kind, with different expressions in a different environment, exhibited 
different concerns, and a different programme for contending with them. Part of 
the thrust of the media strategies of the ANPs is to highlight these differences; 
to make themselves appealing to supporters, extant and potential, by avoiding 
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linkage to deviant political positions, and by taking up contemporary issues 
they perceive as being ignored by the centrist parties. Thus, the campaign for 
transition of the ANPs was understood to have effected organisational change, 
and then extended the appeal to publics through established and self-
produced media. The approach demonstrated they were able to navigate 
contemporary concerns or taboos, working incrementally, neither placing 
themselves in a position of deviance, nor letting themselves be defined as 
affiliates of ‘Establishment elites’.  
The media output of the ANPs and their actions regarding their coverage in the 
mainstream media is pivotal in their efforts at moving towards power in 
contemporary Western Europe. The ANPs are intrinsically newsworthy. They 
are contrarian and combative, and conflict is a news value that will drew media 
attention. Nevertheless they accepted the need to engage in perception 
management related to key issues so as to ensure they are considered as 
filling a space of legitimate political concern, one shown as ignored or glossed 
over by other parties. In this sense the ANPs who wished to improve their 
prospects moved to the centre from the periphery, while the centre moved 
towards them, e.g. the popularity of the FN added impetus towards the centrist 
parties who engaged much more with issues like mass immigration, security 
and identity. 
The media strategies utilised by the ANPs, specifically in relation to the issue 
of Islamism, Islam and Muslims in Western Europe are key in their attempts at 
getting themselves defined in the public mind. They were keen to present 
themselves as the ‘people’s’ saviour from ‘elite’ led centrists. They built up a 
construct, and campaigned for consensus over economic globalisation, and 
rejection of Islam (or specifically rejection of Islamism in some cases), decrying 
the former as a process of destroying national economies and the ‘nation’, via 
outsourcing jobs to low labour cost countries, and conversely admitting large 
numbers of immigrants. Many of those migrants were then represented as 
culturally hostile to established norms by a subset of the population most open 
to the message of the ANPs. 
  
7.3 Defensive Posture of the ANPs’ 
The new authoritarian, nativist and populist parties adopted a different posture 
on the point of aggression, representing their stance as actually a defence of 
culture and society. They might be blunt and rude at times, with supporters not 
adverse to contention, but to date have emphatically held back on questions of 
systematic violence and war. Definitions of fascism are diverse, but always 
must deal with violence. For the purposes of the research there was a 
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particular interest in the popular understanding of varieties of fascism. These 
‘fascisms’ had a number of salient features: (i) intensely militaristic and 
nationalistic, (ii) there is a sense of national decay and a call for palingenesis, 
(iii) biological racism and a strong tendency towards anti-Semitism (not so 
apparent in Italian fascism but a core element of Nazism and allied movements 
e.g. Croatian Ustashe, Romanian Iron Guard), (iv) a strong focus on the 
‘glories’ of the past, (v) totalitarian, profoundly anti-democratic and elitist (with 
the formation of new power elites, or co-optation of rogue elements from the 
old Establishment), (vi) imperialist, (vii) adverse to liberalism, communism, 
conservatism, (viii) a tendency to generate mass political movements, (ix) the 
state is above capital, and wholly centralised, while the state and the nation are 
one, and class struggle is managed via corporatism (Goodwin 2011; Griffin 
1995; Griffiths and Griffiths 2005; Nolte 1965; Payne 1995; Spruce 2007). 
From the above list of factors common among the fascisms it is apparent the 
ANPs overlapped to varying degrees on certain points, however minor, but are 
plainly opposed on others. They would be too disingenuous if this opposition 
and denial involved a large scale concealment of their true motives, although 
they will inevitably be charged with that by political opponents, as they are a 
current iteration of Western European nationalism.  
 
Presenting their position as being an evolution, moderation and modernisation, 
to potentially and currently sympathetic publics, is a viable strategy for the 
ANPs, as they denied a fascist identity and represented themselves as 
committed to democracy. Violent associates were excluded from the ANP 
parties, as they are from established parties. In foreign policy they have 
rejected military involvements, for example the Western venture into Iraq. 
Anders Vistisen MEP (2013) did support the Danish contingent in Afghanistan, 
but saw it as Denmark falling in with the Allies defeating Nazis in WWII. De 
Danne (2013) reported in his interview the FN rejected the NATO war in accord 
with the independent French foreign policy in the Gaullist tradition, though his 
party supported the engagement against Jihadis in Mali, due to historical and 
colonial ties and the broader contest with violent Islamists. The VB and BI 
concentrated on internal security issues related to Islamists within their 
respective nations. The BI president, Fabrice Robert (2013) opted for the 
position that Muslims as such were acceptable while in historically Muslim 
lands – evoking the rigorous separation of ‘civilisations’. Where there is a main 
theme, it is that the ANPs saw themselves as defensive patriots and not 
imperialists, as ‘holding the line’ in a world where new powers, like China, India 
or Brazil are on the rise.  
All of the interviewees from the parties and the social movement renounced 
racism and anti-Semitism, and the current research was unable to uncover any 
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official media content evoking the classic, biological racism. There was an 
actual philo-Semitism, drawing from the Israel-Palestine conflict and the issue 
of anti-Semitism within Europe among Muslim immigrant populations and their 
descendants (Gerstenfeld 2013). As manifestations, the DF expressed public 
support for Israel and the Danish Jewish community; MLP has defined herself 
as a defender of French Jews against Islamists; Filip Dewinter of the VB 
travelled on a friendship visit to Israel. What emerged from the media 
messages of ANPs, is a ‘culturism’, whereby certain cultures, specifically 
conservative Islamic cultures, are depicted as a poor fit for Western Europe 
due to innate incompatibility. Culturalism will be addressed in a following 
section (7.6).  
On economic policy, the ANPs again opted for a form of protectionism. In the 
French case against change that is represented by neoliberalism and 
globalisation; understood as being against the broad interests of French 
citizenry, while being a boon for globalist elites (Chassany and Khalaf 2015). 
Like all iterations of nationalists, most pointedly the fascists, there was a call 
for a palingenesis, but it was principally put forward as a defensive proposition, 
a claim for revival aimed against neoliberal capitalism, Islamism and the ‘anti-
democratic’ bureaucracy of the EU. The FN spokesperson, de Danne (2013) 
reported that he understood the process of globalisation as inevitable, but 
there would need to be better ways to navigate it to maximise the benefit to the 
French people, rather than acquiesce to the selfish vision of globalist elites.  
 
7.4 Authority, Populism and Participation 
Populism is a defining feature of the party family, with the effectiveness of 
direct democracy apparent in the victory of the Swiss People’s Party minarets 
ban and having the number of immigrants limited. The parties have responded 
to the appeal of ‘applying numbers’ on preferred issues, where a following can 
be built up, and where the electoral system does not limit the gains, (as with 
the large multi-member constituencies of the European Parliament which do 
allow for small parties to get delegations elected).   
In the economic debate they offered a programme supporting a mixed 
economy and the welfare state, in opposition to the global market, seeing it as 
impossible to maintain quality of life for Europeans by competing with low wage 
exporters like China. Likewise small businesses were seen as in need of help 
when competing with economies of scale obtained by the transnational 
corporations. When discussing the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement 
(TAFTA) MLP described a situation where, “the world is in the hands of 
multinational corporations and large international finance” (Russia_Today 
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2015).  
Here, in the case of the DF, the interviewee and party president, Soren 
Espersen (Espersen 2013a) stated that his party had been taking more votes 
from the social democrats than the centre right, because of its positioning of 
itself as a party for the everyday Dane, not a wealthy elite. The ANPs were not 
driven predominantly by economic thinking. Leaders and adherents alike 
routinely bring the discussion, and the ideological construct back to ethnicity or 
national identity. In an article in the DF newsmagazine, the former party leader 
and founder, Pia Kjaersgaard, suggested the party should move its focus to 
employment and economic issues, rather than purely immigration, with the 
onset of the global financial crisis (2013). It did remain plain to see, how the 
issues would be inter-linked, with resentment against large numbers of Muslim 
refugees, as competitors for jobs and claimants on a strained welfare budget. 
 
7.5 The ‘Nationalisation’ of Western European Liberalism 
The ANPs wanted their role to be seen representing the best traditions of 
Western societies, offering a critique that will lead to restorative government. 
They did not want to be perpetual outsiders and critics. This is illustrated by the 
rise of the movement in the Netherlands, both pitched against immigration, and 
in step with characteristic liberal social values of contemporary Dutch society 
(e.g. support for gay rights). Interviewed for this research the opinion editor for 
the Dutch broadsheet (quality) newspaper Volksrant (the People’s Voice, 
generally liberal-left in editorial tone), Sander van Walsum (van Walsum 2013) 
said the gay, flamboyant sociologist, Pim Fortuyn, had been crucial to the 
opening up of an acceptable criticism of Islamism in Western Europe. Due to 
Fortuyn’s intelligence, charisma and his outsider status as coming from a 
sexual minority, he was able to discuss illiberalism of Islamism without being 
completely ostracised from society, and denied media attention. He was able 
to raise this salient issue in such a way as to considerably alter the political 
environment, until his assassination by an animal rights activist who was 
concerned about his rise. According to van Walsum, Geert Wilders who 
followed on, lacked the wit, charisma and intelligence of Fortuyn, but was able 
to tap into deep frustration felt by many Dutch citizens around the issue of 
mass immigration and Islam in the Netherlands. That came to be expressed in 
electoral polls regularly giving 10-15% to the Wilders party. 
Fortuyn and Wilders demonstrated a capacity to break through taboos, the 
rules of ‘political correctness’ as these are disparagingly termed throughout the 
‘Anglosphere’, where, as it is seen, influence of elites may push core issues of 
the ANP into the sphere of deviance. In such a case the dissidents can both 
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criticise and start to remake society through taking over aspects of a prevailing 
liberalism, positioning themselves as defenders of native and civilisational 
freedoms against a new tyranny. It was strategic to effect a nationalisation and 
civilisationalist adaptation of certain progressive views, which conflicted with 
traditional Islamism, notably those that focused on rights of women and 
punishment for homosexual behaviour.  
Maintaining a pattern of dissidence of that kind can be a contortion.  For parties 
like the FN and VB it represented a challenge, as party stalwarts are often 
intractably socially conservative. Party leaders therefore sought to offer policies 
that did not go to extremes, neither of conservative repression nor liberal 
largesse, but rather, made for a safe, reasonable place; for example where civil 
unions are accepted and there is no punishment for homosexuality – held up 
against the deadly punishments mandated by Islamist theocracies. The 
solution attempted amounts to a reorientation away from rigidity, in a zone 
between the extreme social conservatism of Islamists, and strong liberalism of 
modern left wing parties. Claeys (2013) said he recognised a seeming irony 
where a socially conservative party like his would support the safety of gays 
from attack by ‘Muslim immigrant’ gangs. MLP did not join the massive street 
marches against the legalisation of gay marriage in France in 2014, though the 
Bloc Identitaire did.  
The management of dissent had the intention of transforming the political 
movement, from an amalgam of dissidents, to a coherent nativist and populist 
political formation, and offered a viable party of government. The parties 
jettison deviant notions, and never adopted them if they are newer parties (e.g. 
the DF). In France, the irascible Jean-Marie Le Pen, father of the FN as well as 
of Marine, has been publicly chastised over outbursts of ‘Jew baiting’. His 
daughter’s victory in winning the party leadership in a vote of members, 
defeating Bruno Gollnisch, a traditionalist Catholic and member of the party 
Old Guard, 68-32% (Moffett 2011), was indicative of an understanding the 
party needed to adapt, as well as the leadership qualities of MLP. An authority 
on the FN, Camus (2013) endorsed the notion of generational change within 
the FN; that while some people in the party may still harbour fascist views, 
members of the new generation had no time for such ideas, and they were not 
even fully cognisant of that period in history. There is no appetite for jackboots 
and coups d’états.  
 
7.6 ‘Culturalism’ 
The case study subjects projected an idea perhaps best defined as 
‘culturalism’, as opposed to racism. When focused on the difference between 
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European norms and Islam, Muslims are not criticised for being racially inferior, 
but rather for adhering to a religio-political ideology that if not denounced as 
inferior to those of the West, is certainly cast as incompatible in many areas.  
The differentiation principally served to separate advocates of discrimination, 
from those believing in innately different biological characteristics (subscribers 
to racialism), to those who argued for the incompatibility of different peoples in 
geographic proximity, due to behavioural traits attributed to a broad culture.  
The use of culturalism as a media tool is demonstrated by its ubiquity in the 
ANP party family; a heavily used line of argument. All of the case study 
subjects and other members of the party family (e.g. Swiss People’s Party, 
Lega Nord, Austrian Freedom Party) and social movements (e.g. EDL, Pegida, 
BI), deny they are racist, while they asserted that their respective historic 
nations may be overwhelmed by Muslim immigrant groups, in some instances 
hostile, at odds with perceived European, national, and in some cases regional 
norms. They argued for a general ND ‘right to difference’, and specifically for 
protection from Islamism and its tenets, characterized as mutually exclusive 
with their own.  
In terms of symbolism or the aesthetics of culturalism entailed in making 
political impressions, the BI was the most radical of the case study subjects. 
The youth arm of these identitarians, Generation Identitaire, had annual camps 
in which self-defence methods were taught and practiced (kickboxing, mixed 
martial arts), and it organised vigilante public defence groups on public 
transport. The principal strategy of the BI was to cause initial media interest in 
itself through provocation, non-violent protest, or stunts and spectacles.  As in 
the illustration (Fig. 17), bands of young men, said they are affronted over the 
penetration of Halal cooking into the national cuisine, wore pig masks to, ‘in 
turn’ affront Muslims. In this sense they were militant, though all their efforts 
were made to put the activity into a frame of ethno-regionalism, European 
confederalism, and localism of the identitarians. A portfolio of media materials 
produced and published by the BI movement, and perused for this research, 
stops short of any biologically racist or stereotypical depictions - no caricatures 
of Arabs, Berbers or Africans were apparent. 
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Fig 17 BI protest ‘March of the Pigs’ (http://www.fdesouche.com/189150-lyon-ils-
reviennent first published 24.03.11, first accessed 20.10.13) 
The BI president, Fabrice Robert (Robert 2013), transitioned from being a 
revolutionary militant to a position expressed in terms of ethno-regionalism and 
civilisationalism, was indicative of evolutionary shifts in broad nativist thinking. 
The organisation was “100% identity, 0% racist”, he said at interview; calling to 
mind new ethnopluralist master frames (Rydgren 2005), which decry ideas of 
racial superiority and rely instead on the notions of ‘difference’. The BI as 
ethno-regionalists saw Islamism as legitimate ‘in its place’ but continued to 
regard it as an historical enemy of Europe (Robert 2013). On a similar theme of 
more moderate, the DF represented a more flexible version of the ‘culturalist’ 
stance, through not insisting that historical differences are irreconcilable: 
immigrants are ‘acceptable’ if they assimilated into established Danish culture 
(Espersen 2013b).    
One incident in the Netherlands illustrated the way that blatantly focusing on a 
racial or community group, can see the parties placed in the ‘deviant’ sphere 
with subsequent political damage evident. This was the response to a move by 
Geert Wilders, among the most ardent and vociferous of the anti-Islamic 
leaders in Western Europe, to change his rhetoric from concerns about 
Islamism as a political ideology, to specifically identify and pillory Moroccan 
immigrants, reaping criticism and framing him as deviant (Criado 2014). Taking 
exception to the ideology, (Islamic doctrine and social teaching on faith and 
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morals, freedom and authority), as opposed to attacking members of a 
targeted community, was seen by many as more within the sphere of deviance.  
The following images, one from the late fascist era, and one from a 
contemporary ANP are demonstrative of the tonal change in representations of 
perceived political threats by non-Europeans. The wartime Italian poster (Fig 
18) offers a lurid treatment of the still-active theme of cultural desecration by 
outsiders, though contemporary propaganda by ANP groups concentrates on 
behavioural or stylistic difference rather than notions of race, and for the 
reasons outlined above would avoid the overtly racialist caricature of the black 
American soldier.  
 
.  
 
Fig 18 Gino Boccasile Late War Italian Propaganda Art with Heavily Caricatured 
African-American Soldier 
(http://longstreet.typepad.com/thesciencebookstore/2011/09/jf-enlist-in-the-italian-ss-
legions-get-rid-of-the-germans.html) 
The images of the shadowy figure wearing the burqa, in the poster from a 
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campaign in Austria (Fig. 19) and of Joan of Arc, deployed by the FN (Fig. 20) 
represent two main propositions. For the ANPs the image of the burqa/niqab 
became, perhaps along with the terrorist and the mosque, the prevailing 
symbol of an Islamisation of Europe; held up as a symbol of repression and 
alienation, and possibly as a threat because of fears over what might be 
hidden. It has proven a highly contentious political subject, with the bans in 
France and Belgium, providing a contrast with relaxed, non-uniform, often 
revealing dress standards in vogue and most-widely accepted throughout 
Europe. The target in this campaign, again, is Islamisation, no specific country 
or community. In the following image, Joan of Arc, in fact burnt at the stake as 
a Witch in 1431, has survived as a revered cultural and patriotic symbol; the 
girl soldier who rallied the French, claiming divine inspiration, and ensuring 
their deliverance. The story and persona of Joan of Arc, for many is still a 
warm recollection from childhood, and plainly intended to be seen as a cultural 
matter reserved for the ‘true-French’. It was as if to say, where the sad and 
menacing burqa belongs to ‘them’, the inspirational and liberating Joan of Arc 
belongs to ‘us’. 
     
 
 
Fig 19. This picture features an Austrian Freedom Party meeting on Islamisation. The 
graphic in the background is an evolution on the poster developed by Alexander 
Segert for the SVP (http://www.doorbraak.eu/posteractie-tegen-wilders-en-zijn-best-
friends-forever-bff-doe-mee-2/ accessed 20.05.15) 
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Fig 20 ‘No to Brussels, Yes to France’, MLP in front of an image of Joan of Arc. 
(http://www.gettyimages.com.au/detail/news-photo/frances-far-right-national-front-
leader-marine-le-pen-news-photo/487595759 first published 01.04.14 first accessed 
10.10.14) 
The ANPs like the other political families addressed their messages mostly to 
existing followers and potential recruits. To take in the ‘other side’ in this 
discussion, would have the study attempt to anatomise many and 
fundamentally different media operations, (e.g. the corporate, ‘Establishment’ 
press, or Jihadist propagandists on line). One counterpoint to the above 
observations, and a reminder that they form one aspect of an ongoing 
psychological contest, is provided by the final image (fig. 21).  
As the ANP leadership was well aware, they are set against large numbers of 
opponents. Those opponents had other and diverse political preoccupations: 
ecology, human rights, or expansion of industry and commerce. As an example 
of the impacts of change, an FN poster (Fig 21) adopted as a model the 
‘liberated’ figure of a young black French woman, complaining that both left 
and right wing politics have “broken everything: rights of nationality, 
assimilation, social advancement and secularism”. (The artefact is in fact from 
a ‘poster-arts war’, with the FN and Young Socialists putting up the same 
design, using a different version of text).  
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Fig 21. FN poster circa the 2007 presidential election; they have broken everything. 
(http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/elections-2007/20061215.OBS3130/le-mjs-
detourne-les-affichesdu-front-national.html First published 26.12.2006 First Accessed 
03.07.2013) 
 
7.7 Politicking, Politics and Populism 
No political campaign defines its own terms, due to the factor of a disruptive, 
contradicting opposition to the message, especially in a society undergoing 
rapid change, which will complicate the ways in which the message is received 
and the set of understandings motivating it. Work on the ANPs by Bos, der 
Brug and de Vrees (2011) makes that point, identifying clear similarities 
between those parties and their centrist opponents; though the situation is 
evolving, they are part of the new normal. In this sense, the resort to a heavy 
concentration on media, by parties and social movements working to establish 
themselves is recognisable as orthodox politicking and was universally 
understood to be a key aspect of growth and maintenance. The phenomenon 
of the charismatic leader was seen as a variant; flamboyant and challenging, a 
getter of attention, yet in the end, another politician (Bos, Van Der Brug and de 
Vreese 2011, 27): 
“The only thing that distinguishes right-wing populist leaders 
from others is their strategy in gaining media attention: their 
populist style resonates with media logic and does not put off 
voters. However, that certain parties use different media 
strategies does not make them intrinsically different than any 
other party with regard to their relationship with voters. In other 
words, right-wing populist parties are not in a league of their 
own, as is often assumed… Right wing populists, besides being 
extraordinary (in order to be newsworthy), also have to try to 
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appear as normal’ as possible by elaborating on their 
viewpoints.” 
That point has been referenced in this study to Hallin’s (1986) 
paradigm, describing the efforts of the parties to remove themselves 
from the field of perception of deviancy. They have been most 
vociferous in resenting and denouncing the Cordon Sanitaire 
proclaimed in the Low Countries, because, highly dangerous to their 
cause, it declared they were illegitimate and rightfully denied a serious 
hearing. In their drive to be moderate and modernise it was important 
for them to be seen as legitimate expressions of reasonable issues 
ignored by established parties.  
At each step, and to that end the ANPs have presented themselves, 
with their populist appeal, as actually the most democratic of all 
parties. This has seen agitation against the European Union, 
represented as a supranational authority, a creature of ‘elitist’, ‘cartel’ 
parties in power that might be blamed for stress in the economy. It was 
seen the attack on immigration and Islam, a field of massive 
opportunity where the party outlook on life, culture and society comes 
together with the burning issue of the present times.   
The two strands of thought were in fact drawn together. If all the main parties, 
centre-left to centre-right, were seen as too similar to one another, governed by 
the educated and wealthy, then in any crisis they would be made to pay the 
price of incumbency. Elites running the major parties in government were 
blamed for unemployment, a credit squeeze, for problems with immigration 
policy and ethnic disturbances in the suburbs. The ideas were easily mixed in 
order to construct arguments (e.g. that elite interests will generate immigration 
to create a surplus of cheap labour and overwhelm poorer native communities 
where most of the immigrants tend to settle. It was crucial for the ANPs never 
to seem reserved and elitist, but to emphasise the homegrown, grounded and 
populist approach, as campaigns over ethnicity and religion were not genteel. 
 
7.8 Islam and Islamism as the Issue 
The parties’ media content focused on the activities of literalist Islamists and 
extreme Jihadists, as the most confronting of problems associated with mass 
immigration. Activist Islamists are conscious ‘out’ groups, not participating in 
the conventions of national life, but rather practicing an oppositional version of 
Islam within Europe, within self-isolated or marginalized communities. The very 
small numbers of terrorists associated engage in violence against the state and 
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citizenry that add to their newsworthiness. Polemics against jihadists 
emphasised this dynamic, of separateness and rejection of Western ways. 
High Muslim immigration has been taking place as Islamism is undergoing a 
political renaissance, with some of the Gulf States acting as memetic hubs and 
sources of funding. This puritan Islamist resurgence is referred to as Salafism, 
or sometimes derogatively as Wahhabism (the official orientation of Saudi 
Arabia). Salafists are not necessarily jihadists; they may have no direct political 
involvements and engage in forming quietist communities.   
Hallin’s (1986) paradigm once more helps to explain the actions of ANPs in 
exploiting the Islamist-cum-immigration issue. They can be seen as following 
the practice of seeking to reframe various salient issues, traditionally ‘sanitised’ 
or ‘taboo’ topics in post World War II Western Europe, like racial conflict. With 
Islamism and immigration as the focus, the parties sought to drive transactions 
over the issue out of the sphere of deviance, into the sphere of controversy 
(satisfying its need for legitimacy), then ideally into the sphere of consensus, 
(showing the issue has ‘arrived’ as a discursive civic concern, where the party 
itself will be in a leading position) - essentially a process of mainstreaming.  
The diagram below, (fig. 22) turns the process around to show a scheme of 
perceptions that ANP leaderships wanted to establish, where for example, the 
posits and declarations of radical, or reactionary Islamists were relegated to 
deviant status, the assumptions and politics of multiculturalism were 
recommitted for debate and adjudication in the sphere of controversy, and 
freedom of speech was maintained as a consensual value, though presumably 
to be interpreted as operating with a loosening of legal constraints on speech 
about ethnicity, immigrants and religion. The particular scheme was geared to 
what the parties might hope to achieve on a national level.  
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Fig. 22 The Media Thrust of the ANPs’ Dediabolisation Process & Their Portrayal of 
Islamism Using Hallin’s 1986 Schema 
 
7.9 Conclusion, Potential Lines of Further Research and Postscript 
The research for this project set out to investigate the engagement of the 
authoritarian, nativist and populist group of political parties, or social 
movements, with mass media and social media. It addressed a question as to 
what media strategies were being applied, in accordance with the ANPs’ 
characteristics. The inquiry was drawn out of observations that the ANPs had 
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become increasingly prominent in a fairly short time, usually within the last 30 
years, to achieve significant gains on indicators such as electoral support and 
growing inclusion and influence within the media debate. Media use and media 
attention was highly important to these groups, which have had the ambivalent 
status both of disruptive elements challenging settled norms, and of 
newsworthy participants in public debate. How did the media aspect work and 
how important would it be? A growing media presence, and legitimisation of 
ANPs in coverage of politics, as represented in this study, suggested the 
media effort was a strong contributing factor in the ANPs’ growth; getting them 
recognition, attention, and more sympathetic understanding in parts of society. 
It enabled them to represent themselves, and be seen as a rallying point where 
there was a major issue running to their advantage, like Islamic migration. The 
fact of progress being made in terms of voter support and some involvement in 
government coalitions, has raised the possibility the ANPs were close to the 
centre of significant, ongoing structural change in politics, and not transient or 
highly marginalised, but rather worthy of serious study. It may in fact become 
the centre, but such speculation, though worthy of investigation is beyond the 
remit of this research. 
The approach was to take the movement under review at ‘face value’ - without 
preliminary analyses of its underlying foundations and motivations. It was 
transparent enough as a movement operating in democratic systems, with 
publicly declared objectives, policies, operations and intentions laid out plainly, 
to make it amenable for study in the same way as other parties, and in some 
cases social movements. This openness and accessibility of information 
enforced the impression that mass communication, whether in the use of mass 
media, or social media, or self-publishing, would be at the heart of the 
enterprise. The methodology employed has been to make a detailed review of 
actual media products in these categories, in the context of an extensive 
literature on the ANPs, and their communication practices, and to conduct case 
studies based on three parties and one social movement, located in Denmark, 
Belgium/Flanders and France, involving a field trip to visit leading figures and 
spokespersons for extensive interviews.  
The parties have invested heavily in their rejection of mass immigration into 
Europe, from Islamic countries particularly, and in opposing radical Islam. They 
have consistent backing from opinion polls demonstrating public concern over 
Islamic, and Islamist penetration into Europe (Poushter 2015). That field of 
policy dominates in their media presence and has gained them enlarged and 
widened public support, continuing acrimony and condemnation in political 
contests, and a stronger, more regularised media profile.  
In analysis of the information obtained, conclusions have been made as to the 
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dynamics of media in relation to the four case study subjects, and to political 
discourse generally. These affirm that despite a disdainful early reception from 
journalists virtually across the board, break-throughs were made, especially 
because of the newsworthiness of the ANP activities. In this sense professional 
journalistic concerns won out over bad opinion that the media community may 
have had towards the suspect outsiders. The ANPs provided news. Their 
campaigns transferred them into the mainstream – via modernisation and 
moderation – making them more acceptable; moving ‘their’ issues, wherever 
possible, out of the sphere of deviance.  
The deviance ‘framework’ has been an unavoidable part of this account. Are 
these political parties and social movements Nazis or fascists in other garb? 
Whereas the research accepted the movement as an object for study it has 
comprehensively addressed that leading question about the movement. The 
definition of these parties ascertained from Mudde, the scholar interviewed for 
this study, naming them as authoritarian, nativist and populist, has grounded 
the research, and provided a measure for addressing the fascism question: 
how do the two groups of parties – historical fascists and the ANPs - compare? 
Fascist ideology thought of the nation as one people, would exclude all 
‘others’, was exceptionally racist in attitudes towards Jews and non-whites, and 
denied an existence to its victims even in their own lands, sending its agents 
there for systematic murder and plunder. The ANP parties espouse none of the 
policies of racial violence. They aver that compatible minorities should be 
made welcome in European states, and that other ‘nations’ including Islamists 
should be left unmolested in their ancestral territories. They shifted away from 
notorious brands of fascism like anti-Semitism, and in cultural terms would 
relegate the fascist episode to the dustbin of history, actively pointing to their 
own acceptance of rights, tolerance, democratic forms and legality, as citizens 
of a new era.  
Populism and authoritarianism had a tug-o-war in determining the democratic 
bona fides of ANPs. Some parties were initially viewed as direct successors to 
the authoritarian fascist regimes because of the carry-over of certain members, 
political themes, aesthetics, and surviving occasional outbreaks of overt 
racism. There was the psychological dimension, of nurturing and stressing the 
national cultural or racial identity, poor tolerance of others, and determination 
to advance, defend or avenge it. They continued in that vein to some degree, 
most obviously acting bold with the rejection of Islamic immigration. Where 
they have brought up a policy for a complete end to immigration (the FN), or 
ending immigration for Muslims only (the DF), these policies have become the 
strongest indication of any serious intent to go to an extreme.  
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A repatriation policy might be called populist if it has broad support among the 
public, as a blunt and obvious solution to a large problem. Fascism permitted 
no civil society, nor open debate, nor political opposition. The ANPs propose a 
wholesome and well-mediatised populism, and even progressive adjustment to 
new social mores, e.g. support for campaigns over at least discursive, if not 
consensual initiatives like gay rights. They have welcomed participatory 
initiatives like the anti-minaret vote in Switzerland. The program may offend as 
many, or more people than it inspires, but the intention is to persuade rather 
than intimidate and strike fear.  
With the ANPs as authoritarians, it is as yet authoritarianism mostly in intent, 
and by name. They have signalled and realised an interest in using 
parliaments and following lawful processes, and of continuing in the 
consultative, populist tradition; doers, providing voters with quick and practical 
solutions. However they do have strong policy declarations, like withdrawal 
from the EU or the end of immigration. This creates a situation which contains 
seeds of trouble because attempts by governments to implement sweeping 
policies, intended to make or control structural changes in society, will likely 
generate bitter resistance. In a familiar pattern affecting governments left and 
right, an imagined ANP government in a country such as France would stand 
to be destabilised attempting to implement its publicised program. A possible 
trajectory is the resort to a pattern of compromise and incremental change 
followed by the centrists main parties. The authoritarian, nativist and populist 
parties see their rise, on the back of the campaign over immigration and 
Islamism, taking them towards government. The insurgency is complete in 
many cases and the process of stabilisation and growth has began in earnest. 
There is a considerable array of areas for possible further research. Similar 
studies could be performed on the political opponents of the groups, whether 
radical Islamist organisations and their media strategy, (notoriously social 
media campaigns to enlist young Muslims with Islamic State or the extension 
of terror video coverage of executions), or perhaps more pointedly the 
representation of the ANPs by the political parties that are their established 
enemies, the current centre of politics. Other areas of research worthy of 
pursuit include a period of being ‘embedded’ with party or social movement 
activists around significant events, such as elections or protests. 
For the researcher the ideal continuation of the line of enquiry would be a 
comparative study of the nativist formations with Islam-critical elements on a 
global level. This would take the form of an embedded reportage with parties or 
other organisations across continents. Examples would be with the BI or FN in 
France, with a Hindu nationalist organisation in India, with a Christian/Animist 
organisation in Africa, and with Buddhist nationalists in Thailand or Burma. 
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The Digital Crusades has focused on the ANPs: their leaders, members, 
supporters and media strategy. Essential to their core motivation is the 
continuation of their nations and European civilisation, as they perceive those 
to be. As a way of understanding the ANPs it may help to think in terms of 
nostalgia. Nostalgia is a crucial tool in political advertising and can be 
considered part of the attraction of the ANPs. It is not coincidental that Joan of 
Arc, Charles Martel and Holger Dansk feature in their communication. It can be 
understood there is a paradox in that the ANPs used cutting edge media 
technologies and are strong in the field of social media, while simultaneously 
calling on fond images of a time of relative ethnic homogeneity, settled 
community, security and full employment as part of their characterisation of 
national life prior to the accelerated changes of the post WWII era. 
 
The ANPs offered an organised platform for ideas, policies, activism and 
electioneering to move towards that end. They considered the main threats to 
the nation to be all globalising ideologies including neoliberalism, socialism and 
Islamism, and were eager to highlight where these ideologies coalesce. For 
instance, mass immigration of Muslims into Western Europe were represented 
as serving the purposes of the ‘liberal left’ who were supportive of diversity and 
averse to ethnic homogeneity, neoliberals who were eager for an expanded 
labour force so there is competition amongst workers, and the Islamists looking 
to expand their religio-political ideology. In this context and arrayed against a 
group of powerful enemies they considered mutually supporting, they were 
determined to maintain national and European identities in light of the process 
of globalisation. 
 
As the party family is the current iteration of nationalism in Western Europe, it 
serves their political enemies to frame them as the heirs of fascism, whilst it 
serves their purposes to distance themselves as far from parties and social 
movements of that type as possible. They have evolved as parties and social 
movements, certainly in the case of all the case study subjects, and have 
represented that evolution heavily in their media efforts. Their intention was to 
firm themselves in the public mind as popular, democratic, representative and 
protective of national and European civilisation as they see it, without being 
deviantly racist warmongers. This has led to a circumstance where they have 
evolved into parties and social movements that are ‘in tune’ with a current 
populist zeitgeist from which they benefit and have been instrumental in 
creating. They have done this in part by developing salient interdependent 
issues that for long remained largely free of criticism by other political parties 
and social movements: Islam, mass immigration and national sovereignty. 
These are all issues, which they perceive and portray as destructive of the 
national community of the historical populations of Europe. 
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7.9.1 Postscript 
The events that followed the conclusion of the work: the massacre at Charlie 
Hebdo, the Paris shootings, the refugee crisis and the assaults in Cologne on 
New Year’s Eve have further highlighted the importance of Islam in Europe as 
an issue, with the tightly intertwined issues of mass immigration and terrorism. 
All the aforementioned issues have led to massive media coverage and 
provided exceptional opportunities for the ANPs to capitalise on extant and 
growing concerns. The ANPs have forewarned of such concerns with an 
enduring history of pessimism towards multiculturalism and mass immigration, 
specifically large populations of Muslims. They are well placed to make political 
gains themselves and influence established parties. 
 
When doing background research the lack of a viable ANP in Germany was 
apparent. This was of course related to the huge historical burden of Nazism, a 
public and government deeply averse to anything resembling fascism. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union there was a rise in the number of overt fascists 
clearly drawing on an ugly past. The migration crisis, and bitter debate over the 
welcoming of one million refugees into Germany last year, has produced big 
gains in membership and voter support, in state elections, of the emergent 
Alternative für Deutschland .  For the researcher, the rise of this party, which 
fits the ANP and not the neo-fascist mould, is a crucial episode in European 
politics. It defines the moment when the historical weight of Nazism and its 
association with non-fascist nationalism was overcome, at least with a portion 
of the population significant enough to concern the centre parties. The 
mainstreaming of a German ANP can be viewed as the end of a near 
European wide process of the moderation and modernisation of Western 
European nationalism. With recent developments the party family will likely 
only become of increasing significance.  
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